1. Understanding the Niger Delta Context (2005-2007)
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria has been a hotspot of conflict for decades, particularly intensifying between 2005 and 2007. A report from the International Business Times in 2015 highlighted the pervasive violence, kidnappings for ransom, and ongoing clashes between militant groups and the Nigerian military that have plagued the area since the early 2000s. This unrest is further corroborated by a 2007 Human Rights Watch report detailing the proliferation of militias and gangs. These groups established camps in the Niger Delta creeks, engaging in illicit activities like oil bunkering, bank robberies, and street battles, notably in Port Harcourt. The BBC reported in June 2007 that the volatile situation had led to the hostage-taking of over 100 foreigners in just six months, with ransoms frequently secured for their release.
Risk Intelligence, in a 2016 analysis, traced the fragmentation of a nascent Niger Delta insurgency in 2003-2004 and 2006. This period saw the emergence of various militant factions, often warring amongst themselves, yet united by a shared animosity towards the Nigerian government. These initial years set the stage for the emergence of key figures and groups that would shape the conflict landscape in the Niger Delta.
2. The Resurgence of Militancy and Current Volatility
Despite periods of relative calm, the Niger Delta has witnessed a resurgence of militant activities. Freedom House pointed to this renewed militancy as early as 2016. Risk Intelligence’s 2016 report further elaborated on this, noting the rise of new groups or the increased activity of existing ones in 2015 and 2016. This escalation was linked to President Buhari’s policies, including reductions in amnesty payments, cancellation of security contracts with former militants, and the indictment of ex-militant leader Tompolo. These factors, combined with underlying socio-economic issues, created conditions mirroring the volatile periods of 2003/4 and 2006. An assistant professor at the University of Alberta, with extensive research experience in the Niger Delta, confirmed this, highlighting the Buhari administration’s heavy-handed approach in late 2015 and 2016 as exacerbating the situation. While the region experienced a lull in insurgent activities post-2017, the assistant professor emphasized that the Niger Delta remains fundamentally volatile and unpredictable, indicating the underlying tensions are far from resolved.
3. John Togo and the Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF)
3.1 Foundation and Leadership of John Togo
The Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF) emerged in 2005, a period of significant upheaval in the region. Multiple sources confirm that John Togo was the founder and leader of this militant group. Also known as John Ipoko, John Togo quickly became a prominent figure in the Niger Delta conflict. A 2015 article in IBTimes described him as “one of the most well-known warlords” operating in the region. This Day, a Nigerian newspaper, characterized Togo in a June 2016 article as “notorious on the waterways in both Bayelsa and Delta States,” infamous for robberies and violence. John Togo’s reign as a militant leader was cut short in 2011 when he was killed in a Nigerian air force bombing, as reported by both This Day and IBTimes.
3.2 Successors and Internal Conflicts After Togo’s Death
Following John Togo’s death in 2011, the NDLF faced leadership transitions and internal strife. Vanguard, another Nigerian newspaper, reported in 2012 that “General” Peter Dolo-Ebiowei, Togo’s second-in-command, assumed leadership. The group, according to Vanguard, preferred to be called “Voice of John Togo,” indicating their intention to continue Togo’s objectives in the Niger Delta. However, leadership disputes soon arose. By 2013, Vanguard reported that Asi Eniegbolokumor had replaced Peter Doloebiowei as leader, though Doloebiowei’s faction contested this change, claiming he remained in charge. A statement endorsing Eniegbolokumor was reportedly co-signed by other NDLF “leaders,” including Commanders Asi Eniegbolokumo, Adobo Ozidi, Ogbowei Allah, and Jerome Demebide. IBTimes further noted the internal violence within the NDLF in 2013, stemming from competing leadership claims. Mark Anthony was identified by several sources, including Sahara Reporters and Vanguard, as the [former] spokesperson for the NDLF, providing a consistent point of contact for media and communications during the group’s active period.
3.3 Operational Locations and Group Size
John Togo’s operational base was primarily within the states of Bayelsa and Delta, as reported by This Day. The Assistant Professor at the University of Alberta further specified Delta State as the main area of operation, extending to other parts of the Niger Delta, including Bayelsa and Rivers states. Stratfor pinpointed Ayakoromo in Delta state as the likely location of the NDLF’s main base camp in 2010. Benjamin Okonofua, Executive Director of the African Center for Conflict Transformation (ACCT), explained that John Togo primarily recruited Ijaw members from cult-gangs in areas around Warri, extending to Okrika, Ogodobiri, and Ayakoromo. It is widely documented that Niger Delta militant groups are predominantly composed of Ijaw people.
A senior lecturer at Federal University Lafia in Nigeria indicated the NDLF’s operational areas shifted over time, initially being active in Port Harcourt and later in Warri, with significant activity in Warri between 2005 and 2007. At its peak in late 2010 and 2011, the NDLF maintained multiple camps, according to the Assistant Professor. These camps, as described by the Senior Lecturer, were substantial, capable of housing up to 1,000 or more individuals, situated away from urban centers, deep within the mangrove swamps. Members would typically reside in these camps during the week, returning to towns and cities on weekends. The Senior Lecturer estimated the NDLF’s membership at approximately 4,000 at its inception, decreasing to around 2,500 by 2011, suggesting a considerable scale of operation during its most active years.
3.4 Aims and Objectives of the NDLF under John Togo
In a December 2010 interview with Sahara Reporters, John Togo articulated his group’s goals. These included the “disarmament” and withdrawal of Nigerian government soldiers from several villages: Ayankoromo, Amasomo, Obokiri, and Igbo areas. Beyond immediate security concerns, Togo’s aims encompassed broader political and economic objectives for the Niger Delta region. These included the creation of a separate state, a more equitable distribution of oil and gas revenues with the Niger Delta communities, and the “abolition of Land Use Acts,” specifically referencing the “1978 Land Use Decree by General Obasanjo.” Multiple sources confirm that the NDLF, under John Togo’s leadership, ultimately sought independence for the Niger Delta region, reflecting a deep-seated desire for self-determination and control over resources.
3.5 Relationship with MEND and JNDLF
The Niger Delta Liberation Front’s (NDLF) activities and identity are intertwined with other significant militant groups in the region, particularly the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force (JNDLF). MEND, founded in 2004, is described by IBTimes as one of the largest militant groups in the Delta, sometimes seen as an umbrella organization encompassing around 100 factions, some involved in attacks on oil pipelines.
Sources indicate that the NDLF was affiliated with MEND. IHS Global Insight described the NDLF as “a MEND break-off group.” Stratfor reported that John Togo was a former MEND member, and NDLF spokesman Mark Anthony stated the group comprised nine former MEND members. In his 2010 Sahara Reporters interview, John Togo explained his formation of the NDLF as a result of MEND becoming “pollute[d]” or “corrupted,” expressing his desire to distance himself from MEND’s perceived compromised state. However, IBTimes noted that following Togo’s death, many NDLF members reportedly joined MEND, suggesting a fluid dynamic between the groups.
Regarding the Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force (JNDLF), Risk Intelligence’s 2016 report highlighted its emergence in June 2016, suggesting it was likely a “confederation of Bayelsa-based groups.” The report also noted the name’s resemblance to John Togo’s NDLF. Sahara Reporters, in a 2016 article, quoted Mark Anthony, the former NDLF spokesman, denouncing the JNDLF as a “fake militant group” falsely using the NDLF’s name to issue threats. This indicates a complex and sometimes contested legacy of John Togo and the NDLF within the evolving militant landscape of the Niger Delta.
4. Activities and Operations of the NDLF
The NDLF, alongside MEND, played a significant role in the Niger Delta insurgency against oil companies and Nigerian security forces during the peak of instability between 2005 and 2009, as reported by IHS Global Insight. The Senior Lecturer listed the NDLF’s activities as including oil bunkering, piracy, and hostage-taking, common tactics employed by militant groups in the region. The Assistant Professor added illegal oil bunkering, small arms trafficking, kidnapping oil workers, and pipeline vandalism to the list of NDLF activities, painting a picture of a group deeply involved in disruptive and criminal operations.
In late 2010, the NDLF claimed responsibility for attacks on pipelines in Delta state. John Togo’s “renewed insurgency” in late 2010, as reported by Sahara Reporters, allegedly shut down three refineries and inflicted significant damage on the Nigerian oil industry, impacting major companies like Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Shell.
John Togo initially engaged with the Nigerian government’s amnesty program in 2009 but later abandoned it. However, in 2011, sources indicate the NDLF laid down arms and formally joined the amnesty program. Despite this, Voice of America (VOA) in 2012 described the NDLF as “a group that claims to be operational, but not currently fighting.” IHS Global Insight in 2012 also noted the NDLF’s general inactivity since the government amnesty. However, in 2012, the NDLF, through spokesman Mark Anthony, re-emerged to demand $6 million and threatened to resume fighting if unmet, demonstrating the fragile nature of the peace and the persistent potential for renewed conflict.
While the Senior Lecturer indicated the NDLF was active from 2005-2014 but had become inactive recently, other sources offer varying timelines. A May 2016 Vanguard article referred to the NDLF as “a non-operational militant group,” and a July 2016 This Day article suggested its operational period ended in 2014. Contradictorily, a June 2016 This Day article reported that security agents were actively pursuing members of the “defunct” NDLF in connection with recent bombings of oil pipelines in Delta and Bayelsa States, suggesting continued, albeit perhaps fragmented, activity or the re-emergence of former members. This indicates the difficulty in definitively declaring the NDLF as entirely inactive, with potential for former members or splinters to engage in further unrest.
5. Consequences of Leaving the NDLF
Understanding the dynamics of membership and defection within Niger Delta militant groups like the NDLF is crucial to understanding the broader conflict. Benjamin Okonofua highlighted the fluid relationship between Delta militias, including the NDLF, and cult-gangs. He described a “revolving door” where militants who accepted amnesty often reverted to cult-gang activities, remaining in a state of semi-mobilization. Okonofua emphasized that membership in militias is transient, likened to “ad hoc armed committees,” while cult-gang membership is often lifelong. He suggested that amnesty payments routed through militia hierarchies were, in part, an effort to maintain ties within cult-gang networks. Okonofua stated that recruitment for groups like the NDLF was primarily from within these existing cult-gang structures.
The Senior Lecturer noted that during its active period, the NDLF recruited “restive youths, less educated teenagers and school drop outs.” He stated that members generally did not leave until a group weakened, typically due to the death of a leader, as in the case of John Togo. In such instances of group collapse, there were generally “no consequences” for leaving. However, leaving before such a collapse was viewed differently, with defectors becoming considered “an enemy.”
Benjamin Okonofua further elaborated that individuals leaving militias often simply returned to their cult-gang affiliations without facing severe repercussions beyond strained relationships or lost financial benefits. However, he noted critical exceptions: if a member left under circumstances involving theft of group funds or weapons, or after informing law enforcement against the group, they could become targets for violent retaliation. The likelihood and severity of this retaliation, according to Okonofua, depended significantly on the individual’s standing within their cult-gang, which provided protection and mediated disputes among members.
The Assistant Professor emphasized the heightened risk of leaving a group like the NDLF after the 2009 amnesty program. Given the close-knit nature of these groups and the communities they drew members from, leaving posed a “grave risk” to the individual and their family. This risk could lead individuals to remain nominally affiliated with a group even after becoming psychologically disengaged, particularly for those unable to relocate or whose families remained in the Niger Delta. In essence, while not impossible, leaving such a group was a “highly risky affair,” highlighting the complex social and security dynamics at play within these Niger Delta militant organizations.
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