John Rawls: A Comprehensive Exploration of His Life, Philosophy, and Impact

John Rawls (1921–2002) stands as a monumental figure in 20th-century political philosophy, deeply rooted in the liberal tradition. His groundbreaking work, particularly his theory of “justice as fairness,” reimagined the social contract tradition and offered a powerful vision of a society characterized by free and equal citizens cooperating within an equitable economic framework. Beyond justice as fairness, John Rawls further enriched political thought with his explorations of “political liberalism,” addressing the complexities of legitimate political power in diverse democracies, and “the law of peoples,” proposing a liberal foreign policy aimed at fostering a peaceful and tolerant global order.

1. Life and Work of John Rawls

Born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland, John Rawls‘s upbringing was steeped in civic engagement and intellectual discourse. His father, a prominent lawyer, and his mother, a chapter president of the League of Women Voters, instilled in him a strong sense of justice and public service. John Rawls pursued his education at Princeton and Cornell, where he encountered the philosophical influences of Norman Malcolm, a student of Wittgenstein, and later at Oxford, where he engaged with leading thinkers such as H. L. A. Hart, Isaiah Berlin, and Stuart Hampshire. His early academic career included professorships at Cornell and MIT before he joined the faculty at Harvard University in 1962, where he remained for over three decades, shaping generations of political philosophers.

While John Rawls‘s life was primarily devoted to scholarly pursuits, two significant historical events profoundly impacted his thinking: World War II and the Vietnam War. As a young man, John Rawls initially penned an intensely religious senior thesis and contemplated entering the priesthood. However, his experiences as an infantryman in World War II, witnessing the arbitrary nature of death and the horrors of the Holocaust, led to a loss of his Christian faith. Later, in the 1960s, the Vietnam War spurred John Rawls to political activism. He publicly opposed the draft, denouncing its discriminatory impact on Black and impoverished Americans. This conflict motivated John Rawls to critically analyze the systemic flaws within the American political system that could lead to what he considered an unjust war, and to contemplate the responsibilities of citizens to conscientiously resist aggressive government policies.

*John Rawls in his study, a space that reflects his intellectual life and dedication to political philosophy.*

John Rawls‘s most influential contribution is undoubtedly his theory of a just liberal society, “justice as fairness.” He meticulously developed this theory, initially presented in his seminal 1971 book, A Theory of Justice. However, John Rawls continuously refined and expanded upon justice as fairness throughout his career, revisiting and restating the theory in Political Liberalism (1993), The Law of Peoples (1999), and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). This ongoing engagement with his own work demonstrates John Rawls‘s commitment to rigorous philosophical inquiry and his dedication to clarifying and strengthening his ideas.

This article will focus on John Rawls‘s final articulation of his theories on justice as fairness, political liberalism, and the law of peoples, drawing primarily from his later works to provide a comprehensive understanding of his mature philosophical positions. For readers interested in exploring recent scholarly interpretations of John Rawls‘s work, a section on Further Reading is provided at the end of this article.

2. Aims and Methodologies in John Rawls’s Philosophy

2.1 The Four Roles of Political Philosophy according to John Rawls

John Rawls believed that political philosophy serves crucial roles within a society’s public culture. He identified at least four significant functions:

Firstly, political philosophy has a practical role. It can offer a basis for reasoned agreement, particularly when deep political divisions threaten social order and potentially lead to violence. John Rawls points to Hobbes’s Leviathan as a response to the English Civil War, Locke’s Letter on Toleration addressing the Wars of Religion, and the philosophical discourse surrounding the US Constitution and the debates over slavery before the American Civil War as examples of philosophy tackling pressing practical issues.

Secondly, philosophy plays an orientational role, helping citizens understand their place within their social world. It can reflect on the meaning of citizenship – particularly in a democracy, the meaning of equal citizenship – and provide a unifying framework for addressing contentious questions about how citizens with this status should interact.

Thirdly, political philosophy has an exploratory role, probing the boundaries of political possibility. While grounded in workable political arrangements that can garner real-world support, philosophy can also be utopian. It can envision an ideal social order, the best we can realistically hope for. In this sense, philosophy imagines laws “as they might be,” given the nature of humanity “as it is.”

Finally, John Rawls emphasizes the reconciliatory role of political philosophy. It can “calm our frustration and rage against our society and its history by showing us the way in which its institutions… are rational, and developed over time as they did to attain their present, rational form” (JF, 3). Philosophy can reveal the rationality underlying societal development, offering a perspective that transcends narratives of mere domination, prejudice, and corruption, and highlighting progress and reason within the human story.

John Rawls viewed his own work as a practical contribution aimed at resolving the enduring tension in democratic thought between liberty and equality. He also sought to define the limits of civic and international toleration. He offered citizens of democratic nations a framework for understanding themselves as free and equal participants in a fair society. Furthermore, he presented a hopeful vision of a stable, just constitutional democracy contributing to a peaceful global community. For those frustrated by the diversity of viewpoints among their fellow citizens, John Rawls offered the reconciliatory idea that this very diversity, while challenging, can underpin a social order characterized by greater freedom for all.

2.2 John Rawls’s Sequence of Theories: A Political, Not Merely Moral, Approach

Unlike utilitarianism, which John Rawls saw as applying a universal moral principle (“maximize utility”) across all domains, John Rawls argued that political philosophy is not simply applied moral philosophy. He rejected the notion of a single, overarching moral principle applicable to all situations. “The correct regulative principle for anything,” John Rawls stated, “depends on the nature of that thing” (TJ, 29). John Rawls deliberately confined his theorizing to the political realm, asserting that within this domain, the appropriate principles for each sub-domain are contingent upon its specific actors and constraints.

John Rawls approached the political domain through a sequence of theories, addressing sub-domains progressively. He began with a self-contained democratic society, focusing on its internal justice and reproduction across generations. Having established principles for this fundamental unit, John Rawls then expanded his scope to a society of nations, of which the democratic society is a member, developing his “law of peoples.” While not explicitly demonstrated, John Rawls suggested that this sequential approach could be extended to encompass further sub-domains, such as human interactions with animals, implying a potential for universal coverage achieved through this layered, context-sensitive methodology.

2.3 Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory in John Rawls’s Framework

Within each political sub-domain, John Rawls employed another sequence: prioritizing ideal theory before addressing non-ideal theory. Ideal theory is characterized by two key types of idealizing assumptions:

Firstly, ideal theory presumes full compliance. It assumes that all actors – whether citizens or societies – are generally willing to adhere to the chosen principles. This assumption essentially brackets out issues of law-breaking, both at the individual level (crime) and the societal level (aggressive war), allowing for a focus on the principles themselves in a simplified context.

Secondly, ideal theory assumes reasonably favorable conditions. It posits social circumstances where citizens and societies are capable of upholding principles of political cooperation. This means abstracting away from extreme conditions, such as citizens being driven by desperate hunger that overwhelms their moral reasoning, or nations struggling with famine or state collapse.

John Rawls argued that developing ideal theory first is crucial. It provides a systematic understanding of how to reform the non-ideal world and establishes a vision of the best achievable social order. This ideal framework then serves as a benchmark for developing non-ideal theory. Non-ideal theory addresses the complexities of the real world, such as injustice, non-compliance, and unfavorable conditions, by referencing the ideal. For instance, understanding ideal principles for fully productive citizens informs the development of non-ideal principles for providing healthcare to citizens with serious illnesses or disabilities. Similarly, ideal principles of international relations provide a basis for addressing issues like failed states or aggressive nations that threaten peace.

2.4 Reflective Equilibrium: The Method of Justification in John Rawls’s Philosophy

John Rawls posited that the goal of political philosophy is to arrive at justified conclusions about how political life should be organized. For him, the degree of justification for one’s political convictions hinges on the extent to which one has achieved reflective equilibrium. Reflective equilibrium represents a state of perfect coherence among all of one’s beliefs, across all levels of generality.

In this state, specific political judgments (e.g., “religious intolerance is unjust,” “racial discrimination is unjust”) are supported by more general political convictions (e.g., “all citizens have certain basic rights”), which in turn are grounded in abstract beliefs about the political world (e.g., “all citizens are free and equal”). Conversely, abstract beliefs explain general convictions, which then explain specific judgments, creating a network of mutual support and explanation. Achieving reflective equilibrium would mean that the justification of each belief is derived from its interconnectedness within this comprehensive web of beliefs.

While perfect reflective equilibrium is likely unattainable, John Rawls advocated for the method of reflective equilibrium as a means to progressively approach it, thereby enhancing the justifiability of one’s beliefs. This method begins with one’s considered moral judgments – those made consistently and confidently under good conditions for thoughtful deliberation (e.g., “slavery is wrong,” “all citizens are political equals”). These judgments serve as provisional fixed points.

The process then involves establishing relationships of mutual support and explanation among one’s beliefs, as described above. This inevitably exposes conflicts, such as a specific judgment clashing with a general conviction, or an abstract principle failing to accommodate a particular case. Resolution involves revising beliefs as necessary, constantly striving for greater overall coherence.

This iterative process of mutual adjustment leads to narrow reflective equilibrium: coherence within one’s initial set of beliefs. The method then expands to incorporate responses to major theories in the history of political philosophy and critiques of political philosophizing itself. Reflecting on these alternatives and continuing to adjust one’s belief system aims for wide reflective equilibrium, where coherence is maintained after considering a broad range of perspectives.

Reflective equilibrium, with its emphasis on coherence and revision, stands in contrast to foundationalism as a theory of justified belief. Foundationalism posits a subset of beliefs as unrevisable, forming a foundation for all other beliefs. Reflective equilibrium, however, does not privilege any particular set of beliefs. Any belief, regardless of its level of generality, is open to revision if it contributes to greater overall coherence.

2.5 The Independence of Moral and Political Theory in John Rawls’s Approach

While reflective equilibrium, in principle, allows any type of belief to be relevant to conclusions about political institutions, John Rawls argued that, in practice, productive moral and political theorizing can proceed largely independently of metaphysics and epistemology. He even reversed the traditional order of priority, suggesting that progress in metaethics is more likely to stem from progress in substantive moral and political theorizing, rather than the other way around (CP, 286–302).

John Rawls‘s own metaethical theory, political constructivism, which addresses the objectivity and validity of political judgments, is best understood as emerging from his substantive political theory, which will be discussed later.

3. Political Liberalism: Legitimacy and Stability in a Diverse Society

In a free society, citizens inevitably hold diverse worldviews. They subscribe to different religions or none, possess varying conceptions of right and wrong, and disagree on how to live and what values to prioritize. Despite these differing commitments, a nation operates under a single legal framework. Laws must address fundamental issues uniformly: whether to establish a national church, whether women have equal rights, the permissibility of abortion and same-sex marriage, and the structure of the economy, among others.

John Rawls argued that this need for unified law in a diverse citizenry presents two fundamental challenges:

The first is the challenge of legitimacy: How can the coercive power of the state be legitimately exercised over citizens with such divergent worldviews? How can it be justified to compel all citizens to adhere to a single set of laws when they hold fundamentally different beliefs and values?

The second challenge is stability: From the citizen’s perspective, why should one willingly obey laws imposed by a collective body composed of individuals with beliefs and values vastly different from their own? Unless a significant majority of citizens willingly comply with the law, long-term social order becomes unsustainable.

John Rawls addressed these intertwined challenges of legitimacy and stability through his theory of political liberalism. Political liberalism, in John Rawls‘s framework, is conceptually prior to his theory of justice as fairness. It establishes the foundational principles of legitimacy and stability, setting the stage for the development of a specific conception of justice.

3.1 Legitimacy: John Rawls’s Liberal Principle of Legitimacy

In a democracy, political power fundamentally resides in the people as a collective body. Given the inherent diversity within a democracy, John Rawls questioned what constitutes the legitimate exercise of coercive political power by citizens over one another. His answer is encapsulated in his liberal principle of legitimacy:

Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason (PL, 137).

This principle dictates that political power is legitimate only when exercised in ways that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse. It establishes a criterion of reciprocity: citizens must have reasonable grounds to believe that all other citizens can also reasonably accept the enforcement of the fundamental laws. Those subject to legal coercion must be able to freely endorse the basic political arrangements, not out of fear, manipulation, or ignorance, but through reasoned acceptance.

John Rawls‘s liberal principle of legitimacy intensifies the challenge of legitimacy. It raises the question: what specific set of basic laws could be legitimately imposed upon a pluralistic citizenry? What kind of constitution could reasonably garner endorsement from all citizens? John Rawls‘s response begins with clarifying what it means for citizens to be “reasonable.”

3.2 The Reasonable Citizen in John Rawls’s Political Liberalism

Reasonable citizens, in John Rawls‘s view, are characterized by a desire to live in a society where cooperation with fellow citizens is possible on terms acceptable to all. They are prepared to propose and abide by mutually agreeable rules, provided they have assurance that others will do the same. Furthermore, reasonable citizens are willing to uphold these rules even when it requires sacrificing their own particular interests. In essence, reasonable citizens aspire to belong to a society where political power is exercised legitimately.

Each reasonable citizen holds their own comprehensive doctrine – a personal worldview encompassing beliefs about God, life, morality, and values. However, their reasonableness prevents them from seeking to impose their comprehensive doctrine on others who are also committed to finding mutually acceptable rules. While a citizen may believe they possess ultimate truth about the best way to live, a reasonable citizen refrains from forcing others to conform to their beliefs, even if they belong to a majority with the power to enforce those beliefs. John Rawls, referencing the Inquisition, points out that oppressive state power is invariably necessary to enforce societal unity around any single comprehensive doctrine, including comprehensive liberalism itself (PL, 37).

One key factor contributing to the tolerance of reasonable citizens is their acceptance of the burdens of judgment. John Rawls argues that the most profound questions of religion, philosophy, and morality are inherently complex and difficult to resolve definitively. Even conscientious individuals will arrive at different answers due to their unique life experiences – upbringing, social class, occupation, and so on. Reasonable citizens understand that these deep and complex issues are subjects of legitimate disagreement among people of good will, and therefore, they are unwilling to impose their own worldviews on those who have reached different conclusions.

3.3 Reasonable Pluralism and the Public Political Culture in John Rawls’s Theory

John Rawls‘s concept of the reasonable citizen reflects a hopeful view of human nature. He rejects the notion that humans are inherently self-centered, dogmatic, or driven solely by a “perpetual and restless desire of power after power” (Hobbes, 1651, 58). Instead, John Rawls posits that humans possess at least the capacity for genuine toleration and mutual respect.

This capacity raises the possibility that the diversity of worldviews in a democratic society can evolve beyond mere pluralism into reasonable pluralism. John Rawls expresses hope that citizens’ religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines will themselves embrace toleration and accept the fundamental principles of a democratic regime. In the realm of religion, for example, reasonable pluralism could encompass reasonable Catholicism, reasonable interpretations of Islam, reasonable atheism, and so on. Crucially, none of these reasonable doctrines would advocate using coercive political power to enforce religious conformity on citizens with different beliefs.

The prospect of reasonable pluralism softens, but does not eliminate, the challenge of legitimacy – how a single set of laws can be legitimately imposed on diverse citizens. Even in a society characterized by reasonable pluralism, it would be unreasonable to expect universal endorsement of, for example, “reasonable Catholicism” as the foundation for a constitutional settlement. Reasonable Muslims or atheists could not be expected to accept Catholicism as the basis for fundamental social arrangements, just as Catholics could not be expected to accept Islam or atheism as the fundamental basis of law. No comprehensive doctrine can achieve universal acceptance among all reasonable citizens, and therefore, no comprehensive doctrine can serve as the foundation for the legitimate exercise of coercive political power.

This raises the critical question: where can we find the fundamental ideas to define society’s basic laws, which all citizens are required to obey? For John Rawls, the sole source of fundamental ideas capable of serving as a focal point for all reasonable citizens in a liberal society is the society’s public political culture.

Since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common; and so we begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture in the hope of developing from them a political conception that can gain free and reasoned agreement in judgment (PL, 100–01).

The public political culture of a democratic society, John Rawls explains, “comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge” (PL, 13–14). He suggests looking to fundamental ideas implicitly embedded in the constitution’s enumeration of individual rights, the structure of the government, and landmark decisions of influential courts. These fundamental ideas, drawn from the public political culture, can be developed into a shared political conception of justice.

3.4 Political Conceptions of Justice: The Basis for Legitimacy in John Rawls’s View

John Rawls‘s solution to the challenge of legitimacy in a liberal society is to ensure that political power is exercised according to a political conception of justice. A political conception of justice is an interpretation of the fundamental ideas inherent in a society’s public political culture.

Crucially, a political conception is not derived from any specific comprehensive doctrine, nor is it a mere compromise among existing worldviews within society. Instead, it is freestanding: its content is defined independently of the comprehensive doctrines that citizens affirm. Reasonable citizens, seeking mutually acceptable terms of cooperation, will recognize that a freestanding political conception, generated from ideas within the public political culture, provides the only basis for cooperation that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse. Consequently, the exercise of coercive political power guided by the principles of a political conception of justice becomes legitimate.

John Rawls identifies three fundamental ideas deeply embedded in the public political culture of a democratic society: citizens are free and equal, and society should be a fair system of cooperation. All liberal political conceptions of justice are therefore centered on interpretations of these three core ideas.

Given that “free,” “equal,” and “fair” can be reasonably interpreted in multiple ways, a variety of liberal political conceptions of justice can exist. However, because they all interpret the same three fundamental ideas, these conceptions share certain core features:

1. A liberal political conception of justice will ascribe to all citizens familiar individual rights and liberties, such as freedom of expression, liberty of conscience, and freedom of occupational choice.
2. A political conception will prioritize these rights and liberties, especially over demands to advance the general good (e.g., to increase national wealth) or perfectionist values (e.g., to promote a specific view of human flourishing).
3. A political conception will guarantee all citizens sufficient all-purpose means to effectively exercise their freedoms.

John Rawls emphasizes that these abstract features must be embodied in specific institutions. He points to several institutional requirements common to all liberal conceptions of justice: a decent distribution of income and wealth, fair opportunities for all citizens (particularly in education and training), government as employer of last resort, basic healthcare for all, and public financing of elections.

The exercise of political power in a liberal society is legitimate when it aligns with the principles of any liberal conception of justice. By John Rawls‘s criteria, a libertarian conception of justice (such as Nozick’s in Anarchy, State, and Utopia) does not qualify as a liberal political conception. Libertarianism, in his view, fails to ensure sufficient means for all citizens to utilize their basic liberties and permits excessive inequalities of wealth and power. In contrast, John Rawls‘s own conception of justice, justice as fairness, does meet the criteria for inclusion within the family of liberal political conceptions of justice.

3.5 Stability: Overlapping Consensus as the Foundation for Enduring Order

In a liberal society, political power is legitimately exercised when it adheres to a political conception of justice. However, the challenge of stability remains. While legitimacy establishes the permissibility of law enforcement, John Rawls needed to explain why citizens would willingly abide by these laws. If citizens lack internal reasons to obey the law from their own perspectives, social order can unravel.

John Rawls places his hope for social stability on the concept of an overlapping consensus. In an overlapping consensus, citizens, despite holding diverse comprehensive doctrines, converge on endorsing a core set of laws, each for their own distinct reasons. In Rawlsian terms, each citizen supports a political conception of justice based on reasons internal to their own comprehensive doctrine.

The freestanding nature of a political conception, specified independently of any comprehensive doctrine, is crucial. This allows a political conception to function as a “module” that can be integrated into a variety of worldviews. In an overlapping consensus, each reasonable citizen affirms this shared “module” from within their own unique perspective.

Consider the example of the Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church. The following quotation illustrates how a particular comprehensive doctrine (Catholicism) affirms a component of a liberal political conception (individual liberty) for its own reasons:

This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in matters religious no one is forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits. The council further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person, as this dignity is known through the revealed Word of God and by reason itself. This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right. (1965, art. 2)

Catholic doctrine here supports the liberal right to religious freedom based on reasons intrinsic to Catholicism. Similarly, reasonable Islamic and atheistic doctrines could also affirm the same right to religious freedom, each based on their own distinct rationales. In an overlapping consensus, all reasonable comprehensive doctrines would support the right to religious freedom, each for its own reasons. Ideally, in a full overlapping consensus, all reasonable comprehensive doctrines would endorse the entirety of a political conception of justice, each from their own unique perspective.

Citizens within an overlapping consensus individually determine how the liberal “module” aligns with their broader worldviews. Some may view liberalism as directly derived from their deepest beliefs, as exemplified by the Vatican II quote. Others may embrace a liberal conception as inherently appealing, but largely separate from their other concerns. The essential element is that all citizens regard the values embodied in a political conception of justice as possessing significant weight, generally outweighing other values in cases of conflict. Each citizen, for their own reasons, prioritizes the political conception when deliberating about the fundamental laws of their society.

John Rawls considered an overlapping consensus the most desirable form of stability in a free society. It surpasses a mere modus vivendi – a balance of power among groups with conflicting worldviews. A modus vivendi is precarious, as shifts in power dynamics can easily disrupt its stability.

In contrast, an overlapping consensus fosters deeper stability. Citizens wholeheartedly affirm a political conception from within their own perspectives, ensuring continued support even if their group’s political power fluctuates. John Rawls argues that an overlapping consensus is stable for the right reasons: each citizen affirms a moral doctrine (a liberal conception of justice) based on moral reasons (derived from their comprehensive doctrine). Compliance with liberal basic laws is not a second-best compromise forced by external power; it is each citizen’s preferred option based on their own beliefs and values.

John Rawls acknowledged that achieving an overlapping consensus is not guaranteed in every liberal society, nor is its permanence assured once established. Some societies may lack sufficient shared ground for convergence on a liberal political conception of justice. In other cases, unreasonable doctrines may proliferate, undermining liberal institutions.

However, John Rawls maintained that historical trends in many liberal societies show both a convergence of beliefs and deepening trust among citizens. This offers hope that an overlapping consensus is at least a viable possibility. Where attainable, John Rawls believed it represents the strongest foundation for social stability in a free society.

3.6 Public Reason: Justifying Political Decisions in a Pluralistic Society

Having addressed legitimacy and stability, we return to the criterion of reciprocity inherent in legitimacy: citizens must reasonably believe that all citizens can reasonably accept the enforcement of fundamental laws. It is unreasonable for citizens to attempt to impose their comprehensive “truth” on others. Political power must be exercised in ways reasonably endorsable by all citizens. John Rawls‘s doctrine of public reason extends this reciprocity requirement to the way citizens justify their political decisions to one another. Essentially, public reason mandates that citizens should be able to justify their political decisions using publicly accessible values and standards.

Consider a Supreme Court justice deciding on a same-sex marriage law. It would violate public reason for the justice to base their opinion on religious texts forbidding same-sex relations or on personal spiritual revelations about the law’s societal impact. This is because not all members of society can reasonably be expected to accept specific religious texts as authoritative political values, nor can personal religious premonitions serve as common standards for evaluating public policy. These are not public reasons.

John Rawls‘s doctrine of public reason can be summarized as follows:

Citizens engaged in certain political activities have a duty of civility to be able to justify their decisions on fundamental political issues by reference only to public values and public standards.

Each highlighted term in this doctrine requires further explanation:

• Public values are those embedded in a political conception of justice: values related to citizens’ freedom and equality, and society as a fair system of cooperation over time. These include freedom of religious practice, political equality of women and racial minorities, economic efficiency, environmental preservation, and family stability (supporting societal reproduction across generations). Nonpublic values are those specific to associations like churches (e.g., restrictions on women’s leadership) or private clubs (e.g., exclusion of racial minorities), which conflict with public values.

• Public standards of inquiry are principles of reasoning and rules of evidence reasonably endorsable by all citizens. Political decisions should not be justified by divination or complex, contested economic or psychological theories. Acceptable public standards rely on common sense, generally known facts, and well-established, non-controversial scientific conclusions.

• The duty of public reason applies to fundamental political issues: constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. These include issues like voting rights, religious toleration, property ownership eligibility, and suspect classifications for discrimination. Public reason applies less strongly, if at all, to less critical political questions, such as specific tax rates or funding for national parks.

• The duty to adhere to public reason applies to citizens engaged in certain political activities, primarily when exercising public office. Judges are bound by public reason in rulings, legislators in legislative discourse and voting, and executives and high-office candidates in public pronouncements. John Rawls also extends this duty to voters when they cast their ballots. All these activities involve or support the exercise of political power, and thus, must be justifiable in terms reasonably endorsable by all citizens (according to the liberal principle of legitimacy). However, public reason does not constrain citizens in other activities, such as religious worship, artistic expression, scientific research, letter-writing to editors, or private political discussions.

• The duty to justify political decisions with public reasons is a moral duty, a duty of civility, not a legal obligation. Citizens always retain their full legal rights to free expression. Violating public reason is not a crime in itself. Rather, citizens have a moral obligation of mutual respect and civic friendship to avoid justifying fundamental political decisions based on partisan values or controversial reasoning standards that cannot be publicly validated.

John Rawls includes an important proviso: citizens may use the language of their comprehensive doctrines – even as public officials, and even on fundamental issues – as long as they demonstrate how these assertions ultimately appeal to public values. For instance, President Lincoln’s use of biblical imagery to condemn slavery was legitimate because his condemnations ultimately appealed to public values of freedom and equality. Thus, even within its defined scope, John Rawls‘s doctrine of public reason is relatively permissive regarding citizens’ speech and actions within the bounds of civility.

4. Justice as Fairness: Realizing Justice Within a Liberal Society

Justice as fairness is John Rawls‘s theory of justice specifically designed for a liberal society. As a member of the family of liberal political conceptions of justice, it provides a framework for the legitimate exercise of political power. However, legitimacy represents a minimal moral standard. A political order can be legitimate without necessarily being just. Justice, in contrast, represents the maximal moral standard: the arrangement of social institutions that is morally best.

John Rawls constructs justice as fairness based on specific interpretations of the ideas that citizens are free and equal, and that society should be fair. He views it as a resolution to the tensions between freedom and equality, tensions highlighted by both socialist critiques of liberal democracy and conservative critiques of the modern welfare state. John Rawls also contends that justice as fairness is superior to utilitarianism, the dominant tradition in modern political thought.

In John Rawls‘s egalitarian liberalism, citizens relate to each other as equals within a social order defined by reciprocity, rather than within unjust status hierarchies prevalent in many contemporary societies.

Significant political and economic inequalities are often associated with inequalities of social status that encourage those of lower status to be viewed both by themselves and by others as inferior. This may arouse widespread attitudes of deference and servility, on one side, and a will to dominate and arrogance on the other. These effects of social and economic inequalities can be serious evils and the attitudes they engender great vices… Fixed status ascribed by birth, or by gender or race, is particularly odious (JF, 131).

4.1 The Basic Structure of Society as the Subject of Justice

Justice as fairness aims to describe a just arrangement of the major political and social institutions of a liberal society: the political constitution, the legal system, the economy, the family, and other fundamental social structures. John Rawls refers to this arrangement of institutions as a society’s basic structure. The basic structure is the primary focus of justice because these institutions distribute the fundamental benefits and burdens of social life: social recognition, basic rights, opportunities for work, distribution of income and wealth, and so on.

The design of a society’s basic structure has profound and lasting effects on citizens’ lives. It shapes not only their life prospects but also their goals, attitudes, relationships, and character. Institutions with such pervasive influence demand justification. Since leaving one’s society is not a realistic option for most, justification cannot rest on the notion of citizens’ consent simply by remaining in the country. Furthermore, the coercive nature of the rules within any basic structure, often enforced with severe penalties, intensifies the demand for justification.

In developing justice as fairness, John Rawls assumes a liberal society characterized by reasonable pluralism, as previously described, and operating under reasonably favorable conditions, where sufficient resources exist to meet everyone’s basic needs. He simplifies the analysis by assuming a self-sufficient and closed society, where citizens enter only by birth and leave only at death. He also primarily focuses on ideal theory, setting aside non-ideal theory issues like criminal justice.

4.2 Two Guiding Ideas of Justice as Fairness: Fairness and Equality

Social cooperation in some form is essential for citizens to lead decent lives. However, citizens are not indifferent to how the benefits and burdens of this cooperation are distributed. John Rawls‘s principles of justice as fairness articulate the core liberal ideas that cooperation should be fair to all citizens, recognizing them as both free and equal. His distinctive interpretation of these concepts involves both a negative and a positive thesis.

John Rawls‘s negative thesis centers on the idea that certain aspects of individuals’ circumstances are morally arbitrary. Citizens do not deserve to be born into wealthy or impoverished families, to possess greater or lesser natural talents, to be born male or female, or to belong to a particular racial group. Because these attributes are morally arbitrary in this sense, they do not, in themselves, justify citizens receiving greater benefits from social cooperation. For example, being born rich, white, and male provides no inherent moral basis for social institutions to favor such a citizen.

This negative thesis does not prescribe how social goods should be distributed; it merely establishes a starting point by removing morally arbitrary factors as justifications for unequal distribution. John Rawls‘s positive distributive thesis is rooted in equality-based reciprocity. It proposes that all social goods should be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution demonstrably benefits everyone. The guiding principle is that, given the fundamental equality of citizens, justice should begin with a presumption of equal division of cooperatively produced goods. Any inequalities must then be justified by their benefit to all citizens, particularly to those who are least advantaged. Equality serves as the baseline, and any deviations from equality must improve the situation of everyone, especially the worst-off. These strong requirements of equality and reciprocal benefit are defining characteristics of John Rawls‘s theory of justice.

4.3 The Two Principles of Justice as Fairness: Liberty and Equality Reconciled

These guiding ideas of justice as fairness are formalized in John Rawls‘s two principles of justice:

First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all;

Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:

1. They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
2. They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle) (JF, 42–43).

The first principle, guaranteeing equal basic liberties, is primarily implemented in the political constitution. The second principle, addressing social and economic inequalities, applies mainly to laws governing economic institutions. The first principle takes priority over the second, and within the second principle, fair equality of opportunity takes priority over the difference principle. This establishes a lexical ordering, prioritizing basic liberties and fair opportunity before addressing economic inequalities.

The first principle affirms that all citizens should possess the familiar basic rights and liberties: freedom of conscience and association, freedom of speech and person, the right to vote and hold public office, and the right to due process under the rule of law. It mandates that these rights and liberties be granted equally to all citizens. Unequal rights would inherently disadvantage those receiving fewer rights, thus justice, in normal circumstances, necessitates equal rights for all.

John Rawls‘s first principle reinforces widely held convictions about the importance of equal basic rights and liberties. Two additional features make this principle distinctive. First, its priority: basic rights and liberties cannot be traded off against other social goods. For example, the first principle prohibits a policy of granting draft exemptions to college students based on the rationale that educated civilians increase economic productivity. The draft is a significant infringement on basic liberties, and if implemented, it must apply equally to all eligible individuals, even if this results in slower economic growth. Citizens’ equal liberty takes precedence over economic considerations.

Second, John Rawls‘s first principle requires fair value of the political liberties. Political liberties, a subset of basic liberties, concern the right to hold public office, influence elections, and participate in political processes. John Rawls demands not only formal but also substantive equality in these liberties. Citizens with similar talents and motivation should have genuinely equal opportunities to hold office and influence politics, regardless of their wealth or income. This requirement of fair value of political liberties has significant implications for campaign finance and electoral processes, as will be discussed later.

John Rawls‘s second principle of justice has two components. The first, fair equality of opportunity, requires that individuals with comparable talents and willingness to use them have equal educational and economic opportunities, irrespective of their socioeconomic background. “In all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed” (JF, p. 44).

For instance, assuming natural endowments and motivation are evenly distributed across children from different social classes, then within any given occupation, one should expect to find roughly equal representation from all socioeconomic strata. Because class of origin is a morally arbitrary factor, justice prohibits it from translating into unequal opportunities for education and meaningful work.

The second component of the second principle is the difference principle, governing the distribution of wealth and income. Allowing for wealth and income inequalities can potentially increase overall social productivity. Higher wages can incentivize training and education, and attract individuals to in-demand jobs. The difference principle permits such inequalities, but only if they ultimately benefit everyone, and particularly those who are least well-off. It dictates that any economic inequalities must be structured to maximize the well-being of the least advantaged members of society.

To illustrate, consider four hypothetical economic structures (A-D) and the average lifetime income levels they would generate for representative members of three groups:

Economy	Least-Advantaged Group	Middle Group	Most-Advantaged Group
A	10,000	10,000	10,000
B	12,000	30,000	80,000
C	30,000	90,000	150,000
D	20,000	100,000	500,000

The difference principle selects Economy C because it maximizes the income of the least-advantaged group. Inequalities in C benefit everyone compared to complete equality (Economy A) and compared to a more equal distribution (Economy B). However, the difference principle rejects Economy D, which allows the rich to become richer at the expense of the poor. The difference principle embodies equality-based reciprocity: starting from an egalitarian baseline, it requires that any inequalities must benefit all, especially the worst-off.

The difference principle is partly grounded in the negative thesis that the distribution of natural talents is unearned. A citizen does not inherently deserve a larger share of social product simply because they were fortunate to be born with talents currently in high demand. However, this does not necessitate equal shares for everyone. The fact that citizens possess diverse talents and abilities can be leveraged to improve everyone’s well-being. In a society governed by the difference principle, the distribution of natural endowments is viewed as a common asset that can benefit all. Those with greater talents are encouraged to utilize them to their advantage, provided that doing so also contributes to the good of the less fortunate.

The difference principle thus expresses a positive ideal of social unity. In a society adhering to the difference principle, citizens understand that the economy operates to everyone’s benefit, and that those born with greater natural potential are not enriching themselves at the expense of the less fortunate. This contrasts with libertarian ideals of economic freedom (like Nozick’s) or meritocratic notions of economic justice prevalent in many democracies. “In justice as fairness,” John Rawls states, “men agree to share one another’s fate” (TJ, 102).

4.4 John Rawls’s Conception of Citizens: Free, Equal, Reasonable, and Rational

Having examined John Rawls‘s two principles of justice as fairness, we return to his interpretations of the liberal ideas that citizens are free and equal, and that society should be fair. These conceptions of citizens and society form the basis for the official justification of the two principles: the argument from the original position.

John Rawls‘s interpretation of citizens as free encompasses several dimensions. Citizens are free in that they see themselves as entitled to make claims on social institutions in their own right – they are not slaves or serfs, dependent on others for their social standing. Citizens are also free in that their public identities are independent of any particular comprehensive doctrine. A citizen converting to a new religion, or abandoning their faith, expects to retain all political rights and liberties throughout this transition. Finally, citizens are free in their capacity to take responsibility for planning their own lives, given the opportunities and resources they can reasonably expect.

Citizens are considered equal by John Rawls by virtue of possessing the capacities necessary for participating in social cooperation over a complete life. While citizens may have varying levels of skills, talents, and abilities “above the line” required for cooperation, these differences do not affect their equal political status.

Rawlsian citizens are not only free and equal, but also reasonable and rational. The idea of citizens being reasonable is central to political liberalism. Reasonable citizens are capable of adhering to fair terms of cooperation, even at personal cost, provided others are also willing to do so. In justice as fairness, John Rawls terms this reasonableness the capacity for a sense of justice. Citizens are also rational, possessing the capacity to pursue and revise their own understanding of what is valuable in life – their conception of the good. These two capacities together are termed the two moral powers.

Like all theories of justice (e.g., those of Locke, Rousseau, and Mill), justice as fairness necessitates an account of citizens’ fundamental interests: what citizens need qua citizens. John Rawls derives his concept of primary goods from his conception of citizens as free, equal, reasonable, and rational. Primary goods are essential for developing and exercising the two moral powers and are useful for pursuing a wide range of specific conceptions of the good life. John Rawls identifies these primary goods:

• Basic rights and liberties.
• Freedom of movement and free choice among a wide range of occupations.
• Powers of offices and positions of responsibility.
• Income and wealth.
• The social bases of self-respect: recognition by social institutions that fosters a sense of self-worth and confidence in pursuing one’s plans (JF, 58–59).

All citizens are assumed to have a fundamental interest in acquiring more primary goods. Political institutions are evaluated based on how well citizens are provided with these goods. John Rawls argues that equalities and inequalities in primary goods are of paramount political significance.

4.5 John Rawls’s Conception of Society: Fairness, Cooperation, and Publicity

John Rawls‘s conception of society is fundamentally defined by fairness. Social institutions must be fair to all cooperating members, regardless of race, gender, religion, social origin, natural talents, or reasonable conception of the good life.

John Rawls also emphasizes publicity as a crucial aspect of fairness. In a well-ordered society, all citizens accept the principles of justice and are aware that their fellow citizens do as well. Furthermore, all citizens recognize the basic structure as just. The full philosophical justifications for the principles of justice are also accessible and acceptable to all reasonable citizens.

The principle of publicity reflects the idea that because principles for the basic structure are coercively enforced on free citizens, they must withstand public scrutiny. Publicity ensures that a society’s operative principles of justice are not overly esoteric or masks for underlying power dynamics. Fairness requires that “in public political life, nothing need be hidden… there is no need for the illusions and delusions of ideology for society to work properly and for citizens to accept it willingly” (PL, 68–69).

4.6 The Original Position: A Thought Experiment for Justice

John Rawls‘s conceptions of citizens and society, while foundational, remain somewhat abstract. The original position is designed to bridge the gap between these abstract conceptions and concrete principles of social justice. It translates the question, “What are fair terms of social cooperation for free and equal citizens?” into “What terms of cooperation would free and equal citizens agree to under fair conditions?” This emphasis on agreement places John Rawls‘s justice as fairness within the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.

The original position is a thought experiment, a hypothetical scenario where each real citizen is represented by a representative. These representatives convene to agree on the principles of justice that should govern the political institutions of the real citizens. This thought experiment is superior to attempting to gather all real citizens for a direct agreement on principles. Real-world bargaining would be influenced by factors irrelevant to justice, such as bargaining power or ability to endure prolonged negotiation.

The original position abstracts away from such extraneous factors. It establishes a fair situation where each citizen is represented solely as a free and equal citizen. Each representative seeks only what free and equal citizens would want and aims to agree on principles for the basic structure under fair conditions relative to other representatives. The design of the original position thus embodies the ideals of freedom, equality, and fairness. For instance, fairness and equality are modeled by the symmetrical situation of the parties: no representative can coerce or outlast another in negotiations.

The most distinctive feature of the original position is the veil of ignorance. This veil prevents arbitrary facts about citizens from influencing the agreement among their representatives. As John Rawls argues, a citizen’s race, class, or gender should not be grounds for social institutions to favor or disfavor them. Therefore, representatives in the original position are deprived of knowledge of the race, class, and gender of the real citizens they represent. In fact, the veil of ignorance extends to all facts about citizens irrelevant to choosing principles of justice, including age, natural endowments, and comprehensive doctrines. Furthermore, specific information about the current state of society is also screened out to ensure a focus on the enduring features of a just social system.

Behind the veil of ignorance, the informational situation of the representatives is as follows:

• Parties do not know:
  • The race, ethnicity, gender, age, income, wealth, natural endowments, comprehensive doctrine, etc., of any citizens in society, or their generation in history.
  • The political system, class structure, economic system, or level of economic development of the society.
• Parties do know:
  • Citizens in society hold diverse comprehensive doctrines and life plans and have interests in primary goods.
  • Society operates under moderate scarcity: enough resources for basic needs, but not unlimited resources.
  • General facts and common sense about human social life, and uncontroversial scientific conclusions (including economics and psychology).

The veil of ignorance ensures that representatives of free and equal citizens are situated fairly relative to each other. No representative can advocate for principles that arbitrarily favor the specific citizen they represent, as they lack knowledge of that citizen’s particular attributes. This situation creates reasonable conditions for rational agreement. Each representative aims to agree on principles that best serve the interests of the citizen they represent (maximizing their share of primary goods). Because the representatives are fairly situated, the agreement they reach is considered fair to all actual citizens.

The design of the original position also models other aspects of John Rawls‘s conceptions of citizens and society. For example, the publicity of a well-ordered society is reflected in the requirement that the chosen principles must be publicly endorsable by all citizens. Certain assumptions also ensure the hypothetical agreement is determinate and decisive: parties are not motivated by envy, are neither risk-seeking nor risk-averse, and must reach a final agreement on principles for the basic structure without the possibility of renegotiation after the veil of ignorance is lifted.

4.7 The Argument from the Original Position: Selecting the Principles of Justice

The argument from the original position unfolds in two parts. First, the representatives agree on principles of justice. Second, they verify that a society governed by these principles could be stable over time. John Rawls primarily focuses on demonstrating that his two principles of justice as fairness would be chosen over utilitarian principles, as he considered utilitarianism the main competing framework for thinking about justice. Thus, the representatives are presented with a choice between John Rawls‘s two principles and utilitarian principles, and asked to choose which they would prefer to agree upon.

The first part of the original position involves two key comparisons between John Rawls‘s principles and utilitarian principles. In the first comparison, representatives compare John Rawls‘s principles to the principle of average utility: the principle that the basic structure should maximize the average level of utility among all citizens. John Rawls argues that representatives would favor his principles in this comparison because the first principle of justice as fairness guarantees equal liberties for all citizens.

In this initial comparison, John Rawls contends that it is rational for representatives to employ maximin reasoning: to prioritize maximizing the minimum level of primary goods that the citizens they represent might receive. He argues that maximin reasoning favors justice as fairness.

Under average utilitarianism, John Rawls argues, the basic liberties of some citizens could be restricted to generate greater overall benefits for others. For example, limiting the political and religious liberties of a minority might benefit the majority, potentially increasing average utility across society. A representative in the original position would find the possibility of their citizen being denied political and religious liberties unacceptable, especially when they could secure equal liberties for their citizen by choosing justice as fairness. John Rawls argues that representatives would not gamble with the fundamental rights and commitments of the citizens they represent when they have the option to safeguard these rights, even if their citizen turns out to be in a vulnerable minority.

Furthermore, John Rawls argues that a society structured by justice as fairness offers advantages over a utilitarian society. Guaranteeing equal basic liberties for all fosters a spirit of cooperation based on mutual respect and removes potentially divisive conflicts over liberty restrictions from the political agenda. In contrast, a utilitarian society could be marked by mutual suspicion, as different groups advance speculative arguments that their partisan policies would maximize average utility, potentially at the expense of others’ liberties. John Rawls‘s first principle, by securing permanent equal liberties for all, promotes social harmony by making justice more transparent and predictable. The balance of considerations, in John Rawls‘s view, decisively favors justice as fairness over average utility.

In the second core comparison, representatives face a choice between justice as fairness and the principle of restricted utility. Restricted utility is identical to John Rawls‘s two principles, except that the difference principle is replaced by a principle maximizing average utility, subject to a guaranteed minimum income level for all. While the first comparison highlighted the importance of basic liberties, this second comparison presents John Rawls‘s formal argument for the difference principle.

It’s important to note that maximin reasoning does not play a role in the argument for the difference principle, nor does risk aversion (JF, xvii, 43, 95, 96).

In this second comparison, John Rawls argues that representatives will prefer justice as fairness because its principles provide a stronger basis for enduring cooperation among all citizens. The difference principle, he argues, demands less sacrifice from the better-off than restricted utility demands from the worst-off. Under the difference principle, those who are more talented and fortunate are permitted to accumulate greater wealth and income, but only on the condition that their doing so also benefits their fellow citizens, including the least advantaged. In contrast, under restricted utility, those at the minimum income level may suspect that their interests have been sacrificed to further enrich the already better-off. This can lead to cynicism and disengagement from public life among the least advantaged.

Furthermore, maintaining public agreement on which economic policies truly maximize average utility is challenging, and debates over the guaranteed minimum income level can generate mistrust between social classes. The difference principle, on the other hand, fosters mutual trust and cooperative virtues by embodying an ideal of economic reciprocity. Each representative will recognize the benefits for the citizen they represent in securing the more harmonious social world envisioned by justice as fairness.

4.8 The Argument from the Original Position: Stability Check and Enduring Consensus

Having chosen the two principles of justice as fairness, the representatives proceed to the second part of the original position: assessing whether these principles can ensure a stable and enduring society. They evaluate whether individuals raised under institutions governed by these principles will develop a sufficient commitment to them to form the basis of a lasting overlapping consensus.

John Rawls argues that representatives will recognize that his two principles are congruent with each citizen’s good. Under these principles, society’s basic institutions affirm the freedom and equality of every citizen, providing a public basis for each citizen’s self-respect. This public foundation of self-respect is crucial for citizens to pursue their life plans with vigor and confidence. Citizens will also see that basic liberties provide ample social space to pursue their reasonable conceptions of the good. Whether rich or poor, citizens are less likely to feel envious or domineering, as they perceive the economy as operating for the reciprocal benefit of all. Citizens can find satisfaction in contemplating the collective good they can achieve together by maintaining just institutions over time.

Given this congruence between the two principles and citizens’ good, John Rawls argues it is reasonable to expect citizens to develop a desire to act in accordance with them. People develop attachments to individuals and institutions that they perceive as beneficial. The two principles create a social world where each citizen can pursue their own goals within a framework of mutual respect and cooperation with others. Because this social world is experienced as good, the principles will gain citizens’ willing and stable allegiance. “The most stable conception of justice,” John Rawls asserts, “is one that is perspicuous to our reason, congruent with our good, and rooted not in abnegation but in affirmation of the self” (TJ, 261).

4.9 Just Institutions: The Four-Stage Sequence for Implementing Justice as Fairness

The two-part argument for justice as fairness described above occurs at the first stage of the original position. At this stage, representatives also agree on a principle of just savings to regulate how much each generation must save for future generations. Because representatives are unaware of the generation of the citizens they represent, it is rational for them to choose a savings principle that is fair across all generations. John Rawls suggests they may not necessarily opt for a principle mandating endless economic growth. They might prefer a Millian “steady state” of zero real growth once a generation achieves the satisfaction of the two principles.

After agreeing on the two principles of justice and the principle of just savings, representatives proceed through a four-stage sequence, adapting these general principles to the specific conditions of the society they represent. Throughout this sequence, the veil of ignorance gradually thins, revealing more information about society’s general features. Representatives use this increasing information to make progressively more concrete applications of the principles already agreed upon. In essence, they progressively fill in the institutional details of what justice requires in the real world.

At the second stage, representatives gain more knowledge about society’s political culture and economic development and undertake the task of crafting a constitution that embodies the two principles of justice. At the third stage, they learn even more societal details and agree on specific legislation that further implements the two principles within the constitutional framework established in the second stage. At the fourth stage, representatives have full information about society and act as judges and administrators to apply the previously agreed-upon legislation to specific cases. Upon completion of the four stages, the principles of justice as fairness are fully articulated for society’s political life.

For example, at the constitutional (second) and legislative (third) stages, broad basic liberties like “freedom of thought” are specified into more concrete rights, such as the right to free political speech. The right to political speech is then further elaborated into rights to criticize the government, protections for the press from political interference, and so on. Throughout the four-stage sequence, representatives refine basic liberties to ensure they are mutually compatible and aligned with other values, always aiming for an overall scheme of liberties that best empowers citizens to develop and exercise their two moral powers and pursue their chosen conceptions of the good (PL, 289–371).

At later stages, representatives also develop institutions necessary to realize the fair value of equal political liberties. John Rawls emphasizes the critical importance of public funding for elections, campaign contribution limits, and substantially equal media access. Without these measures, politics risks being captured by concentrated private economic power, undermining the fair opportunity for equally capable citizens to influence politics regardless of their wealth, as fair value requires. As John Rawls states, public deliberation must be “set free from the curse of money” (PL, 449).

At the legislative stage, representatives work to implement the second principle of justice by shaping laws governing property, contract, taxation, inheritance, hiring, minimum wages, and other economic regulations. Their task is not simply to allocate a fixed set of goods but to design a system of institutions for education, production, and distribution that will realize fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle over time.

To achieve fair equality of opportunity, John Rawls stresses that laws and policies must go beyond merely prohibiting discrimination in education and employment. To ensure genuine opportunity regardless of social origin, the state must fund high-quality education for the less advantaged. Furthermore, the state must guarantee both a basic minimum income and healthcare for all.

In implementing the difference principle, John Rawls states that the goal is an economic order that maximizes the well-being of the least-advantaged group (e.g., unskilled laborers or those with less than half the median wealth and income over their lifetimes). Given that institutions realizing prior principles are already in place, this goal should be reasonably achievable through mechanisms like adjusting marginal tax rates and tax exemptions.

John Rawls explicitly rejects the welfare state (JF, 137–40). He argues that welfare-state capitalism leaves economic control in the hands of a wealthy private elite. This system fails to guarantee all citizens sufficient resources to have roughly equal political influence or sufficiently equal opportunities in education and employment. Consequently, welfare states tend to create a demoralized underclass.

Laissez-faire capitalism is even less egalitarian than the welfare state in these dimensions. A socialist command economy, on the other hand, concentrates excessive power in the state, potentially endangering political equality and basic liberties like free choice of employment.

John Rawls argues that justice as fairness favors either a property-owning democracy or liberal (democratic) socialism. A property-owning democracy actively promotes widespread ownership of productive assets and broad access to education and training. Liberal socialism shares similar goals but incorporates worker-managed firms. Both systems aim to empower all citizens, even the least advantaged, to manage their own affairs within a context of significant social and economic equality. “The least advantaged are not, if all goes well, the unfortunate and unlucky—objects of our charity and compassion, much less our pity—but those to whom reciprocity is owed as a matter of basic justice” (JF, 139).

4.10 The Original Position and Political Constructivism: Objectivity and Validity in Justice

John Rawls presents the original position as a valuable tool for achieving greater reflective equilibrium. He argues that the original position’s effectiveness as a method of reasoning is validated when it selects the first principle of justice, as this principle aligns with many people’s deeply held convictions about the importance of securing basic rights and liberties for all. Having established credibility by confirming these settled moral judgments, the original position then extends to selecting principles for issues where people’s judgments may be less certain, such as structuring employment opportunities and achieving a just distribution of wealth and income.

In this way, the original position both reinforces and expands common intuitions about justice. John Rawls emphasizes the significance that the same method of reasoning justifying equal basic liberties also justifies a greater degree of political and economic equality than many might initially expect. The momentum of the argument for the first principle carries through to the argument for the second principle. Those who believe in equal basic liberties but reject the more egalitarian aspects of justice as fairness must find an alternative justification for those basic liberties.

The original position also forms the core of John Rawls‘s metaethical theory, political constructivism. Political constructivism provides John Rawls‘s account of the objectivity and validity of political judgments.

The original position, John Rawls argues, embodies all relevant conceptions of person and society and principles of practical reasoning necessary for making judgments about justice. When an overlapping consensus centered on justice as fairness exists, the original position provides a shared public perspective from which all citizens can reason about principles of justice and their application to societal institutions. Judgments made from this perspective are then objectively correct in the sense of providing reasons for citizens to act, regardless of their actual motivations or their subjective viewpoints.

Political constructivism does not claim that the original position proves the truth of the principles of justice as fairness. Questions of truth, John Rawls acknowledges, are subjects of reasonable disagreement and are to be addressed by each citizen within their own comprehensive doctrine. However, judgments derived from the original position are considered valid, or as John Rawls prefers, reasonable.

5. The Law of Peoples: Extending Liberal Principles to Foreign Policy

Having developed theories of legitimacy and justice for a self-contained liberal society, John Rawls then extends his approach to international relations with his theory of the law of peoples, the next stage in his sequence of theories.

John Rawls assumes that a global world state is neither feasible nor desirable. Citing Kant, he argues that a world government would likely become either a global despotism or be perpetually destabilized by groups seeking political independence. Therefore, the law of peoples is international, not cosmopolitan. It is a foreign policy framework guiding a liberal society in its interactions with other societies, both liberal and non-liberal.

John Rawls articulates the core motivations behind his law of peoples:

Two main ideas motivate the Law of Peoples. One is that the great evils of human history—unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, not to mention genocide and mass murder—follow from political injustice, with its own cruelties and callousness… The other main idea, obviously connected with the first, is that, once the gravest forms of political injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least decent) social policies and establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these great evils will eventually disappear (LP, 6–7).

The central feature of the “realistic utopia” envisioned by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples is the absence of these great historical evils. The most crucial condition for realizing this utopia is that all societies are internally well-ordered, possessing just, or at least decent, domestic political institutions.

5.1 The International Basic Structure and Principles of the Law of Peoples

John Rawls draws parallels between his presentation of the law of peoples and his theories of political liberalism and justice as fairness. Just as a liberal society has a basic structure of institutions, John Rawls posits an international basic structure (LP, 33, 62, 114, 115, 122, 123). While he does not claim this international structure has the same pervasive impact on individual life chances as domestic structures, its rules are coercively enforced (e.g., the international response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990). The principles governing this international basic structure, therefore, require justification. This justification must accommodate the even greater diversity of worldviews among contemporary societies than within a single liberal society.

John Rawls proposes eight principles to govern the international basic structure:

1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
4. Peoples are to observe the duty of nonintervention (except to address grave violations of human rights).
5. Peoples have a right of self-defense, but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.
6. Peoples are to honor human rights.
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (LP, 37).

All these principles, except the last, are familiar from contemporary international law (though John Rawls‘s list of human rights for principles 4 and 6 is more limited than that in international law). John Rawls also allows for the law of peoples to accommodate various organizations that enhance political and economic coordination among societies, such as idealized versions of the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and World Bank.

5.2 Peoples: Liberal and Decent Societies as International Actors

The primary actors in John Rawls‘s international theory are not individuals (citizens) but societies, which he terms peoples. A people is a group of individuals governed by a common government, united by shared sympathies, and deeply committed to a common conception of right and justice. “People” is a moralized concept, and not all states currently on the world map qualify as such.

John Rawls‘s conception of peoples in the law of peoples parallels his conception of citizens in justice as fairness. Peoples see themselves as rightfully politically independent and equal in their entitlement to recognition and respect. Peoples are reasonable in their willingness to honor fair terms of cooperation with other peoples, even at their own expense, provided others reciprocate. Reasonable peoples are thus unwilling to impose their political or social ideals on other reasonable peoples, satisfying the criterion of reciprocity in their international relations.

John Rawls identifies the fundamental interests of a people as:

• Protecting its political independence, territory, and citizen security.
• Maintaining its political and social institutions and civic culture.
• Securing its proper self-respect as a people, grounded in its citizens’ awareness of its history and cultural achievements.

John Rawls distinguishes peoples from states. He characterizes states as driven by desires to expand territory, convert other societies to their religion, dominate others, or enhance their relative economic power. Peoples, in contrast, are not states. Societies behaving like states may be considered international outlaws by peoples.

Peoples are categorized into two types based on their domestic political institutions: liberal peoples and decent peoples. Liberal peoples meet the requirements of political liberalism: they have legitimate liberal constitutions and governments under popular control, not dominated by concentrated private economic power.

Decent peoples, while not internally just from a liberal perspective, are sufficiently well-ordered to merit equal membership in international society. Their basic institutions may not recognize reasonable pluralism and may not embody liberal ideals of free and equal citizens cooperating fairly. A decent society’s institutions might be organized around a single comprehensive doctrine, like a dominant religion. Their political system may not be democratic, and certain groups (e.g., women or religious minorities) might be excluded from public office. Nevertheless, John Rawls argues that decent peoples are sufficiently well-ordered to deserve equal standing in international society.

Like all peoples, decent peoples do not pursue aggressive foreign policies. John Rawls further describes a specific type of decent society—a decent hierarchical society—to illustrate the requirements of decency.

A decent hierarchical society’s basic structure establishes a decent system of social cooperation. First, it guarantees a core set of human rights. Second, its political system incorporates a decent consultation hierarchy that takes the fundamental interests of all individuals into account. This means the government genuinely consults with representatives of all social groups, representing all individuals in society, and justifies its laws and policies to these groups. The government does not suppress protests and responds conscientiously to any grievances. It also supports the right of citizens to emigrate.

John Rawls uses the fictional society “Kazanistan” as an example of a decent hierarchical society. In Kazanistan, Islam is the favored religion, and only Muslims can hold high office. However, non-Muslim religions are practiced freely, and their adherents are encouraged to participate in the broader civic culture. Minorities are not subject to arbitrary legal discrimination or treated as inferior by Muslims. John Rawls posits that Kazanistan would qualify as a decent, well-ordered member of the society of peoples, deserving respectful toleration and equal treatment by other peoples.

5.3 International Toleration and Human Rights: Defining the Limits of Acceptance

Liberal peoples, according to John Rawls, should tolerate decent peoples and treat them as equals. Failing to do so would be disrespectful of acceptable ways of organizing a society. Liberal peoples should respect national self-determination and allow decent societies to chart their own courses. Liberal governments should refrain from criticizing decent peoples for not being liberal or incentivizing them to become more liberal, as such actions can breed bitterness and resentment and be counterproductive.

Indeed, public reason applies to international relations just as it does domestically, imposing duties of civility on members of international society. Government officials and candidates for high office should justify their foreign policy positions to other peoples using the principles and values of the law of peoples, avoiding reliance on contentious, parochial reasons that cannot be reasonably shared by all peoples.

A primary reason for liberal peoples to tolerate decent peoples, John Rawls argues, is that decent peoples guarantee a core set of human rights for all individuals within their territory. These core human rights include rights to subsistence, security, personal property, and formal equality before the law, along with freedom from slavery, protections for ethnic groups against genocide, and some degree of liberty of conscience (though not necessarily democratic participation). These core human rights are the minimal conditions for individuals to engage in meaningful social cooperation, making their protection essential for any well-ordered society.

Human rights, in the law of peoples, serve to define the limits of international toleration. Societies that guarantee John Rawls‘s core list of human rights are immune from coercive intervention by other peoples. Societies that violate these human rights exceed the bounds of toleration and may legitimately be subject to economic sanctions or even military intervention.

5.4 The International Original Position: Agreement on Principles of International Law

John Rawls constructs an international original position parallel to the domestic original position of justice as fairness. This international original position addresses the question: “What terms of cooperation would free and equal peoples (liberal and decent) agree to under fair conditions?” The strategy is to incorporate the conception of peoples into the design of this original position, along with restrictions on reasons for favoring basic principles of international law. The aim is to define reasonable conditions under which a rational agreement on principles can be reached.

In the international original position, representatives of each people agree on principles for the international basic structure. Each representative operates behind a veil of ignorance, lacking information about the people they represent, such as their territory size, population, or relative political and economic power. Each representative strives to maximize the interests of their people, understood in terms of the fundamental interests that all peoples share.

John Rawls argues that representatives in the international original position would favor the eight principles of the law of peoples listed earlier. Starting from a baseline of equality and independence, they would find no justification for introducing inequalities into the relationships between peoples (beyond functional inequalities in cooperative organizations, such as wealthier nations contributing more to an idealized United Nations). They would reject international utilitarian principles, as no people would agree to sacrifice its fundamental interests for the sake of greater global utility.

After selecting the eight principles, representatives then verify their stability in ordering international relations over time. Analogous to the domestic case, they will see that the principles of the law of peoples affirm the good of peoples and that peoples will develop trust and confidence in one another as they willingly adhere to these principles. The resulting international political order will be stable for the right reasons (not just a modus vivendi), as each people will affirm the principles as their best option, regardless of shifts in the international balance of power.

John Rawls also draws empirical support for his stability argument from research on the democratic peace. Social scientists have observed that democracies historically tend not to wage war against each other. John Rawls explains this by arguing that liberal societies, due to their internal political structures, are inherently satisfied. Liberal peoples do not seek imperial glory, territorial expansion, or religious conversions. Their needs for goods and services from other countries can be met through trade. John Rawls argues that liberal peoples lack reasons to initiate aggressive wars, thus fostering a genuine and lasting peace among them. Because decent peoples are defined as non-aggressive, they can also join this liberal peace.

Once representatives agree on the eight principles of the law of peoples, they proceed to specify these principles in greater detail through a process analogous to the domestic four-stage sequence.

5.5 Non-Ideal Theory: Addressing Outlaw States and Burdened Societies

The principles selected in the international original position include provisions for non-ideal situations: scenarios where nations are unwilling or unable to comply with ideal principles. These provisions are embedded in principles 4 through 8 of the law of peoples.

Outlaw states are non-compliant; they threaten peace by seeking to expand their power and influence or by violating the human rights of those within their borders. The law of peoples permits other peoples to wage war against outlaw states in self-defense and to take coercive actions to halt human rights violations. In military confrontations with outlaw states, peoples must adhere to principles of just war conduct, such as avoiding direct attacks on enemy civilians except in dire circumstances. John Rawls emphasizes that the ultimate aim of war must be to bring all societies to respect the law of peoples and eventually become full participants in international society.

Burdened societies grapple with social and economic conditions hindering their ability to establish either liberal or decent institutions. A burdened society may lack sufficient material or social resources to sustain social cooperation, perhaps due to overpopulation relative to its territory’s resources. John Rawls emphasizes that a society’s basic structure and political culture are paramount for self-sufficiency. The international community has a duty to assist burdened societies in overcoming these obstacles. The law of peoples (eighth principle) mandates that burdened peoples receive assistance until they can manage their own affairs and become well-ordered.

This duty of assistance represents John Rawls‘s most significant departure from contemporary international law. Accepting this duty would necessitate substantial changes in how nations respond to global poverty and failed states.

5.6 Reconciliation and Realistic Utopia: John Rawls’s Vision for a Just World

John Rawls‘s vision is of a perpetually peaceful and cooperative international order where liberal and decent peoples stand ready to pacify aggressive states, protect core human rights, and assist struggling nations until they become self-sufficient.

Compared to other theories, John Rawls‘s international theory has limited ambitions. Democratic societies can realistically hope for little more than that decent societies will evolve toward greater internal tolerance and democracy. Once the duty to assist burdened peoples is fulfilled, no further requirements for international economic redistribution exist in John Rawls‘s framework. International economic inequalities, in themselves, are not a primary political concern for him. Furthermore, individual suffering due to misfortune or spiritual emptiness are not directly addressed by Rawlsian foreign policy.

The limited practical objective of John Rawls‘s law of peoples is the elimination of the great evils of human history: unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, genocide, and mass murder. This limited ambition means that aspects of the world will remain unreconciled by John Rawls‘s political philosophy.

However, while limited in scope, John Rawls‘s vision remains utopian. To believe in its possibility is to believe that individuals are not inherently selfish or amoral and that international relations can transcend a mere struggle for domination, wealth, and prestige. Human life and history need not be solely defined by a Hobbesian “perpetual and restless desire of power after power” (1651, 58). Affirming the possibility of a just and peaceful future can inoculate against cynicism, reinforcing the decency, reciprocity, and reasonableness that already exist and can continue to grow.

“By showing how the social world may realize the features of a realistic utopia,” John Rawls concludes, “political philosophy provides a long-term goal of political endeavor, and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do today” (LP, 128).

6. Further Reading on John Rawls and His Work

Beyond the primary texts by John Rawls cited throughout this article, readers may find his lectures on historical philosophers illuminating for understanding the influences on his own thought. His Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (LHMP) covers Hume, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel, while Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (LHPP) addresses Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, Marx, Sidgwick, and Butler. Reath, Herman, and Korsgaard (1997) is a collection of essays by John Rawls‘s students focusing on his engagement with the history of philosophy.

The scholarly literature on John Rawls is extensive. The following are some recommended entry points:

Voice (2011) provides an accessible summary and defense of John Rawls‘s three main books, suitable for those with some undergraduate philosophy background. Mandle (2009) is a helpful guide for those wanting a deeper understanding of A Theory of Justice. Mandle and Reidy (2014) offer a lexicon with concise entries on key concepts, issues, influences, and critics, ranging from Abortion to Maximin to Wittgenstein.

Freeman (2007) comprehensively traces the historical development of John Rawls‘s theories and sympathetically elaborates on many of his central arguments. Weithman (2011) details the evolution of John Rawls‘s thought from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism. Pogge (2007) provides an exposition of John Rawls‘s domestic theories, including a biographical sketch and brief responses to libertarian and communitarian critiques (see also Pogge (1989)). Maffettone (2011) and Audard (2007) offer critical introductions to John Rawls‘s three major works.

Historically, Daniels (1975) has been a highly influential collection of essays on justice as fairness. Freeman (2003) is a collection of articles on major themes in John Rawls‘s domestic theories and includes an introductory overview of his entire body of work. Brooks and Nussbaum (2015) collect articles focusing on John Rawls‘s political liberalism. Older collections on political liberalism include Davion and Wolf (1999), Griffin and Solum (1994), and Lloyd (1994). Martin and Reidy (2006) focuses on the law of peoples. Hinton (2015) is a collection on the original position.

Mandle and Reidy (2013) and Reidy (2008) are volumes of scholarly essays covering a wide range of issues arising from John Rawls‘s work. Young (2016) presents a selection of more critical articles. Mandle and Roberts-Cady (2020) pairs authors in debates over major issues in John Rawls‘s writings.

Debates surrounding John Rawls and race are explored in Mills (2017, chs. 8 and 9) and Shelby (2004, 2013). Abbey (2013) is a volume on feminist engagements with John Rawls‘s work. Bailey and Gentile (2014) is an anthology exploring the extent to which religious believers can participate in the political life of a Rawlsian society. Brooks (2012) and Fleming (2004) are collections on John Rawls and the law. O’Neill and Williamson (2012) focuses on the institutional design of a Rawlsian property-owning democracy. Edmundson (2017) argues for a socialist interpretation of Rawlsian justice.

Galisanka (2019) provides an intellectual history leading up to A Theory of Justice and details John Rawls‘s experiences in World War II. Gregory (2007) and Nelson (2019, ch. 3) examine John Rawls‘s early religious writings. Bok (2017) emphasizes Wittgensteinian influences on John Rawls‘s early thought. Botti (2019) situates John Rawls within American pragmatism. Recent historicist treatments of John Rawls‘s work include Forrester (2019) and essays in Smith, Bejan, and Zimmerman (2021). In the latter, Terry (2021) discusses John Rawls‘s condemnation of racism in the Vietnam draft.

Readers with library access may find Kukathas (2003, 4 volumes) or Richardson and Weithman (1999, 5 volumes) valuable resources for older scholarly articles on John Rawls‘s work, organized by themes and types of criticism. Those without access to Richardson and Weithman can find tables of contents and locate articles in their original publications via links in the Other Internet Resources section below.

Bibliography

Works by John Rawls Cited in this Entry

Year	Title	Abbreviation
1971	A Theory of Justice	TJ
1993	Political Liberalism	PL
1999	The Law of Peoples	LP
1999	Collected Papers	CP
1999	Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy	LHMP
2001	Justice as Fairness: A Restatement	JF
2007	Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy	LHPP
2009	A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin & Faith (with “On My Religion”)	BI

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• Mills, C., 2017, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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• Reath, A., Herman, B., and Korsgaard, C. (eds.), 1997, Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Reidy, D. (ed.), 2008, John Rawls, reissued in 2016, New York: Routledge.
• Richardson, H., and Weithman, P. (eds.), 1999, The Philosophy of Rawls: A Collection of Essays, 5 vol., New York: Garland.
• Shelby, T., 2004, “Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations,” Fordham Law Review 72(5): 1697–714.
• –––, 2013, “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice,” Critical Philosophy of Race 1(2): 145–62.
• Smith, S., Bejan, T., and Zimmerman, A. (eds.), 2021, “The Historical Rawls,” Modern Intellectual History (special issue) [Preprint available online]
• Terry, B., 2021, “Conscription and the Color Line: Rawls, Race, and Vietnam,” in Smith, Bejan and Zimmerman (2021) [Preprint available online].
• Vatican Council II, 1965, Dignitas Humanae (Declaration on Religious Freedom), in Documents of Vatican II, W. Abbott (ed.), New York: Herder and Herder, 1966.
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