The spotlight is once again on Boeing, and this time, it’s under the sharp and insightful lens of John Oliver. Weeks after a startling incident where a door panel detached mid-flight from an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 Max-9, the host of Last Week Tonight dedicated a segment to dissecting the aircraft manufacturer’s recent safety record. This incident, which thankfully resulted in only minor injuries, could have been catastrophic had circumstances been slightly different. Oliver didn’t mince words, stating, “That’s too soon for a sneaker to fall apart, let alone a multimillion-dollar aircraft,” highlighting the sheer unacceptability of such a failure on a relatively new plane delivered just two months prior.
Initial investigations into the Alaska Airlines incident revealed a shocking oversight: four bolts that were crucial for securing the door plug were missing. Alaska Airlines’ subsequent inspections uncovered loose bolts on “many” of its Max 9 fleet, raising serious questions about Boeing’s quality control and manufacturing processes. This wasn’t an isolated event; as John Oliver pointed out, it feels like “a much broader issue within Boeing,” especially considering a “years-long string of alarming incidents” plaguing the company. These incidents range from onboard fires to the tragic crashes of two Boeing 737 Max planes, events that collectively paint a concerning picture of a company once synonymous with aviation safety.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken notice, giving Boeing a 90-day ultimatum to rectify its safety protocols amidst reports of employees feeling pressured against reporting safety concerns. This marks a significant downturn for an American icon that once revolutionized commercial air travel and maintained an unparalleled reputation for excellence for decades.
The McDonnell Douglas Merger: A Turning Point for Boeing?
To understand the current predicament, John Oliver delved into a pivotal moment in Boeing’s history: the 1996 merger with McDonnell Douglas. McDonnell Douglas, a company primarily known for military aircraft, carried a less-than-stellar safety record. Oliver wryly commented, “Was merging with the McDonnell Douglas aerospace corporation slash murder emporium the worst decision that Boeing CEO’s worst decision? Probably not,” referencing a separate questionable decision made by a former CEO to underscore the magnitude of the merger’s impact.
Post-merger, a significant cultural shift occurred within Boeing. A profit-driven ethos began to overshadow the long-standing commitment to safety and product quality. Within years, the introduction of stock buyback programs signaled a change in priorities, with stock prices seemingly taking precedence over engineering and safety. Oliver illustrated this shift through the development of the 787 Dreamliner in the 2000s. This project was allocated less than half the budget of previous aircraft developments and relied heavily on outsourced production from 50 different suppliers. Oliver likened this approach to “assembling a bunch of pieces other people made, leading to a finished product that, structurally speaking, was always going to be a fucking mess.”
The Dreamliner project, already three years behind schedule and $25 billion over budget, faced further setbacks when the aircraft was grounded due to multiple onboard fires caused by defective batteries from a subcontractor, batteries that Boeing failed to properly audit.
“More is Less”: The 737 Max and Catastrophic Consequences
Boeing’s attempt to rebound with the 737 Max model, marketed under the slogan “more is less,” further exacerbated safety concerns. Between 2014 and 2018, an astounding 92% of Boeing’s operating cash flow was funneled into dividends and share buybacks, dwarfing investments in research and development. This financial strategy preceded two devastating crashes: the 2018 Lion Air crash, claiming 189 lives, and the 2019 Ethiopian Airlines crash, resulting in 157 fatalities. These tragedies brought critical attention to significant safety flaws in the 737 Max.
Oliver meticulously explained the issue with the Boeing Max’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). This system, designed to adjust the plane’s angle in certain flight conditions, could be triggered by a single faulty sensor – a sensor vulnerable to damage from common occurrences like bird strikes. Crucially, Boeing failed to inform pilots about the MCAS system, meaning pilots were not adequately trained to handle potential malfunctions. Oliver expressed disbelief at this omission, questioning, “How is information about a system that could crash the plane ‘unnecessary’?”
Following the Lion Air crash, Boeing pledged a software fix for MCAS within six weeks. However, instead of prioritizing this critical safety update, the company authorized a record $20 billion share buyback program. Oliver sarcastically remarked that this demonstrated Boeing’s concern for safety – “specifically, the safety of their fucking stock price.”
The FAA eventually grounded the 737 Max three days after the Ethiopian Airlines crash. A subsequent congressional investigation unearthed damning internal emails from Boeing employees. One particularly scathing email read, “this airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys,” revealing a deeply troubling internal assessment of the aircraft’s development.
Regulatory Capture and the Path Forward for Boeing
This series of failures prompted John Oliver to question, “Where the fuck are the regulators?” He highlighted the FAA’s reliance on Boeing itself to vouch for the aircraft’s safety, a consequence of the agency’s limited capacity to independently analyze Boeing’s data. Furthermore, Boeing was allowed to appoint its own inspectors, who were, in essence, Boeing employees regulating Boeing. Oliver described this as “the most incestuous relationship we’ve seen in this story so far,” drawing a stark comparison to the earlier mentioned CEO’s inappropriate family relationship to emphasize the level of compromised oversight.
Oliver concluded that “At every point along the way, the FAA either delegated responsibility to Boeing, or gave them the benefit of the doubt, which hopefully they will never do again.” He echoed the sentiments of Boeing whistleblowers, advocating for new leadership to steer the company towards a genuine commitment to safety, beyond mere public relations promises of transparency and accountability. Oliver’s final message was clear: “If you truly are too big to fail,” Boeing, “that should mean that you are big enough to spend the time and resources required to fix the culture that you have destroyed.” The segment served as a powerful indictment of corporate greed prioritizing profits over passenger safety and a call for systemic change within Boeing and its regulatory oversight.
