Exploring John Locke's Social Contract Theory: Foundations of Liberal Democracy

John Locke (1632–1704), a towering figure in modern philosophy, profoundly shaped our understanding of government, individual rights, and the very nature of political legitimacy. His seminal work, Two Treatises of Government, stands as a cornerstone of liberal thought, most notably for its articulation of the John Locke Social Contract. In this treatise, Locke dismantled the then-prevailing divine right of kings theory, arguing instead that individuals are inherently free and equal, possessing inalienable rights that precede any government. This revolutionary concept of the social contract, where government derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed, has resonated through centuries, influencing revolutions and shaping the democratic ideals of nations worldwide.

This article delves into the core tenets of Locke’s political philosophy, expanding upon the original text to provide a comprehensive exploration of his key ideas, particularly focusing on the john locke social contract and its implications. We will examine the interconnected concepts that underpin his theory, including natural law, natural rights, the state of nature, property, consent, punishment, separation of powers, toleration, and education. By meticulously dissecting these elements, we aim to provide a richer and more accessible understanding of Locke’s enduring legacy and its continued relevance in contemporary political discourse.

1. Natural Law and Natural Rights: The Bedrock of Locke’s Social Contract

At the heart of Locke’s political philosophy lies his robust theory of natural law and natural rights. This concept, predating Locke, posits the existence of universal moral truths applicable to all individuals, irrespective of their geographical location or societal conventions. It distinguishes between laws inherent in nature and universally binding, and positive laws, which are specific to particular societies and established by convention. This distinction is fundamental to understanding the limitations Locke places on governmental power within his john locke social contract.

Natural law, for Locke, is discoverable through reason and is distinct from divine law, which, in Christian tradition, refers to laws divinely revealed. Locke believed that natural law could be discerned by reason alone and applied universally, while divine law required special revelation and was applicable only to those to whom it was revealed. He argued that not all of the Ten Commandments, or the entirety of Old Testament law, were universally binding, citing the opening of the Ten Commandments, “Hear O Israel,” as evidence of their specific address (Works 6:37). Interestingly, despite his emphasis on reason, Locke integrated God into his natural law framework, believing that God’s character, discoverable through reason, was consistent with and supportive of natural law. Divine and natural law, in Locke’s view, could overlap but were not coextensive, allowing for a stricter moral code in the Bible without contradicting natural law. Consistency with natural law, in fact, became a criterion for Locke when interpreting biblical passages, highlighting the primacy of reason even in theological interpretation.

Alongside natural law, Locke championed the concept of natural rights, a language gaining traction through thinkers like Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. While natural law emphasizes duties, natural rights underscore individual entitlements or claims. Scholars debate the primacy of rights versus duties in Locke’s theory. Some, like Leo Strauss, prioritize rights, interpreting Locke through a Hobbesian lens as primarily self-interested, seeing natural law obligations as secondary to self-preservation. They argue Locke’s hedonistic view of human motivation (Essay 2.20) supports a self-interested interpretation, suggesting self-preservation trumps any duties.

A portrait of John Locke, emphasizing his intellectual stature and influence on Western thought, relevant to understanding the context of his social contract theory.

Conversely, scholars like Dunn, Tully, and Ashcraft emphasize the primacy of natural law, viewing rights as means to fulfill duties. They argue Locke’s rights to life, liberty, and property primarily highlight our duties not to kill, enslave, or steal. They also point to Locke’s recognition of a duty to assist in the preservation of mankind, including charity for the indigent (Two Treatises 1.42). These scholars see rights as instrumental to duty fulfillment, a framework that shapes the moral obligations within Locke’s john locke social contract. Simmons offers a nuanced middle ground, arguing rights and duties are equally fundamental, with rights protecting a “robust zone of indifference” for individual choice, operating within the bounds of natural law but not solely as means to it. Tierney questions the need to prioritize, suggesting natural law and rights function as corollaries, with modern rights theories evolving from medieval natural law concepts that inherently included permissions to act or not act.

Compromise positions have emerged, with Zuckert acknowledging differences between Hobbes and Locke while maintaining a Straussian perspective. Zuckert highlights Locke’s grounding of property rights in self-ownership, a point Hobbes denied, though questioning Locke’s theism. Seagrave further refines this, arguing Locke’s seemingly contradictory claims of divine and self-ownership are reconciled when considering humanity as a whole owned by God and individuals owning their labor and property relative to each other. This distinction is crucial in understanding the individual autonomy Locke envisions within his john locke social contract, balancing individual rights with broader societal obligations. These interpretations underscore ongoing debates about the precise relationship between natural law and natural rights in Locke’s complex philosophical system.

Another point of contention concerns the knowability of natural law through reason. Strauss and Laslett, despite differing interpretations of Locke, see contradictions in his natural law theory. They point to Locke’s critique of innate ideas in Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Book 1), his claim that morality is demonstrably like mathematics (Essay 3.11.16, 4.3.18–20), and yet his lack of a complete natural law deduction. Strauss even suggests Locke’s contradictions intentionally reveal his disbelief in natural law, while Laslett suggests separating Locke the philosopher from Locke the political writer.

However, scholars like Yolton, Colman, Ashcraft, Grant, Simmons, Tuckness, Israelson, Rossiter, and Connolly argue against inherent inconsistency. They contend that admitting no one has fully deduced natural law (The Reasonableness of Christianity, Works 7:139) doesn’t negate partial deductions. They argue Locke’s Essay (4.10.1–19) focuses on the possibility of moral reasoning, not a full natural law account. They acknowledge Locke’s unsystematic treatment of natural law, requiring reconstruction from scattered passages across his works.

Understanding Locke’s natural law foundation requires situating him within the voluntarism-intellectualism debate. Voluntarists argue morality is determined by God’s will, obligating obedience solely because it’s God’s will, lest God become superfluous to morality. Intellectualists counter that this makes morality arbitrary and fails to explain our obligation to obey God. Zorzi argues “person” is a relational term for Locke, implying accountability to God for following the law.

Locke’s stance on natural law’s grounds and content is debated. Voluntarist-sounding statements emphasize law requiring a legislator with authority (Essay 1.3.6, 4.10.7) and created beings’ obligation to obey their creator (Political Essays 116–120). Conversely, intellectualist statements suggest an external moral standard for God (Two Treatises 2.195; Works 7:6), aiming to avoid arbitrary content in natural law. Herzog proposes Locke is an intellectualist, grounding obligation to God in a prior duty of gratitude. Simmons interprets Locke as voluntarist, based on statement preponderance. Tuckness proposes a compromise: voluntarist on grounds (“why obey?”)—reason is advisory without a superior’s will—but with content shaped by analogous divine and human reason, ensuring natural law doesn’t seem arbitrary, given God created us with reason to follow His will. This nuanced understanding of natural law is crucial for appreciating the moral framework underpinning Locke’s john locke social contract.

The theological aspects of Locke’s theory are debated for contemporary relevance. Straussians see theology as rhetorical cover. Dunn and Stanton find limited relevance due to religious assumptions. Simmons and Vernon attempt to separate foundations from other aspects. Simmons posits Locke’s thought as overdetermined, with religious and secular arguments, the fundamental law being “mankind is to be preserved” (Two Treatises 2.135), presented rule-consequentially or with Kantian undertones of not treating equals as means. Waldron argues Locke’s theology provides a stronger basis for political equality than secular approaches.

Regarding natural law’s content, Locke emphasizes mankind’s preservation as fundamental. Simmons (Two Treatises 2.6) lists duties: self-preservation, preserving others when not conflicting with self-preservation, not taking another’s life, and not harming others. Libertarians downplay duties 1 and 2. Locke’s earlier Essays on the Law of Nature include praising the deity and good character qualities as natural law requirements. These duties and rights, derived from natural law, are the very elements individuals seek to secure and protect when entering into Locke’s john locke social contract.

2. State of Nature: The Pre-Political Condition in Locke’s Social Contract

Locke’s concept of the state of nature is multifaceted and subject to diverse interpretations. On the surface, it appears straightforward. Locke defines it as the “want [lack] of a common judge, with authority,” and “Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them” (Two Treatises 2.19). Many interpret this as the state of nature existing wherever legitimate political authority is absent, disputes are unresolved by a common judge, and individuals live by the law of reason. This view distinguishes the state of nature from political society with legitimate government and a state of war where reason is abandoned. This understanding of the state of nature is the starting point for understanding why individuals would rationally choose to enter into a john locke social contract.

Simmons challenges this view, arguing Locke’s definition is a sufficient, not necessary, condition. He posits that individuals in the state of nature could authorize a third party to settle disputes without leaving the state of nature, as this third party lacks broader legislative power for the public good. Simmons also notes that some individuals within legitimate governments remain in the state of nature: visiting aliens (Two Treatises 2.9), minors (2.15, 118), and those with “defect” of reason (2.60). He proposes the state of nature is a relational concept describing moral relations between individuals not consenting to the same legitimate government’s adjudication, rather than a geographical territory devoid of effective government. These groups, lacking or unable to give consent, remain in the state of nature. Thus, individual A may be in the state of nature relative to B, but not C.

Simmons’ account sharply contrasts with Strauss, who views Locke’s state of nature as a factual, historical description of early society, revealing Locke’s departure from Christian teachings and similarity to Hobbes. Straussians argue state of nature theories contradict the biblical Genesis account and see Locke’s Christian statements as concealing anti-Christian views. Simmons counters that the state of nature is a moral account, compatible with diverse social arrangements. Knowing individuals are in a state of nature only reveals their mutual rights and responsibilities, not their wealth, peace, or war-like nature. This moral dimension of the state of nature highlights the ethical imperatives that drive individuals towards forming a john locke social contract.

Dunn offers a complementary interpretation, viewing Locke’s state of nature less as historical anthropology and more as theological reflection on the human condition. Dunn sees it as expressing Locke’s theological view: humans exist in a world created by God for God’s purposes, but governments are human creations for furthering those purposes.

Locke’s state of nature theory is intrinsically linked to natural law, defining individual rights and status as free and equal. The stronger the acceptance of Locke’s characterization of individuals as free, equal, and independent, the more effective the state of nature becomes as a representative device. It’s crucial to note that these interpretations don’t portray Locke’s state of nature solely as a thought experiment, unlike Kant or Rawls. Locke argued for its historical and contemporary reality (Two Treatises 2.14), believing some governments have actually formed as he suggests. The degree of historical accuracy is debated, particularly regarding consent, questioning whether legitimate government requires actual consent or if hypothetical consent suffices. This question of consent is central to understanding the legitimacy and obligation generated by the john locke social contract.

3. Property: Justifying Private Ownership in Locke’s Social Contract

Locke’s theory of property is both highly influential and heavily debated. Interpretations vary widely, particularly regarding Locke’s intentions. Macpherson views Locke as a proponent of unrestricted capitalist accumulation, arguing Locke initially sets three limitations on property acquisition in the state of nature: (1) spoilage limitation (use before it spoils, Two Treatises 2.31), (2) sufficiency restriction (“enough and as good” left for others, 2.27), and (3) labor appropriation (property acquired through personal labor, 2.27). Macpherson argues these restrictions are progressively transcended. Money negates spoilage (2.46–47), and increased productivity from private property negates sufficiency concerns as even the landless benefit (2.37). Macpherson sees the “enough and as good” requirement as derived from a prior principle guaranteeing access to necessities through labor. He dismisses the third restriction, noting Locke’s recognition of alienated labor (servant’s labor creates master’s property, 2.28). Macpherson critiques Locke’s “possessive individualism” as relying on differential rationality between classes and limiting political membership to property owners. This interpretation highlights the potential for inequality inherent in Locke’s theory of property within the john locke social contract.

Ryan counters Macpherson, arguing Locke’s broad definition of property including life and liberty (Two Treatises 2.87) allows even the landless to be political members. The debate then centers on Locke’s use of “property” in key passages. Tully further challenges Macpherson, citing the First Treatise‘s duty of charity to the indigent (1.42), undermining the idea of wealth without social duty.

Tully offers a reinterpretation, shifting focus from labor-mixing to Locke’s “workmanship model.” He argues Locke believed makers own what they make, mirroring God’s ownership of humanity as creator. Humans, in God’s image, shape the physical environment rationally. Waldron critiques this, arguing it grants absolute maker’s rights akin to God’s, while Sreenivasan defends Tully, distinguishing between creating (absolute right, only God) and making (analogous, weaker right).

Tully also emphasizes the sufficiency condition’s importance. He argues individual property is justified only if appropriation doesn’t worsen others’ condition. In abundance, taking some water or land harms no one. Scarcity invalidates prior labor-based rights as “enough and as good” is no longer available. Post-scarcity, property legitimacy requires political society.

Waldron refutes the sufficiency condition, noting Locke presents it as sufficient, not necessary (“at least where there is enough, and as good left,” Two Treatises 2.27), a descriptive initial condition, not a normative restriction. Waldron argues the condition leads to absurdity: universal starvation due to inability to gain unanimous consent for appropriation.

Sreenivasan defends Tully, highlighting Locke’s repeated “enough and as good,” arguing it’s crucial, solving the consent problem for initial appropriation. No harm, no objection, implied consent; harm implies no consent. Sreenivasan modifies Tully, interpreting “enough and as good” as “enough and as good opportunity for securing one’s preservation,” not same commodity quantity. This lessens Locke’s radicalism, not invalidating all original property rights upon political community creation. However, Sreenivasan acknowledges a flaw: mere opportunity for subsistence wage labor after scarcity deprives laborers of pre-scarcity surplus and equal access to materials, rendering Locke’s theory unable to solve individual property rights in initially common ownership without consent. This debate about property acquisition and distribution is central to critiques of Locke’s john locke social contract as potentially justifying inequality.

Simmons offers another synthesis, rejecting Tully’s workmanship model and siding with Waldron against the sufficiency condition as a restriction. He argues “making” in Two Treatises chapter five isn’t workmanship in Tully’s sense. Simmons notes Locke posits self-ownership without self-creation. He interprets Locke as believing in God’s creator rights, but humans having limited trustee rights, not maker rights. Simmons bases this on two Locke arguments: property justified by God’s will/human need and by labor-mixing. The former can be theologically or rule-consequentially interpreted. Labor, for Simmons, isn’t literally “mixed” substance, but purposive activity satisfying needs. Like Sreenivasan, Simmons sees this as stemming from a prior right to subsistence and self-government. Private property enhances individual independence and self-direction. Simmons finds Locke’s argument flawed in underestimating wage labor’s dependence of poor on rich, undermining self-government. He also critiques Locke’s consent-based justification for money’s unequal property distribution.

Some scholars suggest Locke’s property chapter addressed colonial concerns. Tully and Arneil note Locke’s colonial involvement and labor theory conveniently limiting Native American property rights to hunted animals, not land, which Locke deemed vacant for taking. Armitage links Locke’s Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina revisions to his Second Treatise property chapter. Goldie cautions against overlooking English political events as Locke’s primary focus. This colonial interpretation adds a critical dimension to understanding the historical and potentially biased context of Locke’s property theory within his john locke social contract.

Finally, the status of state-of-nature property rights after civil society is debated. Locke allows majority taxation, not unanimous consent (2.140). Nozick interprets Locke libertarianly, government limited to property right protection, taxing only for that. Tully sees scarcity invalidating state-of-nature holdings upon government formation, allowing unconstrained government action. Waldron mediates, seeing property rights as state-of-nature rights constraining government, but legislature substantially interpreting natural law on property. This ongoing debate highlights the complex relationship between individual property rights, governmental power, and the social contract framework established by Locke.

4. Consent, Political Obligation, and the Ends of Government: The Foundation of Locke’s Social Contract

Consent is central to Locke’s political philosophy. He begins with individuals in a state of nature, lacking common legitimate authority. From this natural freedom and independence, Locke emphasizes individual consent as the mechanism for creating political societies and joining them. While natural law dictates general obligations and rights, specific political obligations arise from voluntary undertakings. Locke explicitly states full societal membership requires express consent (Two Treatises 2.122). The challenge lies in the objection that few have actually consented to their governments, rendering most governments illegitimate, contradicting Locke’s intent. This problem is directly addressed by Locke’s theory of consent within his john locke social contract.

Locke’s primary solution is tacit consent. Simply using a country’s highways constitutes tacit consent and agreement to obey its government while residing there. This explains resident aliens’ obligation to obey laws, albeit temporarily. Inheriting property creates a stronger, more permanent bond, as the original owner subjected the property to the commonwealth’s jurisdiction. Children inheriting property consent to the commonwealth’s jurisdiction over it (Two Treatises 2.120). Debate exists whether property inheritance is tacit or express consent. One interpretation sees it as express consent, making one a full member. Grant suggests Locke ideally envisioned explicit adult consent as a precondition for property inheritance. Another interpretation views property inheritance as tacit, lacking explicit political obligation declaration.

Regardless, tacit consent is needed to explain government legitimacy given limited express consent. Simmons questions how actions like walking on roads or inheriting land constitute “deliberate, voluntary alienating of rights” (Simmons 1993, 69). He argues consent requires awareness. Requiring emigration to avoid tacit consent makes continued residence unfree. Simmons concludes real consent is necessary but rarely given, leaning towards “philosophical anarchism,” contradicting Locke’s own conclusions but highlighting the tension inherent in the concept of tacit consent within the john locke social contract.

Pitkin takes a different approach, diminishing consent’s practical importance. She argues tacit consent dilutes the concept, but Locke can do this because natural law, not consent, dictates government’s basic structure and content. If consent were foundational, government powers would derive from the founders’ contract. Pitkin argues government form and powers are natural law-determined. Present government quality, aligning with natural law, matters more than past consent acts. Walking streets or inheriting property in tyranny doesn’t imply consent to tyranny. Government quality, not actual consent, legitimizes government. Simmons counters that this ignores Locke’s repeated emphasis on political obligations arising from individual consent. This debate highlights the tension between actual consent and the normative principles of Locke’s john locke social contract.

Dunn offers another perspective, arguing Locke’s “consent” concept is broader than modern interpretations. Modern theories require deliberate, voluntary consent. Locke’s concept was broader, encompassing “not unwilling” acquiescence. Voluntary acquiescence suffices. Dunn cites Locke’s use of “consenting” to money use as evidence. Simmons objects that this ignores Locke’s instances of deliberate choice consent and renders Locke unconvincing by diluting the meaning of consent to near insignificance in the john locke social contract.

Recent scholarship continues to explore these issues. Davis distinguishes between political society and legitimate government. Express consent creates political society membership. Government exercises legitimate authority over various non-consenting groups. Government is supreme in some respects, but lacks sovereignty. Davis (2017) argues actual consent in Locke’s time involved declaring intent to vote, not voting for a candidate, more plausibly affirmative consent to political society membership, analogous to voter registration today. Van der Vossen (2015) argues initial property owner consent isn’t the mechanism for government territorial rule. Locke envisions people (initially fathers) exercising political authority, and people tacitly consenting, justifying a rudimentary state ruling consenters. Treaties between these states establish territorial borders. Hoff (2015) argues tacit consent acts aren’t necessary for political obligation. Consent is implied if government functions accountably to the people, shifting focus from explicit acts of consent to ongoing governmental accountability within the john locke social contract.

Obligation extent after consent is also debated. Straussians emphasize self-preservation primacy, limiting natural law duties to non-self-threatening situations (Two Treatises 2.6), thus obligations cease when preservation is threatened. Consider a soldier’s perilous mission. Grant notes Locke’s view that a deserting soldier (Two Treatises 2.139) is justly executed. Grant argues Locke implies a moral soldier obligation to sacrifice for the common good (Hobbes would deny this), not just legitimate enforcement of desertion laws. Grant sees Locke as believing consent can extend to life-risking commitments. Entering political society is a permanent, calculated decision, including combat risk. Revoking consent during attack renders initial consent pointless. Grant also sees reciprocity-based duty given others’ sacrifices. This highlights the strong obligations individuals undertake within Locke’s john locke social contract, potentially extending to self-sacrifice for the common good.

Most approaches focus on consent as a political obligation solution. Another approach examines consent’s role in determining legitimate governmental ends. The Seliger-Kendall debate contrasts constitutionalist (Seliger) and majoritarian (Kendall) Locke interpretations. Constitutionalist Locke sees the people consenting to a constitution creating the commonwealth. Majoritarian Locke sees the people creating a majority-rule legislature. Tuckness (2002a) sees Locke as flexible on constitutional drafting.

Another debate focuses on ends, not institutions. Locke limits government power to the public good, “no other end but preservation,” prohibiting killing, enslaving, or plundering citizens (2.135). Libertarians like Nozick interpret this as government solely protecting rights. Tuckness (2002b, 2008a) interprets Locke’s natural law formulation “as much as possible mankind is to be preserved” (Two Treatises 2.135) positively, encompassing positive goals and negative rights. Government power to promote common good includes population growth, military improvement, economic and infrastructure strengthening, indirectly aiding societal preservation, explaining Locke’s Letter advocacy for government promotion of “arms, riches, and multitude of citizens” against foreign threats (Works 6: 42). This broader view of governmental ends within Locke’s john locke social contract allows for a more active role for the state in promoting the public good beyond mere rights protection.

5. Locke and Punishment: Enforcing the Social Contract and Natural Law

Locke defines political power as “a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less Penalties” (Two Treatises 2.3). Punishment is central to Locke’s politics and his innovation. He termed his punishment account “very strange doctrine” (2.9), challenging the assumption only political sovereigns punish. Locke believed punishment requires law, and the state of nature has natural law, justifying individual “punishment” in that state to enforce the john locke social contract at its most basic level, even before formal government. Locke reasoned that natural law’s fundamental aim of mankind’s preservation would be “in vain” without enforcement power (Two Treatises 2.7), legitimizing pre-governmental individual punishment, disagreeing with Pufendorf who argued punishment requires positive legal structures.

Locke acknowledged the key objection: individuals as judges in their own cases in the state of nature. He admitted this inconvenience and a primary reason for leaving the state of nature (Two Treatises 2.13). Locke emphasized this point to explain civil society’s emergence. In the state of nature, individuals have liberty for “innocent delights,” self-preservation within natural law, and punishing natural law violations. Civil society limits self-preservation power by law and transfers punishment power to government (Two Treatises 2.128–130). State-of-nature punishment power is the foundation for governmental coercive force, highlighting the transition from individual to collective enforcement within the john locke social contract.

Punishment principles become complex. Rationales for punishment are forward-looking (deterrence, societal protection, rehabilitation) and backward-looking (retribution). Locke seems to conflate these:

And thus in the state of nature, one Man comes by a power over another, but yet no absolute or arbitrary Power, to use a criminal when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will, but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint. For these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that [which] we call punishment. (Two Treatises 2.8)

Locke mentions both retribution and punishment only for reparation and restraint. Simmons sees this as combining rationales. However, seventeenth-century natural rights punishment justifications commonly used “retribute” while rejecting retributive punishment as understood today (Tuckness 2010a). Locke, in the passage, likely means proper punishment amount is for restitution, public protection, and deterrence. Locke’s other writings on toleration, education, and religion consistently justify punishment non-retributively. Tuckness highlights Locke’s restitution emphasis as backward-looking (restoring prior state) and forward-looking (tangible victim benefit). Locke’s natural punishment understanding links to legitimate state punishment: even in the state of nature, punishment primarily furthers human life and property preservation. Governmental punishment emphasis on deterrence, public safety, and restitution mirrors this, focusing on the practical goals of punishment within the john locke social contract.

Another puzzle is international punishment permissibility. Locke describes international relations as a state of nature. States should have the same power to punish natural law breaches internationally as individuals in the state of nature. This could legitimize punishing war crimes or crimes against humanity even without state or international law authorization. Thus, even if “crimes of aggression” wasn’t recognized in WWII, natural law violations of life, liberty, or property could justify punishment. Common interpretation sees international punishment power as symmetrical to state-of-nature punishment.

Tuckness (2008a) argues for asymmetry, noting Locke limits states to citizen right protection, not universal rights (Two Treatises 1.92, 2.88, 2.95, 2.131, 2.147). In the state of nature, punishment preserves mankind. After state formation, punishment benefits the particular society. State-of-nature individuals aren’t required to risk life for others (Two Treatises 2.6), presumably also for risky punishment. Locke may object to compelling soldiers to risk lives for altruistic international crime punishment. State-of-nature individuals could refuse risky punishment, so Locke reasons individuals may not have consented to states risking their lives for altruistic international crime punishment. This highlights the limitations of punishment in the international state of nature compared to within a civil society formed by the john locke social contract.

6. Separation of Powers and the Dissolution of Government: Maintaining the Social Contract

Locke advocates for separation of powers in legitimate government. The legislative power is supreme (Two Treatises 2.149), having ultimate authority over “how the force for the commonwealth shall be employed” (2.143). The legislature is bound by natural law and creates laws furthering natural law goals and specifying punishments (2.135), acting as the most direct expression of the collective will formed through the john locke social contract. The executive power enforces the law in specific cases. Locke’s third power, the “federative power,” is international action according to natural law. States in a state of nature internationally follow natural law and punish violations to protect citizens.

Locke’s omission of judicial power as separate clarifies when distinguishing powers from institutions. Powers are functions. Power is a legitimate function (lawmaking, enforcement). Legislative supremacy over executive doesn’t mean parliament over king. It means “what can give laws to another, must needs be superior to him” (Two Treatises 2.150). Multiple institutions can share power; legislative power in Locke’s time was shared by Commons, Lords, and King, all needing agreement for law (1.151). Federative and executive powers are typically held by the executive, allowing one person to exercise multiple powers/functions. No one-to-one power-institution correspondence exists (Tuckness 2002a).

Locke isn’t against courts, but doesn’t see interpretation as a distinct function or power. Legislation announces general rules with punishments. Executive power judges specific cases and administers force by rule (Two Treatises 2.88–89). Both involve interpretation. Positive laws “are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted” (2.12). Executives interpret laws by natural law. Legislation specifies natural law and applies it to circumstances (2.135), also requiring natural law interpretation. Locke didn’t see interpretation as distinct, viewing it as part of legislative and executive functions (Tuckness 2002a).

Comparing Locke’s separation of powers to Montesquieu (1989) reveals more terminological than conceptual differences. Montesquieu’s legislative, executive, and judicial division still affirms legislative superiority, with executive power handling international affairs (Locke’s federative) and judicial power domestic law execution (Locke’s executive). Terminology shifted. Locke considered arrest, trial, and punishment as executive function parts, not distinct functions (Tuckness 2002a). This separation of powers is designed to prevent tyranny and uphold the principles of the john locke social contract.

Locke favored elected representatives in the legislative power, but legislative power could include monarchical and aristocratic elements. He believed people could create “mixed” constitutions. Locke’s separation of powers doesn’t dictate a specific constitution or preclude unelected officials in legislative power. Locke prioritized popular representation with power to block liberty infringements and unjustified taxation. The community remains supreme, retaining the right to “remove or alter” legislative power (Two Treatises 2.149). Society dissolves through foreign invasion (2.211), but Locke focuses on people reclaiming power from government. Rule of law ignored, representatives prevented from assembling, election mechanisms altered without consent, or people handed to foreign power—these justify reclaiming authority and overthrowing government (2.212–17). Rebellion is also justified against rights-violating government (2.222). Locke sees rebellion as likely for oppressed people and unlikely for non-oppressed. Rebellion threat deters tyranny (2.224–6). While constitutions vary, power delegation is conditional.

Locke’s separation of powers is complicated by prerogative: executive right to act without explicit legal authorization, even contrary to law, to better fulfill laws preserving human life. A king might demolish a house to stop fire spread (Two Treatises 2.159). Locke defines prerogative as “the power of doing public good without a rule” (2.166). This challenges legislative supremacy. Locke explains prerogative as necessary because general rules can’t cover all cases, inflexible rules harm public good, and legislature isn’t always in session (2.160). Executive-legislative relationship depends on constitution. If the executive lacks legislative power, legislature can overrule prerogative decisions upon reconvening. Executive veto creates stalemate. Similar stalemate exists if executive controls parliament’s convening. In such cases, Locke sees no earthly judge on prerogative misuse, leading to “appeal to heaven,” like people appealing to heaven against tyranny (2.168).

“Appeal to heaven” is crucial in Locke’s thought. Leaving the state of nature, people create government with a constitution defining power distribution. Powers are meant to protect rights and promote public good, upholding the john locke social contract. Disputes between people and government on obligation fulfillment lack higher human authority. The “appeal to heaven” is the final recourse: armed conflict, letting God judge righteousness. This ultimate right of revolution is a critical component of Locke’s social contract theory, ensuring government remains accountable to the people.

7. Toleration: Religion and the Limits of Governmental Power in Locke’s Social Contract

Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration develops arguments for proper spheres of religion and politics. His central claims are that government should not use force to compel religious belief and religious societies are voluntary with no coercive power over members or outsiders. One argument strand is explicitly religious: neither Jesus’s example nor New Testament teachings indicate force as a path to salvation. He also points to hypocrisy: persecutors over minor worship/doctrine differences are unconcerned with greater moral sins (Works 6:10–12). This religious argument for toleration is a key aspect of Locke’s broader philosophy of individual liberty, which underpins his john locke social contract.

Beyond religious arguments, Locke gives three philosophical reasons against governmental religious coercion (Works 6:10–12). First, God or human consent hasn’t entrusted soul care to magistrates. This echoes Two Treatises‘ argument for natural freedom and equality. No biblical command mandates magistrates to enforce true faith, and people cannot consent because belief isn’t volitional; it’s based on perceived truth, not will. Second, government power is force, while true religion requires inward persuasion, rendering force ineffective for true religion. Third, even if magistrates could change minds, universal acceptance of the magistrate’s religion wouldn’t lead to true religion, as many magistrates believe false religions.

Locke’s contemporary, Proast (1999a), argued Locke’s three reasons reduce to two: true faith is unforced, and we lack certainty of our own rightness. Proast argued force can indirectly aid truth by prompting consideration of ignored arguments or preventing exposure to misleading ideas. If force indirectly helps true faith, Locke’s argument weakens. Regarding false magistrate religion harm, Proast deemed it irrelevant, distinguishing between magistrate promoting believed-true religion and actually true religion. Proast believed non-skeptics must see their own position as objectively better.

Waldron (1993) restated Proast’s objection for contemporary audiences. He argued, leaving aside Christian arguments, Locke’s main point was instrumental irrationality of religious force because force affects will, not belief. Waldron notes this only blocks one persecution rationale, not all, like preserving peace. Even with religious goals, Waldron agrees with Proast that force can indirectly alter beliefs. Current Locke toleration discussions center on Locke’s response to Proast/Waldron. Tuckness (2008b) and Tate (2016) argue Locke deemphasized the rationality argument in later writings.

Some contemporary commentators rescue Locke by redefining the magistrate’s religious goal. Mendus (1989) notes brainwashing might induce sincere belief utterance, but not genuine belief. Coerced beliefs are similarly problematic. Bou Habib (2003) argues Locke seeks sincere inquiry, impossible under duress. These approaches argue force cannot achieve desired religious sincerity.

Others focus on Locke’s first argument about authority, especially consent. Wootton (1993) argues even if force sometimes works, it’s rarely enough for rational consent to governmental religious power. Those unlikely to change beliefs under persecution rationally prevent persecution. Vernon (1997) argues we want right beliefs for right reasons. Reason, not force, should determine belief, so we wouldn’t consent to systems influenced by irrelevant force. Tate (2016) sees Locke’s strongest toleration argument rooted in lack of consent to governmental religious authority, only secular interest promotion, which toleration furthers. This emphasis on consent as limiting governmental power is a direct application of the principles of the john locke social contract to the realm of religious belief.

Still others focus on the third argument: magistrate fallibility. The question is whether Locke begs the question. Wootton (1993) argues individuals rationally believe governments will be wrong on true religion. Governments pursue power, not truth, and are poor religious guides. Rulers hold diverse religions, so likely one’s own ruler’s views are false. Wootton sees Locke showing individual irrationality in consenting to governmental religion promotion. Tuckness interprets the third argument differently, focusing on legislator rationality, not individual citizen/ruler. Drawing on Locke’s later toleration writings, he argues natural law assumes God accounts for magistrate fallibility. If “use force to promote true religion” were a natural law command, it would fail practically due to many magistrates wrongly believing their religion true. Tuckness argues Locke’s later toleration writings shifted from instrumental rationality for individual consent to emphasizing human fallibility and universal principles applicable to legislators designing just laws within the framework of the john locke social contract.

8. Education and Politics: Shaping Citizens for the Social Contract

Locke’s epistemology in Essay Concerning Human Understanding makes education politically crucial. His attack on innate ideas elevates the importance of proper childhood education for developing correct ideas. He notes in the Essay that people are governed by various laws, with “Law of Opinion or Reputation” being most practically effective (Essay 2.28.10). Social praise and blame norms are powerful. Ideally, social norms reinforce natural law, stabilizing political society. Locke’s educational writings suggest raising children to be well-functioning citizens in a liberal society, capable of upholding the john locke social contract. Some see Locke’s family-centered education as granting the state too little influence on future citizens (Gutmann 1999), while others see considerable state power in Locke’s education (Tuckness 2010b).

Locke’s main educational work, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, is based on letters to his friend Edward Clarke, assuming a wealthy parent overseeing son’s education. It was highly popular. A key feature is encouraging parents to cultivate children’s love for praise and esteem (Some Thoughts, 56–62). This helps children control harmful desires, like dominion, and impulses, fostering reflection before action.

Some contemporary critics, inspired by Foucault, argue Locke’s education isn’t for liberty, but for compliant liberal regime subjects (Baltes 2016, Carrig 2001, Metha 1992). Locke encourages tightly controlled child social environments to prevent corruption by wrong ideas. He aims for children with internalized self-denial and work ethic for the modern economy. Critics see tightly controlled parental education producing specific children, guided by praise/blame norms, revealing the autonomous liberal subject as imposed conformity. This critique questions whether Locke’s educational philosophy truly prepares individuals for the autonomous citizenship envisioned by his john locke social contract.

Defenders argue this critique underestimates Locke’s education’s orientation toward meaningful freedom. Under normal circumstances, natural law and reputation law should align, minimizing harm from following reputation law (Stuart-Buttle 2017). Locke’s education aims to increase natural law compliance (Brady 2013). Much depends on whether natural law conformity decreases or increases freedom. While Locke recognizes the social nature of the Lockean subject, he doesn’t see habituation and autonomy as necessarily opposed (Koganzon 2016, Nazar 2017). Human beings naturally conform to societal norms, so without Lockean education, they’d simply conform to existing norms, not be more free. Locke’s education aims to equip children to critically evaluate and potentially reject prevailing norms later in life. Locke assumes early childhood isolation ends and adolescents think differently from parents (Koganzon 2016). Locke may even use custom to help people rationally evaluate customary prejudices (Grant 2012), ultimately aiming to foster rational and autonomous individuals capable of participating in and upholding the john locke social contract.

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Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank Sally Ferguson for pointing out a number of typographical and other infelicitous errors in this entry.

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