John Locke and Natural Rights: Exploring the Foundations of Liberal Thought

John Locke (1632–1704) stands as a towering figure in the landscape of modern political philosophy. His profound impact resonates through centuries, shaping our understanding of government, individual liberties, and the very nature of rights. Central to his enduring legacy is the concept of John Locke Natural Rights, a revolutionary idea articulated in his seminal work, Two Treatises of Government. In this groundbreaking text, Locke challenged the prevailing notion of divinely ordained monarchy, asserting instead that individuals are inherently free and equal. He posited that these individuals possess fundamental rights – to life, liberty, and property – rights that are not granted by any earthly power but are inherent to their very being. Locke’s articulation of john locke natural rights became a cornerstone of liberal thought, providing a philosophical justification for limited government, the consent of the governed, and the right to revolution when government oversteps its bounds. His ideas not only fueled intellectual discourse but also ignited revolutionary fervor, profoundly influencing the American and French Revolutions and continuing to shape contemporary debates on human rights and political legitimacy.

This exploration delves into the core tenets of Locke’s political philosophy, focusing specifically on the concept of john locke natural rights. We will examine the intellectual context in which Locke developed his theories, analyze the key components of his doctrine of natural rights, and trace the enduring influence of these ideas on modern political thought. By examining the nuances of Locke’s arguments, we aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of why john locke natural rights remain a vital and debated topic in political philosophy today.

1. Natural Law and the Genesis of Natural Rights in Locke’s Philosophy

At the heart of Locke’s political philosophy lies his intricate theory of natural law and john locke natural rights. The concept of natural law, predating Locke by centuries, served as a framework for articulating universal moral truths applicable to all individuals, irrespective of geographical location or societal conventions. This concept distinguished between laws inherent in nature, possessing universal applicability, and conventional laws, specific to particular societies and established through human agreement. This distinction is often described as the dichotomy between natural law and positive law.

Natural law differs from divine law, which, within the Christian tradition, typically refers to laws directly revealed by God through prophets and inspired texts. Natural law, in contrast, can be discerned through reason alone and applies universally, while divine law is accessible only through divine revelation and binds only those to whom it is revealed and specifically intended to be bound. Locke, along with some of his seventeenth-century contemporaries, argued that not all of the Ten Commandments, let alone the entirety of Old Testament law, were universally binding. He pointed out that the Ten Commandments begin with “Hear O Israel,” suggesting their specific address to the people of Israel (Works 6:37). While Locke believed natural law was discoverable independently of divine revelation, he saw no inherent conflict between the two, provided that the relevant aspects of God’s character were accessible through reason. In Locke’s framework, divine law and natural law are consistent and can overlap, but they are not entirely coextensive. Consequently, Locke found no issue if the Bible advocated a stricter moral code than natural law, but he would find a fundamental contradiction if biblical teachings contradicted natural law. In practice, Locke used consistency with natural law as a criterion for interpreting biblical passages.

The language of john locke natural rights gained traction in the writings of thinkers preceding Locke, such as Grotius and Hobbes, and his contemporary Pufendorf. While natural law emphasized duties, natural rights typically highlighted entitlements or claims individuals possessed. The relationship between these concepts in Locke’s theory has been a subject of considerable scholarly debate.

Leo Strauss (1953) and his followers prioritize rights, suggesting Locke’s position is fundamentally similar to Hobbes. They emphasize Locke’s hedonistic theory of motivation (Essay 2.20) and argue he must concur with Hobbes on the essentially self-interested nature of humans. Straussians contend Locke acknowledges natural law obligations only when self-preservation is not at stake, underscoring that self-preservation trumps any duties.

Conversely, scholars like Dunn (1969), Tully (1980), and Ashcraft (1986) argue for the primacy of natural law over john locke natural rights. They contend that Locke’s emphasis on the rights to life, liberty, and property primarily highlights our duties to others: the duties not to kill, enslave, or steal. Many scholars also recognize Locke’s acknowledgment of a general duty to assist in the preservation of humanity, including charity towards those lacking subsistence (Two Treatises 1.42). These scholars see duties as primary because rights ensure our capacity to fulfill these duties. Simmons (1992) adopts a similar stance, arguing that rights are not merely the inverse of duties or solely means to fulfill them. Instead, rights and duties are equally fundamental because Locke posits a “robust zone of indifference” where rights protect our capacity for choice. While these choices must not violate natural law, they are not simply instruments for fulfilling it. Brian Tierney (2014) questions the need to prioritize natural law or natural rights, suggesting both function as corollaries. He posits that modern natural rights theories evolved from medieval natural law conceptions that included permissions to act or refrain from acting in certain ways.

Some attempts have been made to reconcile these opposing views. Michael Zuckert’s (1994) interpretation of the Straussian position acknowledges more nuances between Hobbes and Locke. Zuckert still questions Locke’s sincerity regarding theism but recognizes Locke grounds property rights in self-ownership, a concept Hobbes denied. Adam Seagrave (2014) further argues that the apparent contradiction between Locke’s claims of divine ownership and self-ownership is resolvable. He draws upon Locke’s other writings, particularly Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Seagrave suggests Locke refers to humanity as a whole in passages about divine ownership, while self-ownership pertains to individual humans with property ownership capacity. God created humans capable of property rights among themselves based on labor ownership. Both Zuckert and Seagrave emphasize the distinctions between Locke’s use of natural rights and the earlier natural law tradition.

Another debated point concerns the extent to which Locke believed natural law was knowable through reason. Strauss (1953) and Laslett (in his introduction to Locke’s Two Treatises) perceive contradictions in Locke’s theory of natural law, despite their differing interpretations of Locke overall. In Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke refutes innate ideas (Essay Book 1) and asserts morality is demonstrable like mathematics (Essay 3.11.16, 4.3.18–20). Yet, Locke never provides a complete deduction of natural law from first principles. Furthermore, Locke occasionally seems to invoke innate ideas in the Second Treatise (2.11) and admits in The Reasonableness of Christianity (Works 7:139) that no one has fully derived natural law from reason alone. Strauss infers these contradictions indicate Locke’s disbelief in natural law. Laslett, more cautiously, suggests separating Locke the philosopher from Locke the political writer.

However, numerous scholars, including Yolton (1958), Colman (1983), Ashcraft (1987), Grant (1987), Simmons (1992), Tuckness (1999), Israelson (2013), Rossiter (2016), and Connolly (2019), reject this view. They argue that Locke’s admission in The Reasonableness of Christianity is not necessarily inconsistent. The fact that natural law has not been fully deduced does not imply no part of it has been. The supposed contradictions in Two Treatises are not definitive. While Locke does not provide a deduction in the Essay, it is not clear he intended to. Section 4.10.1–19 of the Essay seems more focused on demonstrating the possibility of moral reasoning rather than fully detailing natural law. Nonetheless, Locke’s unsystematic treatment of natural law is acknowledged. Efforts to understand its basis and content require reconstructing it from scattered passages across his diverse writings.

To understand Locke’s foundation for natural law, it is crucial to place it within the broader historical context of natural law theory, specifically the “voluntarism-intellectualism” or “voluntarist-rationalist” debate. Voluntarism posits that right and wrong are solely determined by God’s will, and our obligation to obey God stems simply from it being God’s will. Voluntarists argue that without this, God becomes superfluous to morality, as both content and obligation could be explained without divine reference. Intellectualists counter that this renders morality arbitrary and fails to explain our obligation to obey God. Graedon Zorzi (2019) argues that for Locke, “person” is a relational term, indicating our accountability to God for adhering to the law.

Locke’s stance on the grounds and content of natural law is not entirely explicit. He makes statements suggesting a voluntarist view, noting law requires a legislator with authority (Essay 1.3.6, 4.10.7). He also repeatedly asserts in Essays on the Law of Nature that created beings must obey their creator (Political Essays 116–120). Conversely, other statements imply an external moral standard God must adhere to (Two Treatises 2.195; Works 7:6). Locke clearly aims to avoid the implication that natural law’s content is arbitrary. Several interpretations have been proposed. Herzog (1985) proposes an intellectualist reading, grounding our obligation to God in a prior duty of gratitude independent of God. Simmons (1992) suggests a voluntarist interpretation, aligning with the majority of Locke’s statements. Tuckness (1999), supported by Grant (1987) and Israelson (2013), proposes separating voluntarism into grounds and content. This view suggests Locke was a voluntarist regarding “why obey natural law?” believing reason alone is merely advisory without a superior’s will. Regarding content, divine and human reason must be sufficiently analogous for humans to reason about God’s likely will. Locke assumes that God created us with reason to follow divine will, ensuring natural law does not appear arbitrary to us.

Those interested in the contemporary relevance of Locke’s political theory must grapple with its theological dimensions. Straussians argue the theological aspects are primarily rhetorical, a “cover” to avoid persecution. Others, like Dunn (1969) and Stanton (2018), see Locke’s relevance as limited due to reliance on religious assumptions no longer widely held. Some, like Simmons (1992) and Vernon (1997), attempt to separate the foundations of Locke’s argument from its other aspects. Simmons argues Locke’s thought is over-determined, containing both religious and secular arguments. He suggests Locke’s fundamental law of nature is “as much as possible mankind is to be preserved” (Two Treatises 2.135). He argues Locke presents this principle both in rule-consequentialist terms and with Kantian undertones, emphasizing the impropriety of treating equals as mere means. Waldron (2002) explores the opposite, arguing Locke’s theology provides a stronger foundation for political equality than secular approaches that simply assert it.

Regarding the specific content of natural law, Locke never provides a comprehensive account. In Two Treatises, he frequently states the fundamental law is the preservation of mankind. Simmons (1992) argues that in Two Treatises 2.6, Locke outlines (1) a duty to self-preservation, (2) a duty to preserve others when it does not conflict with self-preservation, (3) a duty not to take another’s life, and (4) a duty not to act in a way that “tends to destroy” others. Libertarian interpretations tend to minimize duties of types 1 and 2. Locke presents a more extensive list in his earlier Essays on the Law of Nature, including praise and honor of the deity and good character qualities as requirements of natural law.

2. The State of Nature: Freedom and Equality Before Government

Locke’s concept of the state of nature has been subject to diverse interpretations. Initially, it appears straightforward. Locke writes, “want [lack] of a common judge, with authority, puts all men in a state of nature,” and “Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature” (Two Treatises 2.19). Many interpret this as Locke’s definition, concluding the state of nature exists wherever legitimate political authority to judge disputes is absent and people live by the law of reason. This view distinguishes the state of nature from political society, where legitimate government exists, and a state of war, where individuals deviate from the law of reason.

Simmons (1993) challenges this view, arguing the statement is a sufficient, not necessary, condition. Individuals in the state of nature might authorize a third party to resolve disputes without leaving it, as this party lacks legislative power for the public good. Simmons also argues this interpretation fails to account for individuals under legitimate governments yet remaining in the state of nature: visiting aliens (Two Treatises 2.9), minors (2.15, 118), and those with “defect” of reason (2.60). He proposes the state of nature is a relational concept describing moral relations between specific individuals, not a territory lacking effective government. It defines moral rights and responsibilities between people not consenting to adjudication by the same legitimate government. The mentioned groups cannot or have not consented, thus remaining in the state of nature. Therefore, A may be in the state of nature relative to B, but not C.

Simmons’ account contrasts sharply with Strauss (1953). Strauss sees Locke’s state of nature as a factual depiction of early society, revealing Locke’s departure from Christian teachings upon closer inspection. Strauss and his followers argue state of nature theories contradict the Genesis account and indicate Locke’s alignment with Hobbes. As mentioned, Straussians view Locke’s Christian statements as a facade concealing anti-Christian views. Simmons counters that the state of nature, being a moral account, is compatible with varied social accounts without contradiction. Knowing individuals are in a state of nature only reveals their mutual rights and responsibilities, not their wealth, peace, or war-like nature.

Dunn (1969) offers a complementary interpretation regarding the relationship between Locke’s state of nature and Christian beliefs. Dunn argues Locke’s state of nature is less historical anthropology and more theological reflection on the human condition. He interprets Locke’s state of nature thinking as an expression of theological views: humans exist in a world created by God for divine purposes, while governments are human creations to further these purposes.

Locke’s theory of the state of nature is intrinsically linked to his theory of natural law, as the latter defines individual rights and status as free and equal. The stronger the justification for Locke’s characterization of humans as free, equal, and independent, the more effective the state of nature becomes as a representational tool. However, it is crucial to note that none of these interpretations claim Locke’s state of nature is merely a thought experiment, like Kant’s or Rawls’s use of the concept. Locke did not dismiss the critique “where have people ever been in such a state” by claiming it was just a thought experiment. Instead, he argued that people are and have been in the state of nature (Two Treatises 2.14). The historical reality of governments forming in his suggested manner seems important to him. The significance of this historical aspect is further discussed under consent, as the central question revolves around whether a good government can be legitimate without the actual consent of its people. Hypothetical and actual contract theories diverge in their answers to this question.

3. Property: Labor, Value, and the Limits of Acquisition in Locke’s Theory

Locke’s treatment of property is widely considered a pivotal contribution to political thought, yet it is also among the most debated and criticized aspects of his philosophy. Significant debate surrounds Locke’s intended objectives in his theory of property. Macpherson (1962) interprets Locke as an advocate for unrestrained capitalist accumulation. Macpherson posits that Locke initially set three limitations on property accumulation in the state of nature: (1) appropriation is limited to what one can use before spoilage (Two Treatises 2.31), (2) one must leave “enough and as good” for others (the sufficiency restriction) (2.27), and (3) (supposedly) property can only be acquired through personal labor (2.27). Macpherson argues that Locke progressively transcends each restriction. The spoilage restriction becomes irrelevant with money’s invention, as value can be stored in non-perishable forms (2.46–47). The sufficiency restriction is overcome because private property enhances productivity, benefiting even those who cannot acquire land (2.37). Macpherson views the “enough and as good” requirement as derivative of a principle guaranteeing the opportunity to acquire life’s necessities through labor. He contends the third restriction was never truly held by Locke. While Locke seemingly suggests property acquisition is limited to personal labor, he acknowledges that even in the state of nature, “the Turfs my Servant has cut” (2.28) can become one’s property, indicating recognition of labor alienation. Macpherson critiques Locke’s “possessive individualism,” arguing its coherence relies on assumptions of differential rationality between capitalists and wage-laborers and societal class divisions. He suggests Locke intended only property owners to be voting members of society.

Macpherson’s interpretation has faced criticism from various perspectives. Ryan (1965) argued that Locke’s definition of property includes life and liberty alongside estate (Two Treatises 2.87), suggesting even the landless could be political society members. The disagreement hinges on whether Locke used “property” in its broader sense in crucial passages. Tully (1980) challenged Macpherson’s interpretation by highlighting the First Treatise‘s duty of charity towards those lacking subsistence (1.42). While consistent with low wages for the poor, this duty undermines the claim that the wealthy have no social obligations.

Tully also proposed a fundamental reinterpretation of Locke’s theory. Previous interpretations focused on the idea that individuals own their labor, and mixing labor with unowned resources creates property. Nozick (1974) famously critiqued this with the example of mixing owned tomato juice with the sea. Why does mixing owned items with unowned ones create property rather than loss? Tully argues the mixing metaphor obscures Locke’s emphasis on the “workmanship model.” Locke believed makers have property rights in their creations, mirroring God’s property rights over humans as their maker. Humans, created in God’s image, share a lesser ability to shape and mold the physical environment rationally. Waldron (1988) criticizes this, arguing it would grant human makers absolute rights like God’s over creation. Sreenivasan (1995) defends Tully, distinguishing between creating and making. Only creation grants absolute property rights, exclusive to God, while making, analogous to creation, grants weaker, analogous rights.

Another contentious aspect of Tully’s interpretation is his understanding of the sufficiency condition and its implications. He considers it crucial to Locke’s argument’s plausibility. Starting with the assumption of common world ownership, individual property is justified only if it demonstrably does not worsen anyone’s situation. In conditions of abundance, taking a portion of water or land harms no one. When scarcity arises, those denied access have legitimate objections. Tully argues Locke recognized that with land scarcity, prior rights acquired by labor become invalid as “enough and as good” is no longer available. After land scarcity, property could only be legitimized through political society.

Waldron (1988) argues, contrary to Macpherson (1962), Tully (1980), and others, that Locke did not recognize a sufficiency condition. He notes Locke presents sufficiency as a sufficient, not necessary, condition when stating labor creates property rights “at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others” (Two Treatises 2.27). Waldron interprets this as a descriptive, not normative, statement about initial conditions. He argues “enough and as good” is not presented as a restriction or grouped with restrictions. Waldron believes this condition would lead to the absurd conclusion that scarcity necessitates universal starvation, as unanimous consent would be impossible and any appropriation would worsen others’ situations.

Sreenivasan (1995) offers a strong defense of Tully’s position, arguing Locke’s repeated use of “enough and as good” is significant. He argues it is the only plausible solution to needing universal consent for appropriation in the state of nature. If others are unharmed, they have no grounds to object and can be seen as consenting. Harm makes consent implausible. Sreenivasan diverges from Tully, interpreting “enough and as good” as “enough and as good opportunity for securing one’s preservation,” not “enough and as good of the same commodity (like land).” This lessens Locke’s radicalism, not invalidating all original property rights upon political community creation. However, Sreenivasan acknowledges this interpretation flaws Locke’s argument. Those merely having the opportunity for subsistence wage labor lack the pre-scarcity liberty to fully benefit from their created surplus value. Poor laborers also lack equal access to production materials. Sreenivasan concludes Locke’s theory fails to solve how individuals obtain individual property rights from common ownership without consent.

Simmons (1992) offers another synthesis, siding with Waldron (1988) against Tully (1980) and Sreenivasan (1995) in rejecting the workmanship model. He argues references to “making” in Two Treatises chapter five are not in the sense required by the workmanship model. Locke believes we own our persons without making or creating ourselves. Simmons argues Locke saw God as having rights as creator, while humans possess limited rights as trustees, not makers. Simmons bases this partly on two distinct arguments he identifies in Locke: one justifying property based on God’s will and human needs, the other on “mixing” labor. The former argument, according to Simmons, justifies some property rights by showing that a system allowing appropriation without consent benefits human preservation. This argument is overdetermined, interpretable theologically or as rule-consequentialist. Regarding the latter, Simmons views labor not as a literally “mixed” substance but as purposeful activity to satisfy life’s needs and conveniences. Like Sreenivasan, Simmons sees this as stemming from a prior right to subsistence, but adds a prior right to self-government. Private property can arise from labor because it enhances individual independence and self-direction. Simmons finds Locke’s argument ultimately flawed, underestimating wage labor’s potential to make the poor dependent on the rich, undermining self-government. He also joins those criticizing Locke’s appeal to consent for money’s introduction as inadequate to justify current unequal property distribution.

Some scholars suggest Locke had colonial concerns in mind when writing about property. Tully (1993) and Arneil (1996) note Locke’s involvement in American colonial affairs and how his labor theory conveniently led to the conclusion that Native American labor only generated property rights over hunted animals, not the land, which Locke considered vacant and available for taking. Armitage (2004) suggests Locke was actively revising the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina while drafting the property chapter in Second Treatise. Goldie (1983) cautions against overlooking that English political events were still Locke’s primary focus in Second Treatise.

A final question concerns the status of state-of-nature property rights after civil society formation. Locke seemingly allows taxation by majority consent, not unanimity (2.140). Nozick (1974) interprets Locke as a libertarian, denying government the right to take property for the common good without owner consent. He suggests the majority can only tax to the extent necessary for government to protect property rights. Conversely, Tully (1980) posits that land scarcity by government formation invalidates state-of-nature holdings, placing no constraints on governmental action. Waldron’s (1988) view falls between these extremes, acknowledging that state-of-nature property rights constrain government, but recognizing substantial legislative power to interpret natural law in this area.

4. Consent, Political Obligation, and the Purpose of Government in Locke’s Theory

A direct interpretation of Locke’s political philosophy highlights the central role of consent. His analysis begins with individuals in a state of nature, free from common legitimate authority to legislate or adjudicate disputes. From this natural freedom and independence, Locke emphasizes individual consent as the mechanism for creating political societies and individuals joining them. While natural law imposes general obligations and rights, specific obligations arise from voluntary undertakings. Locke explicitly states full societal membership requires express consent (Two Treatises 2.122). Literature on Locke’s consent theory often addresses the objection: few people have actually consented to their governments, rendering most governments illegitimate. This is problematic as it contradicts Locke’s intention.

Locke’s most apparent solution is his doctrine of tacit consent. Simply using a country’s highways implies tacit consent to its government and agreement to obey laws while residing there. Locke believes this explains resident aliens’ obligation to obey laws, but only during residency. Inheriting property creates a stronger bond, as the original owner permanently placed the property under commonwealth jurisdiction. Children accepting parental property consent to commonwealth jurisdiction over it (Two Treatises 2.120). Debate exists whether property inheritance constitutes tacit or express consent. One interpretation suggests accepting property makes one a full society member, implying Locke views this as express consent. Grant (1987) proposes Locke’s ideal was explicit adult consent as a precondition for property inheritance. Another interpretation recognizes that property inheritors may not explicitly declare political obligation.

Regardless of this debate, many in any society, past or present, have never given express consent, thus some form of tacit consent seems necessary to justify government legitimacy. Simmons questions how merely walking on a street or inheriting land can be “deliberate, voluntary alienating of rights” (Simmons 1993, 69). He argues actions can imply consent, but claiming consent without awareness is problematic. Requiring emigration and property abandonment to avoid tacit consent creates a situation where continued residence is not a free choice. Simmons agrees with Locke that real consent is necessary for political obligation but disagrees on whether most people have given such consent. Simmons suggests Locke’s arguments lean towards “philosophical anarchism,” the view that most lack moral obligation to obey government, though Locke himself would not claim this.

Pitkin (1965) offers a contrasting perspective, arguing Locke’s logic diminishes consent’s practical importance. Tacit consent weakens the concept, but Locke can do this because natural law, not consent, sets the fundamental nature of governments. If consent were truly foundational, government powers would be defined by the original founders’ contract. Pitkin argues Locke sees government form and powers as determined by natural law. What truly matters is present government quality, its alignment with natural law. Locke would not consider walking streets or inheriting property in a tyrannical regime as consenting to it. Government quality, not actual consent, determines legitimacy. Simmons objects, arguing this ignores Locke’s repeated statements that political obligations arise only from personal consent.

Dunn (1967) takes a different approach, arguing modern conceptions of “consent” as deliberate and voluntary are anachronistic when applied to Locke. Locke’s concept of consent was broader, encompassing “not unwilling” acquiescence. Dunn argues voluntary acquiescence suffices. He points to Locke’s examples of “consenting” to money use, which fit this broader interpretation. Simmons counters that this overlooks instances where Locke describes consent as deliberate choice and makes Locke unconvincing even if consistent.

Recent scholarship continues to explore these issues. Davis (2014) examines Locke’s terminology, distinguishing between political society and legitimate government. Only those expressly consenting are members of political society, while government legitimately governs various non-consenting groups. Government is supreme in some ways, but lacks a sovereign. He also argues (2017) actual consent in Locke’s time could be given by declaring intent to vote, not voting for a candidate. The former is more plausibly affirmative consent to political society membership. Registering to vote, not actual voting, is a modern analogue. Van der Vossen (2015) makes a related argument, claiming initial property owner consent is not how governments rule territories. Locke thought people (initially fathers) began exercising political authority and people tacitly consented. This justifies a rudimentary state ruling over consenters. Treaties between these governments then fixed territorial borders. Hoff (2015) goes further, arguing specific tacit consent acts (like not emigrating) are unnecessary for political obligation. Consent is implied if government functions in ways demonstrating accountability to the people.

A related question concerns the extent of obligation after consent. The Straussian school emphasizes preservation’s primacy. Natural law duties apply only when preservation is not threatened (Two Treatises 2.6), so obligations cease when preservation is directly threatened. This has implications for soldiers on life-threatening missions. Grant (1987) notes Locke believes a deserting soldier (Two Treatises 2.139) is justly sentenced to death. Grant interprets Locke as claiming not just legitimate enforcement of desertion laws (Hobbes might agree), but also a moral obligation for soldiers to sacrifice themselves for the common good (Hobbes would deny). Grant argues Locke thinks consent can extend to life-risking commitments. Entering political society is a permanent decision precisely because society needs defense, and allowing revocation of consent during attacks would render initial consent pointless. Entering society is a calculated decision, including combat risks. Grant also sees a reciprocity-based duty, as others also risk their lives.

Most of these approaches focus on consent as a solution to political obligation. Another approach examines consent’s role in determining legitimate governmental ends. This is captured by the Seliger (1968) vs. Kendall (1959) debate, with Seliger viewing Locke as a constitutionalist and Kendall seeing him as granting majorities almost unlimited power. The constitutionalist view sees the constitution created by popular consent as part of commonwealth creation. Kendall sees the people creating a legislature ruling by majority vote. Tuckness (2002a) argues Locke was flexible, allowing considerable freedom in constitutional drafting.

Another part of this debate concerns ends, not institutions. Locke states in Two Treatises that government power is limited to the public good, “that hath no other end but preservation,” prohibiting killing, enslaving, or plundering citizens (2.135). Libertarians like Nozick (1974) interpret this as government existing solely to protect rights. Tuckness (2002b, 2008a) offers an alternate interpretation, focusing on Locke’s positive formulation of natural law: “as much as possible mankind is to be preserved.” He suggests government is limited to natural law purposes, including positive goals as well as negative rights. This view extends the power to promote the common good to population increase, military improvement, economic and infrastructural enhancement, provided these indirectly serve societal preservation. This aligns with Locke’s Letter describing government promotion of “arms, riches, and multitude of citizens” as the proper remedy for foreign threats (Works 6: 42).

5. Locke’s Theory of Punishment: Justice and Social Order in the State of Nature and Society

John Locke defined political power as “a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less Penalties” (Two Treatises 2.3). Locke’s theory of punishment is therefore central to his political view and a key innovative aspect of his philosophy. However, he also called his account of punishment a “very strange doctrine” (2.9), likely because it challenged the assumption that only political sovereigns could punish. Locke believed punishment requires law, and since the state of nature is governed by natural law, it is permissible to describe individuals “punishing” each other in that state. Locke’s reasoning is that since the fundamental law of nature is human preservation, and this law would “be in vain” without human enforcement power (Two Treatises 2.7), individual punishment in the state of nature must be legitimate. In this, Locke disagreed with Pufendorf (1934), who argued punishment was nonsensical without established positive law.

Locke acknowledged the critical objection to individual judges and punishers in the state of nature: they would be judges in their own cases. He readily admitted this inconvenience was a primary reason for leaving the state of nature (Two Treatises 2.13). Locke emphasized this point to explain the transition to civil society. He believed in the state of nature, individuals had liberty to engage in “innocent delights” (actions not violating laws), seek self-preservation within natural law limits, and punish natural law violations. In civil society, self-preservation power is limited by law, and punishment power is transferred to government (Two Treatises 2.128–130). The state-of-nature punishment power thus forms the basis for governmental coercive force.

The principles guiding punishment become more complex. Punishment rationales are often categorized as forward-looking and backward-looking. Forward-looking rationales include crime deterrence, societal protection, and criminal rehabilitation. Backward-looking rationales typically focus on retribution, inflicting harm proportionate to the crime. Locke seems to conflate these in passages like:

And thus in the state of nature, one Man comes by a power over another, but yet no absolute or arbitrary Power, to use a criminal when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will, but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint. For these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that [which] we call punishment. (Two Treatises 2.8)

Locke mentions both retribution and punishment limited to reparation and restraint. Simmons argues this indicates Locke’s theory combines both punishment rationales. However, a survey of seventeenth-century natural rights justifications for punishment reveals common use of “retribute” in theories rejecting retributive punishment as we understand it today (Tuckness 2010a). In the quoted passage, Locke argues proper punishment is the amount necessary for restitution to victims, public protection, and future crime deterrence. Locke’s other writings on toleration, education, and religion consistently justify punishment based on grounds beyond retribution. Tuckness argues Locke’s emphasis on restitution is interesting as it is backward-looking (restoring a prior state) and forward-looking (providing tangible benefits to recipients). A connection exists between Locke’s understanding of natural punishment and legitimate state punishment. Even in the state of nature, punishment primarily aims to further the positive goal of preserving human life and property. Governmental punishment mirroring this emphasis on deterrence, public safety, and restitution.

A second puzzle concerns the permissibility of international punishment. Locke describes international relations as a state of nature, implying states should have the same power to punish natural law breaches in the international community as individuals in the state of nature. This would legitimize punishing war crimes or crimes against humanity even without specific state or international law authorization. Thus, even if “crimes of aggression” were not then recognized as individually punishable in World War II, actions violating natural law principles against depriving life, liberty, or property could still justify criminal punishment. The common interpretation is that international punishment power mirrors state-of-nature punishment power.

Tuckness (2008a) argues for asymmetry between the two cases because Locke also limits state goals. Locke often states government power should protect its own citizens’ rights, not everyone’s rights everywhere (Two Treatises 1.92, 2.88, 2.95, 2.131, 2.147). Locke argues in the state of nature, punishment should preserve mankind as a whole. After state formation, punishment power should benefit one’s own society. In the state of nature, one is not required to risk life for another (Two Treatises 2.6), presumably also meaning no requirement to punish in the state of nature if it risks the punisher’s life. Locke may be objecting to compelling soldiers to risk lives for altruistic reasons. In the state of nature, one could refuse to punish others if it risked their life, thus Locke reasons individuals may not have consented to states risking their lives for altruistic international crime punishment.

6. Separation of Powers and the Right to Revolution: Checks on Government in Locke’s System

Locke asserts legitimate government is based on separation of powers. The legislative power is primary, described as supreme (Two Treatises 2.149) in having ultimate authority over “how the force for the commonwealth shall be employed” (2.143). The legislature remains bound by natural law and primarily sets laws furthering natural law goals and specifying punishments (2.135). The executive power then enforces the law in specific cases. Interestingly, Locke’s third power, the “federative power,” is the right to act internationally according to natural law. As nations remain in a state of nature, they must adhere to natural law and can punish violations to protect their citizens’ rights.

Locke’s lack of explicit mention of judicial power as separate becomes clearer by distinguishing powers from institutions. Powers relate to functions. Having power means legitimately performing a function (like lawmaking or enforcement). Legislative supremacy over executive, for Locke, does not mean parliament over king. Locke simply affirms “what can give laws to another, must needs be superior to him” (Two Treatises 2.150). Moreover, Locke thinks multiple institutions can share power; legislative power in his time was shared by the House of Commons, Lords, and King. All three needed to agree for law, making them all part of legislative power (1.151). He also believes federative and executive powers are usually held by the executive, allowing the same person to exercise multiple powers (or functions). There is no one-to-one power-institution correspondence (Tuckness 2002a).

Locke is not against courts, but does not see interpretation as a distinct function or power. For Locke, legislation is primarily about announcing general rules stipulating actions and punishments. Executive power is judging cases to apply rules and enforce them (Two Treatises 2.88–89). Both actions involve interpretation. Locke states positive laws “are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted” (2.12). The executive must interpret laws in light of natural law. Legislation also involves specifying natural laws and applying them to circumstances (2.135), requiring natural law interpretation. Locke did not see law interpretation as distinct because he saw it as part of both legislative and executive functions (Tuckness 2002a).

Comparing Locke’s separation of powers to Montesquieu (1989) reveals more terminological than conceptual differences. Montesquieu’s legislative, executive, and judicial division, when elaborated, reaffirms legislative superiority, describes executive power as international affairs (Locke’s federative power), and judicial power as domestic law execution (Locke’s executive power). Locke considered arrest, trial, and punishment as all part of law execution, not distinct functions (Tuckness 2002a).

Locke valued an elected representative assembly within legislative power, but legislative power could also include monarchical and aristocratic elements. Locke believed people could create “mixed” constitutions using all these elements. Locke’s separation of powers theory does not dictate a specific constitution and allows unelected officials in legislative power. Locke was more concerned with people having representatives powerful enough to prevent liberty infringements and unjustified taxation. He affirmed the community remains the ultimate supreme power, retaining the right to “remove or alter” legislative power (Two Treatises 2.149). This can occur for various reasons. Foreign invasion can dissolve society (2.211), but Locke focuses more on the people reclaiming power from entrusted government. Ignoring the rule of law, preventing representative assembly, altering election mechanisms without consent, or handing people to foreign power justify people reclaiming authority and overthrowing government (2.212–17). Rebellion is also justified against rights violations (2.222). Locke believes oppressed people will likely rebel anyway, and non-oppressed people will likely not. The threat of rebellion deters tyranny (2.224–6). While various legitimate constitutional forms exist, power delegation under any constitution is conditional.

Locke’s separation of powers is complicated by the doctrine of prerogative. Prerogative is the executive’s right to act without explicit legal authorization, or even against law, to better fulfill laws aimed at human preservation. A king might order house demolition to stop city-wide fire spread (Two Treatises 2.159). Locke broadly defines it as “the power of doing public good without a rule” (2.166). This challenges legislative supremacy. Locke explains its rationale: general rules cannot cover all cases, inflexible rule adherence would harm public good, and the legislature is not always in session (2.160). Executive-legislative relationship depends on constitution. If the chief executive is not part of supreme legislative power, the legislature can overrule executive prerogative decisions upon reconvening. If the chief executive has veto, stalemate ensues. Locke describes a similar stalemate if the chief executive can prevent parliament meeting by refusing to call it. In such cases, Locke says there is no earthly judge on whether the executive misused prerogative, and both sides have the right to “appeal to heaven” like people against tyrannical government (2.168).

“Appeal to heaven” is crucial in Locke’s thought. Locke assumes people create government with a constitution specifying power allocation when leaving the state of nature. He assumes these powers will protect people’s rights and promote public good. Disputes between people and government on whether government fulfills obligations lack higher human authority for appeal. The only remaining appeal, for Locke, is to God. “Appeal to heaven” means armed conflict, letting God judge who is right.

7. Locke on Toleration: Separating Church and State for Individual Liberty of Conscience

In Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, he develops several arguments to define appropriate spheres for religion and politics. His central claims are that government should not use force to compel religious belief and that religious societies are voluntary organizations lacking coercive power over members or outsiders. One recurring argument is explicitly religious. Locke argues neither Jesus’s example nor New Testament teachings suggest force as a proper means to salvation. He frequently points out hypocrisy: persecutors for minor worship or doctrine differences often ignore more significant moral sins posing greater eternal threats.

Beyond religious arguments, Locke provides three more philosophical reasons against governmental force in religious belief (Works 6:10–12). First, he argues care of souls was not entrusted to magistrates by God or human consent. This echoes Two Treatises‘ structure establishing natural human freedom and equality. No biblical command directs magistrates to bring people to true faith, and people cannot consent to this governmental goal as belief is not volitional, but based on perceived truth, not will. Locke’s second argument is that government power is only force, while true religion requires inward persuasion, making force incapable of achieving true religion. Locke’s third argument is that even if magistrates could change minds, universal acceptance of the magistrate’s religion would not increase true religion. Many magistrates believe false religions.

Locke’s contemporary, Proast (1999a), countered that Locke’s three arguments reduce to two: true faith cannot be forced, and we have no more reason to think ourselves right than others. Proast argued force can “indirectly, and at a distance” aid truth by prompting consideration of arguments otherwise ignored, or preventing exposure to misleading information. If force indirectly aids true faith, Locke’s argument is weakened. Regarding Locke’s argument about false magistrates using force, Proast deemed it irrelevant, distinguishing between magistrates promoting what they believe true and what is actually true. Proast believed non-skeptics must consider their own positions objectively superior.

Waldron (1993) restated Proast’s objection for a contemporary audience, arguing Locke’s main position, aside from Christian arguments, was that religious persecution was instrumentally irrational from the persecutor’s perspective because force only acts on will, and belief is not volitional. Waldron noted this argument only blocks this specific persecution rationale, not all. It wouldn’t stop persecution for non-conversion goals, like preserving peace. Even for religious goals, Waldron agrees with Proast that force can be indirectly effective in changing beliefs. Current discussion of Locke’s toleration contribution centers on whether Locke effectively rebutted Proast and Waldron. Tuckness (2008b) and Tate (2016) argue Locke deemphasized the rationality argument later.

Some contemporary commentators attempt to rescue Locke’s argument by redefining the magistrate’s presumed religious goal. Mendus (1989), for example, notes brainwashing might induce sincere belief utterances, but these beliefs might not be genuine. Coercion-induced beliefs might be similarly problematic. Bou-Habib (2003) argues Locke sought sincere inquiry, believing duress-induced inquiry insincere. These approaches try to show force truly cannot achieve the desired religious goal.

Other commentators focus on Locke’s first argument about authority, particularly consent. Wootton (1993) argues even if force sometimes changes belief, it’s not frequent enough for rational consent to government religious power. Those reasonably expecting no belief change under persecution have reason to prevent persecution. Vernon (1997) argues we want right beliefs for right reasons. Beliefs should be determined by reason, not force, so we would not consent to a system where irrelevant belief reasons influence us. Tate (2016) argues Locke’s strongest toleration argument roots in lack of consent to government authority in this area, only consent to secular interests, which Locke thought toleration furthers.

Still other commentators focus on the third argument, magistrate fallibility. The question is whether Locke’s argument begs the question. Two promising arguments emerge. Wootton (1993) argues strong individual reasons exist to expect governmental religious error. Governments seek power, not truth, and are poor religious guides. With diverse ruler religions, if only one is true, likely one’s own ruler’s views are false. Wootton sees Locke showing individual irrationality in consenting to government religion promotion. Tuckness presents a different interpretation, arguing magistrate fallibility generates toleration based on legislator rationality, not individual citizen or ruler perspective. Drawing on Locke’s later toleration writings, he argues natural law assumes God, as its author, accounts for magistrate fallibility. If “use force to promote true religion” were a universal natural law command, it would be counterproductive due to many magistrates wrongly believing their religion true. Tuckness argues Locke’s later toleration writings shifted away from individual instrumental rationality arguments, emphasizing human fallibility and universal principles.

8. Education and the Formation of Liberal Citizens: Locke’s Vision for a Virtuous Society

Locke’s epistemological positions in Essay Concerning Human Understanding underscore education’s critical role in his political philosophy. His attack on innate ideas elevates the importance of proper childhood education for developing correct ideas. He also notes in the Essay that humans are governed by various laws, the most practically effective being the “Law of Opinion or Reputation” (Essay 2.28.10). Social norms allocating praise and blame are powerful and significant due to the strong human motivation for social approval. Ideally, these social norms reinforce natural law, stabilizing political society. Locke’s educational writings suggest raising children to be citizens functioning well in a liberal society (Tarcov 1984). Some criticize Locke’s family-centered education for giving the state too little influence in citizen formation (Gutmann 1999), while others see Locke as granting the state considerable educational regulatory power (Tuckness 2010b).

Locke’s main educational work, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, is based on letters of advice to his friend Edward Clarke, assuming a wealthy recipient overseeing his son’s education. The book was very popular, with numerous editions post-publication. A key feature is encouraging parents to cultivate children’s love for praise and esteem (Some Thoughts, 56–62). This helps children restrain harmful desires like dominion, and control impulses by reflecting before acting.

Some contemporary critics, inspired by Foucault, argue Locke’s education is not for liberty but for compliant liberal regime subjects (Baltes 2016, Carrig 2001, Metha 1992). Locke encourages tight parental regulation of children’s social environments to prevent corruption by wrong ideas and influences. Locke envisions children internalizing strong self-denial and a work ethic for compliance in a modern economy. Critics argue tight parental control to produce specific children, and human guidance by praise/blame norms, reveals the autonomous liberal subject as a facade for imposed conformity.

Defenders of Locke argue this critique underestimates his education’s orientation toward meaningful freedom. Reasons exist to believe natural law and reputation law normally coincide, minimizing harm from following reputation law (Stuart-Buttle 2017). Locke’s education aims to increase natural law compliance (Brady 2013). Much depends on whether natural law conformity reduces or increases freedom. While Locke recognizes the social nature of the Lockean subject, he does not see habituation and autonomy as necessarily opposed (Koganzon 2016, Nazar 2017). Without Lockean education, humans naturally conform to societal norms, and Locke’s education is designed to give children the later ability to critically evaluate, and possibly reject, prevailing norms. Locke assumes early childhood isolation will end and adolescents will typically think differently from parents (Koganzon 2016). Locke may even use custom to help people rationally evaluate customary prejudices (Grant 2012).

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Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank Sally Ferguson for pointing out a number of typographical and other infelicitous errors in this entry.