John Menard Jr., a name synonymous with the Midwest’s home improvement giant Menards, is more than just a businessman; he’s a Wisconsin legend. Often hailed as the state’s richest man, Menard’s journey from a farm boy to a billionaire CEO is a compelling narrative of ambition, relentless drive, and unwavering control. This is the story of John Menard Jr., the architect behind “Save Big Money at Menards,” a slogan etched into the minds of heartland shoppers, and a figure as complex and enigmatic as his business empire.
The story of John Menard Jr. is deeply intertwined with racing. His father, John Menard Sr., a racing enthusiast, established an Indy-car racing team a quarter of a century before Paul Menard, John Jr.’s son, was even born. Paul practically grew up amidst the roar of engines and the scent of gasoline, honing his competitive spirit in go-karting and ice boat racing from a young age. By eight, Paul had already tasted victory, a testament to the Menard family’s ingrained drive to win, a trait clearly inherited from John Menard Jr.
This competitive spirit is the bedrock of John Menard Jr.’s staggering business success. He meticulously built Menards, his regional home improvement store chain, brick by metaphorical brick, or rather, two-by-four by two-by-four, transforming it into a behemoth with over $6.6 billion in annual sales and a workforce of 37,000. John Menard Jr. didn’t just build stores; he built a fortress against national giants like Home Depot and Lowe’s, fiercely defending his market share. Between 1996 and 2007, his personal fortune ballooned from $775 million to a staggering $5.2 billion, according to Forbes, solidifying John Menard Jr.’s position as a financial titan. The Menards slogan, “Save Big Money at Menards,” wasn’t just a catchy jingle; it was John Menard Jr.’s promise to value-conscious consumers, a promise consistently delivered across the American heartland.
Racing, for John Menard Jr., became an extension of his marketing strategy, amplifying the Menards brand beyond store aisles and into the hearts of racing fans. Team Menard Inc. clinched the Indy Racing League championship twice, further cementing the Menards name in the public consciousness. Yet, despite his immense wealth and success, John Menard Jr. often appeared unassuming. Dressed in his team’s black jacket and cap, he resembled a Menards customer more than a man who shouldered the highest tax bill in America in 2002. His ranking at 155th on Forbes’ list of world billionaires placed him comfortably ahead of Herbert Kohler, Wisconsin’s second-richest man, who inherited his plumbing empire. John Menard Jr., the Eau Claire farm boy, built his empire from the ground up, a testament to his self-made success.
The relentless pursuit of empire building, however, came at a personal cost. John Menard Jr.’s dedication to his business often overshadowed family moments. While Milwaukee Mile communications vice president Jim Tretow witnessed John Menard Sr.’s enthusiastic celebration of his son Paul’s racing victory, John Menard Jr. was conspicuously absent from the Victory Lane family photo. His girlfriend, mother, and sister were there to celebrate Paul’s milestone first win in 85 Busch starts, but John Menard Jr. was reportedly already en route back to Menards headquarters in Eau Claire, his mind likely still on business.
“He’s a loner. He’s normally by himself and just moves in and out of the shadows,” observed Indianapolis Motor Speedway track historian Donald Davidson, encapsulating the elusive nature of John Menard Jr.’s public persona. Interviews with John Menard Jr. are rare; he declined to contribute to the original article entirely. Even those within his inner circle describe him with contrasting terms: hero and villain, the epitome of the American entrepreneur, brilliant and charming, yet also a foul-mouthed micromanager, a perfectionist with cruelly demanding expectations of his employees. The driving force behind John Menard Jr., even to those closest to him, remains an enigma. Wisconsin’s wealthiest individual is, paradoxically, one of its least known.
The Early Life of John Menard Jr.
John Robert Menard Jr.’s story began in 1940 in Eau Claire, Wisconsin. He was the eldest of eight children, born to educators. His father, John Menard Sr., was a math professor at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, and his mother, Rosemary, taught at St. James the Greater, a local Catholic grade school. Before John Jr. entered high school, his father transitioned from academia to agriculture, moving the family to the countryside to establish one of Wisconsin’s largest dairy herds.
Growing up on a farm instilled in John Menard Jr. the values of hard work and frugality, essential tenets that would later define his business philosophy. However, he reportedly disliked morning chores, concerned about carrying the farm’s scent to his Catholic high school. One insider claims he developed a habit of excessively using cologne to mask any lingering farm odors.
“There’s an independent streak that runs through the family and owning your own business has always been a big deal,” stated his cousin Frank Watson, highlighting the entrepreneurial spirit inherent in the Menard lineage. This ethos resonated deeply with John Menard Jr., “but he was never interested in staying on the farm. He wanted to escape it,” Watson added, suggesting that John Menard Jr.’s ambition extended far beyond the family farm.
Even during his high school years, John Menard Jr.’s entrepreneurial inclinations began to surface. When his father hired a company to construct a pole barn, John seized the opportunity for a summer job with the construction crew. After just two years of working for the pole barn company, John Menard Jr., demonstrating remarkable initiative, hired his own crew and started selling pole buildings independently, right by the roadside near his family’s farm. He juggled his burgeoning business during the day with night shifts at a local movie theater. This was in 1960; John Menard Jr. was only 20 years old, already laying the foundation for his future empire.
“It was quite a struggle,” recalled Larry Menard, John’s younger brother, Menards Inc. vice president, and operations manager, during a 2006 arbitration hearing, emphasizing the humble beginnings of Menards. “We didn’t have any money. It took until about 1964 when … we were able to sell a lot of asphalt shingles and things like that.” John Menard Jr.’s pole building customers frequently inquired about purchasing building materials, as lumberyards were often closed on weekends. Responding to this demand, John Menard Jr. established Menards Cashway Lumber to cater to his clientele. Upon graduating college in 1963, he declined a job offer from IBM, choosing instead to fully commit to building his own company, a pivotal decision that charted the course of his extraordinary career.
Building Menards: A Foundation of Frugality and Detail
John Menard Jr.’s meticulous attention to detail was evident from the outset. “John always paid attention to the littlest details,” recounted a long-term employee who remained with Menards for over 30 years. “In his lumber yard, he’d recycle scraps, like short pieces of two-by-fours that would have been garbage to other people. They were clean cut so they could be sold or made into treated tree rings.” This early practice of resourcefulness highlights John Menard Jr.’s ingrained frugality and his commitment to maximizing value, principles that became cornerstones of the Menards business model.
Even scrap wood that couldn’t be sold was repurposed for heating, after nails were salvaged using magnetic rollers. The former employee noted that this practice of waste minimization continues today, with Menard heating most of the 60-plus buildings at his expansive nearly 650-acre Eau Claire corporate headquarters by burning scrap pallets, showcasing John Menard Jr.’s enduring commitment to efficiency and cost-saving measures.
“John’s absolutely driven to maximize everything,” observed Steve Kight, former managing director of Menard’s British racing engine company, Menard Engineering Ltd., further emphasizing John Menard Jr.’s relentless pursuit of optimization in all facets of his operations.
Menard rapidly expanded Cashway, adding facilities for truss manufacturing, lumber treatment, countertop production, pre-hung doors, boards, steel, and nails. By vertically integrating and manufacturing a portion of his own products, John Menard Jr. was able to maintain consistently low prices. In 1972, he officially incorporated Menards Inc. and opened his first hardware store, perfectly timed to capitalize on the burgeoning do-it-yourself movement, according to industry analysts.
Mirroring the strategy of retail giant Wal-Mart, John Menard Jr. built his empire on the foundation of offering the lowest prices. Products manufactured by Menards, including items like dog houses and picnic tables, constituted approximately a quarter of the store’s inventory. By eliminating the middleman, John Menard Jr. could undercut competitors, for instance, slashing the price of a steel door by 10 percent.
“We had a policy, we will never be beaten on price,” stated Norm Baumann, a former Wausau assistant store manager who worked for Menards from 1996 to 2006, underscoring the company’s unwavering commitment to price leadership. Menard implemented rigorous price monitoring, tasking managers with checking competitor prices and even counting cars in competitor parking lots during lunch breaks. Menards would consistently undercut every competitor’s price by at least a penny, a tactic designed to demonstrably draw customers away from rivals.
“They comparison shop constantly,” Baumann confirmed. If beating a competitor’s price proved challenging, John Menard Jr. would instruct his managers to purchase the competitor’s entire stock of that particular product. Baumann recalled Home Depot selling oriented strand board (OSB), a plywood substitute, at a significantly lower price. Menards managers were dispatched to discreetly buy truckloads of the competitor’s OSB. “I bought over two fork lifts of it myself, $4,000 worth,” Baumann recounted, “and when I got back to the store, they’d credit back the money.” These aggressive tactics illustrate the lengths John Menard Jr. was willing to go to maintain his price advantage.
John Menard Jr. also capitalized on opportunistic purchasing, buying manufacturer overstocks and rejects at deeply discounted prices. Steve Faber, who served the company for 19 years, including 15 as an Iowa store manager, recalled, “In the 1980s, he bought ships full of Fiat tractor parts that had been refused by the customer who’d ordered them. John had them painted, got them put together, and we sold them.” This resourceful approach to inventory management contributed to Menards’ unique and often unpredictable product assortment.
Menard’s shrewd deal-making resulted in an eclectic merchandise mix. Ivan DenOuden, a former department manager in Mason City, Iowa, described, “One year, we had truckloads of poinsettias” and another year “Bumpy Diapers.” He added, “We sold more diapers than the Target next door. There were all kinds of one-time buys. Gloves, candy, coffee. You made more money on that than lumber, where you had to sell 10 two-by-fours to make 50 cents because you competed against the other big boxes.” This unpredictable inventory created a treasure-hunt shopping experience for customers.
This unconventional approach cultivated a distinctive shopping environment at Menards. “It’s entertainment. It changes every day. There are new treasures,” explained Edward S. Archibald, who spent 27 years with the company, including 15 as a top executive, before departing two years prior to the original article. In 2004, Home Channel News magazine characterized Menards’ “treasure-hunt” atmosphere as a blend of Home Depot, Dollar General, and Wal-Mart, noting, “Many Menards’ units have … the ambience of, say, Kmart, circa 1978.” Yet, the magazine also acknowledged “cutting-edge flourishes” absent from competitors, such as computerized kiosks that converted customer-provided dimensions for decks or garages into comprehensive shopping lists of required materials, showcasing Menards’ blend of old-school bargain appeal with modern conveniences.
Continuing to experiment with the merchandise mix, Menard introduced milk and groceries at select locations in February of the year the article was written. “Anything they can make a buck on … They’re kind of the Wal-Mart of the home improvement industry,” commented Scott Bropst, a Menards employee for 21 years and a store manager for 14.
However, Menards’ strategy wasn’t without its critics. Will Ander, senior partner at the Chicago retail consulting firm McMillan/Doolittle LLP, argued, “Popcorn and peanuts, all that crap at the checkouts, that’s a big mistake. They buy bulk peanuts by the truckload but they get stale. And as a shopper, I’m not very happy when the peanuts I buy are stale. It’s more important for Menards to focus on what it’s great at: home improvement.” Ander suggested that diluting the focus on core home improvement offerings could detract from Menards’ primary strength.
Despite such criticisms, the “junk in front,” as Ander termed it, arguably reinforced Menards’ image as a bargain-hunter’s paradise. The higher profit margins and consistent sales of consumer goods might also have provided a buffer against economic downturns in the home sales sector, a vulnerability that had recently impacted competitors Home Depot and Lowe’s.
A 2004 Federal Tax Court case highlighted Menards’ financial efficiency. An IRS expert estimated Menards’ return on assets at 14.2 percent, significantly outperforming Home Depot’s 10.3 percent and Lowe’s 6.8 percent. In the same case, a financial analyst hired by John Menard Jr. assessed comparable retail chains and placed Menards in the most frugal bottom 10 percent for average debt. Menards notably financed new store construction without resorting to bank loans, demonstrating exceptional financial discipline.
Like Wal-Mart, known for its aggressive supplier negotiations, Menards adopted a hardline approach with its vendors. His buyers were described as “ruthless” by Baumann. “I’d hear them on the phone and you’d never hear so much swearing in your life. They’d say, ‘I’ll buy this from you, so what are you going to give me for free?’” These accounts paint a picture of John Menard Jr.’s uncompromising negotiating style.
Racing and Marketing Synergies
In 1979, John Menard Jr. invested $65,000 in a race car and hired a local driver for the Indianapolis 500. This marked the beginning of racing as a key marketing channel for Menards stores and a strategic tool for leveraging supplier relationships. “He was absolutely a pioneer at leveraging shelf space to get sponsors for his Indy team,” noted Eric Wright, research and development vice president for Joyce Julius and Associates, a leading sponsorship reporting service in racing. “You see it now with Lowe’s, Home Depot, Target and Best Buy, but he was way ahead of the curve.” John Menard Jr. recognized the powerful marketing potential of racing long before his competitors.
Suppliers seeking prime shelf space at Menards were often encouraged to purchase racing sponsorships. Between 1997 and 1998, Glidden Paints reportedly spent nearly $4 million on Team Menard sponsorships, and in 2002, both Stanley Tools and Moen each contributed around $1 million, highlighting the significant financial leverage John Menard Jr. exerted through his racing program.
However, “the primo advertising spot, the rear right fender, the area that the TV cameras grab most,” was strategically reserved by John Menard Jr. for his own Menards stores, according to Milwaukee Mile’s Tretow. “His team was as much about marketing his Menards stores as it was about racing,” underscoring the dual purpose of Menard’s racing endeavors.
One notable casualty of Menard’s tough negotiating tactics was driver Andy Petree. Petree, a successful NASCAR crew chief with championships under his belt with Dale Earnhardt, faced sponsorship challenges when he formed his own team. John Menard Jr. negotiated a three-year sponsorship agreement that, while financially beneficial for Menards, also provided an opportunity for his son Paul to advance his racing career by driving for Petree. “John strong-armed me to a point where I probably should have said no,” Petree admitted, indicating the pressure exerted by Menard, explaining that he soon reached “the financial breaking point.”
Adding insult to injury, mid-season, John Menard Jr. abruptly terminated the contract, taking his financial support and his son Paul to join forces with Dale Earnhardt Inc., the racing team managed by Earnhardt’s widow. “It’s rare in the racing world for someone to break a contract the way he did, but when you’re John Menard, I guess you can do that,” Petree commented, highlighting the perceived impunity associated with Menard’s wealth and power. Petree spent the subsequent 18 months laying off employees and liquidating assets, a direct consequence of Menard’s abrupt contract termination. (Petree later became an analyst for ABC-ESPN’s 2007 NASCAR coverage.)
John Menard Jr.’s negotiating prowess is so renowned that former Indianapolis 500 champion driver Eddie Cheever remarked that he would attend an hour-long lecture by Menard on the subject. Cheever, a former Menard racing partner, once spent an hour and a half disputing a $25 hotel bill with Menard, ultimately paying it himself, illustrating Menard’s extreme attention to even minor expenses.
Menards’ marketing strategy was multifaceted, comprising three key components. The first was a weekly circular featuring deeply discounted and even free items, such as a 75-cent extension cord. Customers who mailed in a rebate coupon were added to Menards’ mailing list and received a coupon for future purchases, effectively driving repeat business. The second element was Menards’ memorable radio and television commercials featuring Wisconsin announcer Ray Szmanda and the ubiquitous slogan “Save big money at Menards.” The folksy “Menards Guy” became a recognizable and almost cult-like figure in the region.
The third pillar of Menards’ marketing strategy was racing sponsorships. Menard’s drivers and race cars were prominently featured at grand openings of new Menards stores, creating a direct link between the racing world and the home improvement retail environment. Given the significant overlap between home improvement consumers and racing enthusiasts, this synergy proved highly effective. By the end of the 1980s, Menards had expanded to over 45 stores across five states, a testament to the success of John Menard Jr.’s integrated marketing approach.
Retail Wars: Battling the Big Boxes
By the early 1990s, Atlanta-based Home Depot, then the country’s second-largest retailer after Wal-Mart, set its sights on the Chicago market. John Menard Jr. considered Chicago the heart of his territory and was determined to maintain dominance in this crucial market.
Lacking the time for ground-up construction, Menard opted to convert existing, albeit often less desirable, retail spaces. Scott Bropst was assigned to the Lombard, Illinois, store, a location with pre-existing challenges. “There were a lot of problems. Crime. Thugs. A ton of staffing problems. We got a lot of that cleaned up,” Bropst recounted, highlighting the initial hurdles in establishing Menards’ presence in some Chicago locations.
Menards concluded 1993 with $1.7 billion in sales, significantly boosted by the opening of 18 new Chicago stores in various formats, ranging from smaller Hardware Plus outlets to expansive superstores. When Home Depot launched its first Chicago store the following September, “we were ready and waiting,” Bropst asserted, indicating Menards’ proactive stance in the face of intensifying competition.
Home Depot expanded into another Menards stronghold, Milwaukee, in 1998. However, the primary battleground remained Chicago, accelerating the decline of smaller regional home improvement chains like Courtesy Home Centers, Builder’s Square, and Handy Andy. Lowe’s entered the Chicago market in 1999, further escalating the competitive pressure. Historically, Home Depot and Lowe’s had primarily driven businesses of Menards’ size out of the market. These retail giants reportedly exerted pressure on manufacturers like Kohler and DeWalt to cease supplying products to Menards, illustrating the intensity of the competition.
Retail consultant Ander argued that in the big-box retail landscape, “three’s a crowd, and the third-best is inevitably driven out of business.” However, across its 11-state operating region – Wisconsin, Minnesota, the Dakotas, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Nebraska – Menards consistently ranked first or second in market share. It maintained near parity with Home Depot in Chicago (each with approximately 30 stores) and dominated the Minneapolis-St. Paul market with 19 stores. In metro Milwaukee, Menards boasted nine stores, surpassing Lowe’s five and trailing only Home Depot’s 12.
Home Depot’s customer-centric return policy was legendary. Company founders Bernie Marcus and Arthur Blank, in their book Built from Scratch, recounted an anecdote from the 1990s about a customer attempting to return tires, despite Home Depot not selling tires. The service desk employee, upon contacting corporate headquarters, was instructed to inquire about the purchase price and issue a full refund. From that day forward, the tires were displayed near the service desk as a constant reminder that customer satisfaction was paramount. Home Depot prioritized long-term customer loyalty over concerns about potential theft or minor errors.
Menards’ initial return policy stood in stark contrast, disallowing returns without a receipt. However, pressured by Home Depot’s customer-friendly approach, Menards modified its policy by the mid-1990s to “If we sell it, you take it back,” according to Bropst, signaling a shift towards greater customer accommodation in response to competitive pressures.
As competition intensified, Menard lodged complaints with the Council of Better Business Bureaus, alleging that Home Depot’s advertising in both Chicago and Minneapolis-St. Paul falsely implied that Menards sold inferior merchandise, deeming the claims “blatantly” false. In 2003, Menards filed a lawsuit against Home Depot, accusing the retail giant of “ripping off” Menards’ flyers and displaying them in its stores. The dispute proceeded to mediation before a federal magistrate and was ultimately settled in Menards’ favor for a modest cash sum.
On the racing front, however, successes continued. Menard’s team secured the Indy Racing League championship in both 1997 and 1999. Perhaps emboldened by these victories, John Menard Jr. became unusually open with the media, even confessing to a national publication about a fantasy of driving his race car over Home Depot’s CEO, a statement reflecting the intense rivalry between the two companies.
In 1999, Advertising Age magazine recognized Menards’ “excellence in brand building” in “going head-to-head with Home Depot.” John Menard Jr. was named one of the publication’s 100 marketing marvels, acknowledging his successful navigation of the competitive retail landscape.
John Menard Jr. also found another way to outperform his rivals: executive compensation. In 1998, he paid himself $20.6 million, triple the compensation of Lowe’s CEO and seven times that of Home Depot’s CEO. “In his world, everything is measured by your bank account,” revealed a former high-level corporate executive who requested anonymity. “He kept telling me, ‘It’s a game and I’m winning.’” This perspective underscores John Menard Jr.’s intensely competitive and financially driven nature.
For years, Lowe’s had strategically avoided the Midwest market, partly due to Menards’ strong market presence and loyal customer base, according to industry analyst Keri Spanbauer of Thrivent Financial for Lutherans, a significant investor in both Home Depot and Lowe’s. Rumors circulated about a potential Lowe’s acquisition of Menards, but instead, Lowe’s opted for market entry, expanding into Chicago in 1999 and Milwaukee in 2005.
“Increasingly, new stores cannibalize sales at a chain’s existing stores or they bump heads with a competitor,” Spanbauer noted, reflecting the growing saturation of the home improvement retail market. A Merrill Lynch report from the previous summer estimated the U.S. retail home improvement industry to be at 85 percent saturation.
Home Depot also faced internal challenges. In December 2000, the company appointed Robert Nardelli, an executive with no prior retail experience, as CEO. Upon hearing this news, Menard reportedly reacted with delight. “John called me up and said, ‘let’s go have the most expensive steak in town and celebrate,’” Archibald recalled, suggesting Menard perceived Nardelli’s appointment as a strategic advantage for Menards.
Customer service at Home Depot reportedly declined under Nardelli’s leadership, and he was eventually dismissed earlier in the year of the article’s publication. Analysts cited ongoing leadership issues, an outdated inventory control system, and store appearances that were perceived as tired and disorganized as contributing factors to Home Depot’s struggles.
In contrast, Lowe’s management team was generally regarded as highly competent. Lowe’s stores were newer, cleaner, and emphasized the fashion aspects of home improvement, appealing particularly to female shoppers. “Lowe’s has become a much stronger competitor,” Spanbauer acknowledged.
The proportion of do-it-yourself customers was reportedly decreasing, prompting Home Depot and Lowe’s to offer in-house installation services. “Let’s build something together,” declared actor Gene Hackman in Lowe’s advertising campaign. “You can’t just sell items any more,” Ander asserted. “You’ve got to sell solutions.” This shift reflected a broader trend towards service-oriented retail in the home improvement sector.
However, Menards remained steadfast in protecting its relationships with its core and most profitable customer segment: contractors. Menards consciously avoided competing directly with its contractor clientele by offering installation services. Instead, Menards provided customers with lists of independent contractors, maintaining a collaborative relationship with this important customer group.
John Menard Jr. also firmly adhered to his “Save Big Money with Menards” mantra, even as Wal-Mart, the original low-price leader, began to reconsider its singular focus on price, given its slowing sales growth. Menards’ unwavering commitment to low prices remained a central tenet of its brand identity.
In 2004 and 2005, while Lowe’s and Home Depot downsized store formats and concentrated on smaller, 80,000- to 100,000-square-foot urban stores, Menard adopted a strategy of super-sizing his new stores. He constructed a massive two-story store in St. Paul, Minnesota, featuring a moving walkway to transport customer carts—past a baby grand piano and plasma screens advertising specials—to the second level. In Duluth, Minnesota, he unveiled what was described as the “mother of all home improvement big boxes,” a 250,000-square-foot behemoth, more than double the size of a typical Home Depot. Menard expanded kitchen and bath displays, added appliance showrooms, and enhanced garden centers to his already extensive product lines.
The company reportedly planned further “monster stores.” Industry observers considered this a high-stakes gamble, but one that potentially ensured Menards’ long-term survival in an increasingly competitive market.
However, Menards had lost the marketing advantage it once held through racing sponsorships. Home Depot, not Menards, had become the “Official Home Improvement Warehouse of NASCAR.” In 2005, Home Depot—with former Menards driver Tony Stewart—captured NASCAR’s premier title, the Nextel Cup championship, followed by Lowe’s in 2006. These sponsorships translated into millions of dollars worth of publicity. In the preceding year, the estimated value of Menards’ racing-circuit exposure was $22.2 million, according to sponsorship expert Eric Wright, while Home Depot’s exposure was valued at $98.6 million and Lowe’s at $143.6 million, highlighting the growing marketing dominance of Menards’ larger competitors in the racing arena.
Perhaps not coincidentally, by 2006, Home Depot’s annual sales reached $81.5 billion with over 2,000 stores across the U.S., Mexico, Canada, and Puerto Rico. Lowe’s reported $43 billion in sales from 1,250 stores in 49 states. Menards, a distant third, generated an estimated $6.5 billion in sales revenue from 211 stores in 2005, according to industry analyst Dunn and Bradstreet.
Despite its smaller scale compared to Home Depot and Lowe’s, Menards reportedly enjoyed record profits in 2006, while both Lowe’s and Home Depot experienced declines in total same-store sales, suggesting Menards’ resilient business model and operational efficiency.
Ruling by Intimidation: The Menards Management Style
John Menard Jr. earned a college degree in business, but he reportedly told a senior Menards executive that his minor in psychology was far more crucial, believing that “how you treat people” was the key to his success. This statement, however, contrasts sharply with accounts of Menards’ management practices.
Menards’ management style is perhaps best illustrated by an internal pamphlet titled Grow with Menards, outlining the company’s standard operating procedures. Larry Menard reportedly stated in a 2006 arbitration hearing that this booklet was inspired by his Army experience during the Vietnam War. To this day, Larry asserted, the booklet “is basically our rule book,” suggesting a highly structured and regimented approach to management.
Menards managers were required to sign a work agreement encompassing pages of rules and penalties. These included fines of $10 for exceeding 15 carts in the parking lot, $100 per minute for late store openings, and $10 for customers failing to pick up special orders within 10 days. Manager absences were tightly controlled, and suggestions to superiors were reportedly discouraged, reflecting a hierarchical and rule-driven corporate culture.
These rules also mirrored the personality of John Menard Jr., a self-made billionaire who achieved success through relentless cost control. “That company’s his life and when he feels someone is taking money out of his pocket, he just goes nuts,” commented Kight, the former director of Menard’s racing engine business. National Home Center News, a trade publication, quoted vendors describing Menard as “‘tenacious,’ ‘frightening,’ ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘paranoid’ all in the same breath.” These descriptors paint a picture of a demanding and intensely controlling leader.
Managers were prohibited from building homes, even using materials purchased elsewhere, ostensibly to prevent employee theft, a policy John Menard Jr. publicly cited to the media, with termination as the penalty for violation.
Even minor home improvement projects by employees were scrutinized. Former managers recounted instances where Menard hired private investigators to photograph employee home additions or deck construction, then tasked internal examiners with cross-referencing the photographed materials against employee purchase records, searching for evidence of stolen products. This level of surveillance and suspicion permeated the Menards corporate culture.
The most widely publicized case illustrating this policy involved Eldon Helget, a lumber yard manager at Menards’ Burnsville, Minnesota, store. Helget’s daughter, who used a wheelchair, faced accessibility challenges in their narrow hallways. As she grew larger, it became increasingly difficult for Helget’s wife to carry her upstairs, and the bathroom was not wheelchair-accessible, depriving her of privacy. Unable to find a suitable existing home, the Helgets decided to build a custom, wheelchair-accessible house.
However, Larry Menard reportedly informed Helget that company policy offered no exceptions. Helget, who had a stellar 13-year employment record with Menards, was offered the option to resign his management position and accept a lower-level role, which entailed a $15,000 pay cut from his $40,000 salary, a demotion Helget reluctantly accepted.
The Helgets contracted a builder to construct a ramp-equipped home, using building materials from a competitor. Upon learning of this, John Menard Jr. reportedly terminated Helget’s employment entirely. The company further notified Helget that any future presence on Menards property would result in arrest for trespassing, a harsh and uncompromising response.
“John would say, ‘Why make a rule if you’re not going to enforce it?’” Archibald recalled, adding, “sometimes, you have to cut throats. That’s how business works.” This perspective reflects a ruthless, results-oriented approach to management.
Helget’s story gained media attention through the Minneapolis Star Tribune. A columnist characterized Menards’ policy as “something exhumed from the Bronze Age with all its primitive logic intact.” The story continued the following day when a local lumberyard offered Helget employment. The Helgets were initially overjoyed, until they discovered that Helget’s Menards contract included a non-compete clause, barring him from working for a competitor for a year.
This non-compete provision stemmed from John Menard Jr.’s concern about protecting trade secrets. He reportedly refused to hire former Home Depot or Lowe’s employees, fearing they might be corporate spies, reflecting a deep-seated paranoia about competitive intelligence.
Linda Helget reportedly telephoned John Menard Jr. to plead for leniency. “He said we could find a house in another town, but all our friends and family are here. He thought he was a real stud muffin the way he talked and I said ‘who are you to tell us where to live?’ I told him ‘someday I hope a train runs you over and cuts your legs off.’’ Linda Helget’s emotional outburst reflects the profound distress and anger caused by Menard’s unyielding policy.
The National Enquirer tabloid amplified the story nationally. The Helgets filed a wrongful termination claim against Menards, and their attorney, Edwin Sissam, took depositions from the Menard brothers. Sissam reportedly expected John Menard Jr. to be a sophisticated businessman in formal attire but instead encountered “a cowboy in jeans with his shirt partially unbuttoned and a chain around his neck.”
“It was clear Mr. Menard is very, very secure in himself. His body language, his mannerisms, answering questions when he wasn’t asked; not answering them when he was,” Sissam observed. “Most companies with an employee with a disabled daughter would want to be behind the family … But John Menard had this attitude, ‘Who the hell is telling me how to run my company?’” Sissam’s account underscores Menard’s autocratic and uncompromising leadership style.
The Helgets ultimately accepted Menards’ second settlement offer, reportedly “somewhere between $1 and $50,000,” according to a source close to the case, which was settled in 1992.
In his pursuit of absolute control, John Menard Jr. was described as the “ultimate micromanager” by employees. “There’s an emotional youthfulness and wonder about him – like a kid having fun – and then he says, ‘wait a minute, I can’t control that,’ and he tries to control absolutely everything,” Kight noted, highlighting the paradoxical nature of Menard’s personality, blending childlike enthusiasm with an obsessive need for control.
Menard frequently reviewed the mail of his top executives and meticulously read customer complaints, former insiders revealed, seeking to identify problems or instances of perceived employee generosity at his expense. This pervasive monitoring reflects a deep-seated distrust and a relentless focus on cost control.
The Menard brothers were notorious for verbally berating employees. In the 2006 arbitration case, former Menards assistant store manager Cory Lickiss testified under oath that Larry Menard had called him a “f-cking retard” in front of customers and employees the day before Lickiss resigned. Such accounts illustrate a pattern of abusive and demeaning behavior within Menards’ management culture.
“We used to joke when a letter came from headquarters that it would start with either “What the F…” or “Why the F…,” former manager Bropst recounted, illustrating the confrontational and often profane tone of corporate communications.
Corporate headquarters maintained close surveillance of sales per customer per store area, Larry Menard testified. Menards employed secret shoppers to evaluate customer service, a common retail practice, but also maintained a substantial team of merchandising and operations personnel who regularly flew out of Eau Claire on six company airplanes seven days a week, supplemented by a fleet of Menards cars for road inspections. This extensive oversight apparatus underscores the company’s intense focus on operational control and performance monitoring.
When John Menard Jr. was in a particular city, he would reportedly conduct his own store inspections, often in what was described as a crude, unintentional disguise. His hair color reportedly varied, ranging from red to golden brown to “shoe-polish black,” according to a former insider, who claimed that one of Menard’s ex-girlfriends, a salon owner, provided these hair coloring services at a favorable price.
The home office monitored security cameras in every store for at least an hour daily. “We can see team members doing their job well or not doing their job,” Larry Menard testified. “We can see too many carts, not enough carts. We can see lines at registers and do corrective action.” This constant video surveillance often resulted in a “blizzard of memos” to store managers, insiders reported, highlighting the micromanagement from corporate headquarters.
Menards was vehemently opposed to unionization in its stores. “When I was promoted to assistant general store manager, the first thing I had to do was go to a one-and-one-half-day seminar in Eau Claire about fighting unions,” Baumann recounted. “If a person had ever worked in a union shop, you couldn’t hire them.” Bropst was reportedly forced to terminate two promising management trainees because they had worked as baggers at a unionized grocery store during high school, illustrating the company’s extreme anti-union stance.
Menards policy stipulated a 60 percent pay reduction for managers if their store unionized, according to former Iowa manager Faber. Manager compensation, however, was generally generous, ranging from $80,000 to $200,000 annually, including bonuses and profit sharing. This was particularly attractive given that over half of Menards managers lacked college degrees, Larry Menard testified.
However, the corporate culture was described as “just beat you down and made you feel you’re replaceable, and that you had no other options,” by Bropst. Most store managers reportedly did not remain employed long enough to retire, suggesting high turnover and burnout.
Managers were expected to operate with minimal staffing. In 1996, Home Channel News magazine described Menards’ staffing as “remarkably frugal,” with 52 employees per store, including headquarters personnel, compared to Home Depot’s 195. Menards store managers annually traveled to Eau Claire to “negotiate” their store budgets but reportedly had limited success in increasing staffing levels, indicating tight labor cost controls.
Some budget-constrained managers reportedly struggled to meet headquarters’ demands due to understaffing. Managers who questioned company policies faced potential repercussions. All Menards managers were required to sign an agreement mandating arbitration, not court litigation, for any disputes with the company. Furthermore, they were required to pay their own attorney’s fees and half the arbitrator’s costs, even if Menards was found liable.
When an even more stringent clause was added later, Faber, the former Iowa store manager, questioned it and incurred Larry Menard’s displeasure. The new clause required managers to pay a $200 deductible if a delivery driver they hired was involved in a traffic accident. Faber testified that Larry Menard told him he would “hire someone younger” who would likely perform better for less money if Faber objected to the policy.
“Questioning their policy was the beginning of the end,” Faber concluded. Company audits soon began identifying alleged operational deficiencies at his store.
Ultimately, Faber, a 20-year Menards veteran then aged 48, was replaced by a 29-year-old. Faber was offered a demotion in a different city, which he declined, subsequently filing an age discrimination complaint, which he lost.
In his arbitration testimony, Larry Menard described the company’s practice of demoting managers as a benevolent act, reserved for high-potential individuals who “have kind of gone astray” and needed time for reflection to “get their act back together.” This euphemistic characterization contrasts sharply with the reality of demotion as a disciplinary measure.
Menards’ demotion policy typically involved offering the targeted employee a lower-paying position at a lower rank in a different city, requiring family relocation, effectively forcing resignations or compliance with unfavorable terms.
Bropst also experienced repercussions for questioning an order, this time directly from John Menard Jr.
“That was the beginning of the end of my career with them,” he stated.
Larry Menard informed Bropst of a required relocation. “They offered me another new store in Wilmer, Minn., and said ‘take it or leave it,’” he recalled. “I was nearly 40 years old and I figured it was time to stand up for myself … or I’d dance their tune forever.” Bropst resigned.
When Bropst became manager of a competitor’s store in the same city a few months later, Menards sued him, seeking $25,000 for violating his non-compete clause. Bropst incurred $4,000 in legal fees before the case was dismissed.
However, Menard pursued an injunction against Bropst, “They tried to sue me for soliciting their employees,” he explained. At that point, Bropst’s new employer intervened in his defense. When Bropst presented 50 online job applications from Menards employees in court, the judge dismissed the complaint, and with his employer’s legal team involved, Menards’ legal actions ceased.
Bropst recounted disturbing accounts of how other employees were treated.
One involved a North Dakota Menards store manager whose wife gave birth to triplets prematurely, requiring specialized care at the University of Minnesota Medical Center. The manager incurred substantial airfare expenses commuting to and from the hospital. Despite working 35 to 40 hours weekly, his contract mandated a minimum of 55 hours, resulting in a pay reduction from $1,000 to $500 or $600 per week, Bropst stated. “Two of the babies didn’t make it, and John (Menard) fined him $2,000 [out of his bonus] because he had to bury two of his kids and didn’t put in 55 hours those two weeks.” This anecdote vividly illustrates the perceived ruthlessness and lack of compassion within Menards’ corporate culture.
“John expects his employees to be like him,” Archibald asserted. “The company has to come first; families get in the way.”
However, Archibald added, “In John’s defense, the few times he has fallen for someone’s sorry-ass excuse, they’ve stabbed him in the back and left the job anyway.” This suggests a possible underlying cynicism and distrust driving Menard’s demanding management style.
Most observers, however, suggested that such instances of employee betrayal were rare. More frequently, Menard reportedly reacted with outrage towards those who questioned his management practices. Archibald characterized it as being about power: “Whatever he does, he does it because he can.”
The Price of Success: Personal Life and Legacy
Edward Archibald served Menards for 27 years, including 15 as its top merchandising and marketing executive, considered by former company insiders to be John Menard Jr.’s “right-hand man.” However, two years before the article’s publication, John Menard Jr. accused Archibald of accepting kickbacks from a supplier. Archibald demanded proof and, when none was provided, resigned and never returned.
“I still love John like a brother,” Archibald maintained, but he could no longer tolerate the treatment. “After 27 years, I expected more.” Archibald and three other former Menards executives (two requesting anonymity) offered a portrait of a boss whose immense wealth had not necessarily brought him happiness.
In 2002, John Menard Jr. paid more in personal federal income tax than any other American: $228 million on $593 million in adjusted gross income. Menards Inc. operated as an S-Corporation, where profits are passed through to owners and taxed at their personal income tax rate, and John Menard Jr. owned 88.7 percent of the company.
John Menard Jr. is not widely known for philanthropy. “He doesn’t go for all these foundations and write-offs,” commented former Eau Claire state senator Dave Zien.
Greater Eau Claire Area Chamber of Commerce President Robert S. McCoy acknowledged Menard’s support for Regis High School, a Catholic school. “He’s probably done things people don’t see,” McCoy speculated, suggesting possible discreet charitable contributions.
Eau Claire city officials reportedly desired “The Menard Center,” a civic and convention hub funded by the entrepreneur, but as Menard’s cousin Watson remarked, “I don’t see why John needs another building with his name on it; he’s already got over 200.”
Menard reportedly maintains a frugal lifestyle at home. He resides down the block from his brother Larry in the 1972 ranch house he shared with his second wife, Paula Christine, and their three children—J.R. (John R. Menard III), Paul C., and Molly C.—until their divorce in 1993. The 11-room, one-story wood home features five bedrooms, three baths, two fireplaces, and a property assessment of $425,000. It is equipped with a large-screen TV and a basement model railroad setup that “looks like something you see in the movies,” according to Dominic Giuffre, who once partnered with John Menard Jr. in a failed attempt to purchase the Milwaukee Mile racetrack. A former Menards executive described the train set as “John Menard’s perfect world,” because “he controls everything. Nothing moves without his approval,” again highlighting Menard’s need for control extending beyond his business into his personal life.
Menard’s divorce from Paula was reportedly triggered after Paula began taking tae kwon do classes, which John objected to, leading to escalating disagreements, according to Archibald, who claimed to have spent more time with John Menard Jr. in the preceding 15 years than Menard’s own family.
Paul, the race car driver, then 26, relocated to North Carolina to escape his father’s shadow, Archibald stated. J.R., 28, and Molly, 23, were employed by Menards. All three younger children have trust funds holding Menards stock. IRS records revealed that the Paul C. Menard 1985 Trust had a 2002 taxable income of $30.4 million, while Molly’s trust reported $4.5 million, illustrating the substantial wealth accumulated by John Menard Jr.’s younger children.
John Menard Jr.’s first marriage ended more acrimoniously, and his relationship with his two children from that marriage, Renee, 43, and Christopher, 40, was reportedly strained. Archibald claimed that these older children “never forgiven their father for having an affair with another woman while he was married to their mother.”
Menard also had an out-of-wedlock daughter named Michelle, 39, who legally changed her last name to Menard and worked for the company for a period.
Christopher and Renee both worked for Menards but, upon reaching their mid-30s, reportedly “cashed their stock options and got $15 to $20 million in 1990 dollars and walked away,” according to Archibald. Sources indicated that Renee had limited Menard’s access to his grandchildren through her. When contacted by phone, Renee reportedly laughed and declined to discuss her father. Milwaukee Magazine was unable to reach the other Menard children.
“John’s trying to buy off his younger children, so they won’t leave him, like the older ones did,” Archibald suggested. He noted that the youngest children would soon become eligible to receive payouts from their trust funds, structured in 10 annual installments rather than a lump sum.
“John Menard’s first, second and third true loves are Menards Inc. Everything – including his family – comes after that,” Kight asserted, summarizing Menard’s unwavering prioritization of his business.
Archibald added, “He’s been a failure when it comes to his family, when it comes to relationships. He’s had six children by three women, married and divorced two of them. And two long-running girlfriends, Darla [the hairstylist] and Debbie, an attorney.” These accounts portray a complex and often troubled personal life, overshadowed by John Menard Jr.’s relentless pursuit of business success.
In late 2006, Menard ended his engagement with Debbie just two weeks after firing her sister, Dawn Sands, the company’s general counsel of 10 years. (Dawn Sands filed an arbitration action against the company and declined to comment.)
Perhaps the closest personal relationship John Menard Jr. ever had was with Indy racing driver Scott Brayton, who raced for Team Menard for four years. Brayton reportedly called Menard “one of my dearest friends.” They would often talk for hours on the phone late at night, according to Indy historian Davidson.
However, Brayton tragically died at age 37 in a 1996 crash at Indianapolis. Menard was present at the racetrack and comforted Lee Brayton, Scott’s father, remaining by his side until Scott’s wife and mother arrived. “John was very, very good to the family. He and others, Firestone, the Speedway, Dale Earnhardt Sr., Roger Penske, they contributed a lot of money for a scholarship for [Scott’s 2-year-old daughter] Carly,” Lee Brayton recalled.
Menard later hired Scott’s widow, Becky, to handle public relations for his racing team, allowing her to work remotely. This instance of compassion, however, was described as rare by his associates.
Menard’s compensation structure reflected his business priorities. His $20.6 million pay in 1998, as company president and CEO, included a bonus equal to 5 percent of the company’s pre-tax profit, an arrangement established in 1973.
Compensation data for other Menards corporate officers, revealed in the company’s 1998 tax case, showed a dramatic disparity compared to the CEO’s salary: operations manager Larry Menard received a $45,000 base salary and a $180,000 bonus; John’s son Christopher, then corporate secretary and Eau Claire distribution center manager, earned $172,815; real estate head Marvin Prochaska received $121,307; and chief financial officer and treasurer Earl Rasmussen earned $55,702. These figures underscore the vast income inequality within Menards’ top management structure, with John Menard Jr. as the overwhelmingly dominant earner.
A 2002 tax filing revealed that John Menard Jr. owned 100 percent of the company’s voting stock and 56 percent of its non-voting stock, with trusts named after Menard and his family members holding the remaining shares, solidifying his absolute control over Menards Inc.
None of John Menard Jr.’s children reportedly expressed interest in succeeding him in leading the business. John, then 67, had experienced “a serious health scare,” described as “a prostate problem” by Archibald and others, but had reportedly recovered.
Retail consultant Ander suggested that Menards Inc.’s success was attributable to strong leadership by “a benevolent dictator.” However, he questioned, “But after the dictator’s gone, does the culture survive? Does the company?” The question of Menards’ long-term sustainability beyond John Menard Jr.’s leadership remained uncertain.
John Menard Jr. had reportedly designated his 33-year-old nephew, Charlie Menard, Larry’s son, as his successor. Charlie, a regional Midwest circuit race car driver with no prior experience outside the family business, was appointed chief operating officer in 2005.
“He’s the only one that wants it, but he’s not capable,” asserted a former high-ranking executive. Former Menards executives described Charlie as “a computer geek” and “a nice guy” lacking the business acumen and interpersonal skills to effectively run the company.
“If they continue to mimic what’s being done today, they could survive a long time,” Archibald speculated, comparing the company to a high-performance race car. He added, anyone can drive it, “until it crashes. When it comes to decisions about how far to expand, John had a wisdom that these people don’t.” Archibald suggested a potential vulnerability in Menards’ future strategic decision-making without John Menard Jr.’s guidance.
However, Archibald predicted that regardless of who succeeded John Menard Jr., Menards “is going to go up for sale and the kids will split up the proceeds” upon John’s departure. He further speculated that if a new owner were to expand the Menards concept nationally, “they will eat Home Depot’s and Lowe’s lunch,” suggesting untapped national potential for the Menards brand.
Others remained less certain. The fundamental question was whether the Menards concept could be separated from John Menard Jr. He had controlled every aspect of the company since its inception, a control that had yielded extraordinary success, but whether it had brought him personal contentment remained ambiguous.
“That’s the toughest question,” reflected former Menard engineering director Kight. “When he gets happy, I think he struggles with that. He distrusts that.” This suggests a potential internal conflict within John Menard Jr., perhaps struggling to reconcile his relentless drive for success with personal happiness.
And what did John Menard Jr. truly trust?
“John’s life is his business,” Archibald concluded. “That’s it.” This succinct summation encapsulates the all-consuming nature of John Menard Jr.’s dedication to his company.
Arsenic and Old Waste: Environmental Controversies
John Menard Jr. and his company have accumulated a significant history of environmental violations. Wisconsin Department of Justice lawyers, in a 2005 complaint against Menard, noted that John Menard Jr.’s companies had “more run-ins with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) than any other Wisconsin company.” DNR officials had reportedly cited Menards at least 13 times since 1976 for neglecting or violating state regulations pertaining to air and water pollution and hazardous waste management.
Menards’ environmental compliance issues extended beyond Wisconsin to other states as well.
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1994: Wisconsin secured a civil judgment against Menards for the unlicensed transportation and disposal of ash generated from incinerating CCA-treated lumber. CCA (chromated copper arsenate) treated wood contains chromium, copper, and arsenic, a known carcinogen, classified as hazardous waste requiring disposal in licensed landfills. Menards was fined $160,000.
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1997: John Menard Jr. was apprehended personally transporting plastic bags filled with chromium and arsenic-laden wood ash in his pickup truck to his residence for disposal with household trash. Menard pleaded no contest to felony and misdemeanor charges related to records violations, unlawful transportation, and improper disposal of hazardous waste. John Menard Jr. and his company were fined $1.7 million for 21 violations, a substantial penalty reflecting the severity of the environmental infractions.
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2003: The Minnesota attorney general filed charges alleging that Menards manufactured and sold arsenic-contaminated mulch labeled “ideal for playgrounds and for animal bedding.” Warning labels from CCA-treated wood were reportedly found in the mulch. The EPA recommends against converting CCA-treated wood into mulch. This case remained pending at the time of the article.
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2005: Menards agreed to pay a $2 million fine after Wisconsin DNR officials discovered a floor drain in a company shop believed to be used for dumping paint, solvents, oil, and other waste into a lagoon that flowed into a tributary of the Chippewa River. This penalty surpassed the previous record fine of $1.7 million imposed on Menard in 1997, highlighting a pattern of repeated environmental violations.
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2006: The construction of a $112 million warehouse became a contentious issue in the Wisconsin governor’s race. The proposed warehouse site involved filling a 0.6-acre bean field designated by the DNR as a seasonal wetland utilized by migrating tundra swans. Menards offered to create a replacement wetland more than twice the size, but this proposal was rejected by Scott Humrickhouse, a DNR regional director, who stated that such mitigation was acceptable “only when every alternative for saving the original wetland was exhausted.” The escalating dispute garnered significant media attention, with a DNR warden reportedly referring to Menards’ general counsel as a “legal bitch” and the company threatening to relocate jobs out of Wisconsin. Tensions appeared to ease after Governor Jim Doyle arranged $4.2 million in state aid to support Menards’ Eau Claire manufacturing headquarters expansion. Menard had previously contributed $20,000 to Doyle’s gubernatorial campaign.
Also in 2006: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued an administrative order against Menards for damaging a Sioux Falls, South Dakota, stream running through its property by filling 1,350 linear feet of the stream and replacing it with a 66-inch storm sewer pipe, further demonstrating a pattern of environmental regulatory non-compliance.
