John Rawls (1921–2002) stands as a pivotal figure in 20th-century political philosophy, renowned for his profound contributions to liberal thought. His seminal work, A Theory of Justice, introduced the concept of “justice as fairness,” reshaping contemporary discussions on social justice, equality, and the foundations of a just society. Beyond this, his work extended into political liberalism and international justice, offering a comprehensive framework for understanding justice at multiple levels. This article delves into the core tenets of John Rawls’s theory of justice, exploring its aims, methods, key concepts, and enduring influence.
1. Life and Intellectual Journey
Born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland, Rawls’s early life was shaped by intellectual and civic engagement. His father, a lawyer, and mother, active in the League of Women Voters, instilled in him a deep appreciation for law and public service. He pursued his education at Princeton and Cornell, encountering the philosophical insights of Norman Malcolm and later engaging with influential thinkers at Oxford like H. L. A. Hart, Isaiah Berlin, and Stuart Hampshire. His academic career led him to professorships at Cornell and MIT before he joined Harvard in 1962, where he remained for over three decades, becoming a leading voice in political philosophy.
Rawls’s personal experiences, particularly the profound impact of war, significantly shaped his philosophical outlook. Initially considering priesthood, his faith was shaken by the horrors he witnessed as an infantryman in World War II, including the capriciousness of death and the atrocities of the Holocaust. Later, the Vietnam War spurred his analysis of systemic injustices, leading him to critique the draft’s discriminatory nature against marginalized communities. These experiences fueled his commitment to developing a theory of justice that could address fundamental societal inequalities.
His most influential work, A Theory of Justice (1971), laid out the systematic framework for “justice as fairness.” Rawls continually refined and expanded his theory throughout his career, revisiting and elaborating on its themes in Political Liberalism (1993), The Law of Peoples (1999), and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). This article reflects Rawls’s mature perspective on justice as fairness, political liberalism, and the law of peoples, drawing from his final statements and incorporating insights from contemporary Rawlsian scholarship.
2. Aims and Methodological Approach
2.1 The Four Roles of Political Philosophy
Rawls articulated four crucial roles for political philosophy within a society’s public discourse. First, it serves a practical role, offering a basis for reasoned agreement amidst deep political divides, potentially preventing violent conflict. He pointed to historical examples like Hobbes’s Leviathan, Locke’s Letter on Toleration, and the philosophical debates surrounding the US Constitution and slavery as instances where philosophy addressed pressing societal crises.
Second, political philosophy helps citizens orient themselves within their social world. It provides a framework for understanding their roles and responsibilities as members of society, particularly in a democracy where they are considered equal citizens. Philosophy can offer a unifying perspective on how individuals with this status should interact.
Third, philosophy explores the limits of political possibility. While grounded in the practicalities of workable political arrangements, it can also be utopian, envisioning the most just and desirable social order achievable given human nature and societal constraints. It strives to imagine ideal laws within the realm of what is realistically possible.
Fourth, political philosophy plays a role in reconciliation. It can mitigate frustration and anger towards society by demonstrating the rationality and historical development of its institutions. Philosophy can reveal the progress and underlying reason within societal structures, offering a more hopeful perspective on human social arrangements beyond mere domination and injustice.
Rawls saw his own work as directly addressing the tension between liberty and equality in democratic thought. He aimed to define the boundaries of civic and international tolerance, providing a framework for citizens to see themselves as free and equal within a fair society, and to envision a just democracy contributing to a peaceful global community. For those disillusioned by societal divisions, Rawls offered the idea that diverse worldviews, while challenging, can coexist and even strengthen a social order committed to greater freedom.
2.2 The Sequence of Theories and Domain-Specific Principles
Unlike utilitarianism, which applies a single moral principle universally, Rawls argued that political philosophy is not simply applied moral philosophy. He contended that “the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing” (TJ, 29). His approach is domain-specific, focusing on the political realm and tailoring principles to particular sub-domains and their unique constraints.
Rawls approached the political domain through a sequence of theories, starting with a self-contained democratic society across generations. Once principles for such a society are established, he expanded to a society of nations. He suggested this sequence could extend further, potentially encompassing human interactions with animals and other domains, aiming for universal coverage through domain-appropriate principles.
2.3 Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory: A Two-Stage Approach
Within each political sub-domain, Rawls employed a two-stage approach: ideal theory precedes non-ideal theory. Ideal theory operates under two key assumptions. First, it assumes full compliance, meaning all actors (citizens or societies) are willing to adhere to chosen principles. This idealizes away issues of crime and aggression. Second, it assumes reasonably favorable conditions, where citizens and societies are capable of cooperation, free from extreme hardship or societal collapse.
Rawls argued that developing ideal theory first is crucial for establishing a clear vision of a just society and a systematic framework for addressing real-world injustices. Once ideal principles are defined, non-ideal theory can be developed to address deviations from the ideal, such as healthcare for the ill or responses to aggressive states, using the ideal as a benchmark.
2.4 Reflective Equilibrium: Coherence and Justification
For Rawls, justified political convictions are achieved through reflective equilibrium. This state is characterized by perfect coherence among all levels of one’s beliefs, from specific judgments to abstract principles. In reflective equilibrium, specific judgments support general convictions, which in turn align with abstract beliefs, creating a network of mutual justification.
The method of reflective equilibrium is the process of moving towards this coherence. It begins with “considered moral judgments”—consistent and confidently held beliefs made under good conditions (e.g., “slavery is wrong”). These serve as provisional anchors. The process involves iteratively adjusting beliefs at different levels to enhance overall coherence. Conflicts between specific judgments and general principles necessitate revisions, striving for greater internal consistency.
This iterative process leads to narrow reflective equilibrium, coherence among initial beliefs. Expanding this, wide reflective equilibrium incorporates engagement with major historical and critical theories of political philosophy. Reflecting on these alternatives further refines one’s belief system, aiming for a comprehensive and robust coherence.
Reflective equilibrium, emphasizing coherence and revision, contrasts with foundationalism, which relies on a fixed set of unrevisable foundational beliefs. In Rawls’s method, all beliefs are open to revision if it improves overall coherence.
2.5 The Independence of Moral and Political Theory
While acknowledging that various types of beliefs can be relevant to political philosophy, Rawls maintained that moral and political theorizing can proceed largely independently of metaphysics and epistemology. He even reversed the traditional priority, suggesting that progress in metaethics is more likely to stem from advancements in substantive moral and political theory, rather than the other way around (CP, 286–302). This methodological stance emphasizes the practical and context-dependent nature of his approach.
Rawls’s metaethical theory, political constructivism, is best understood in the context of his substantive political theory, to which we now turn.
3. Political Liberalism: Legitimacy and Stability in Diverse Societies
In diverse, free societies, citizens hold a wide array of worldviews, encompassing different religions, moral codes, and conceptions of the good life. Despite this diversity, a unified legal framework is necessary. This reality poses two fundamental challenges that political liberalism seeks to address: legitimacy and stability.
3.1 Legitimacy: The Liberal Principle of Acceptable Power
The challenge of legitimacy concerns the justifiable use of coercive political power in a democracy. Given diverse worldviews, how can imposing a single set of laws be legitimate? Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy provides an answer:
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason (PL, 137).
This principle dictates that political power is legitimate only when exercised in ways reasonably endorsable by all free and equal citizens. It establishes a criterion of reciprocity: citizens must reasonably believe that all others can reasonably accept the basic legal framework. Coercion must be justified by principles acceptable to those being coerced.
3.2 Reasonable Citizens and the Burdens of Judgment
Rawls defines reasonable citizens as those who desire social cooperation on terms acceptable to all. They are willing to propose and abide by mutually agreeable rules, expecting the same from others, even if it requires sacrificing some self-interest. Reasonable citizens value legitimate political power.
Each reasonable citizen holds a comprehensive doctrine—a personal worldview encompassing beliefs about religion, morality, and life’s meaning. However, their reasonableness leads them to refrain from imposing their doctrines on others who are also seeking mutually acceptable rules. Even holding strong personal beliefs, they recognize the importance of finding common ground.
This tolerance stems partly from accepting the burdens of judgment. Rawls argues that deep questions of philosophy, religion, and morality are inherently complex. Even conscientious individuals will arrive at different conclusions due to varying life experiences and perspectives. Reasonable citizens acknowledge this inherent difficulty and are therefore hesitant to impose their own potentially contested worldviews.
3.3 Reasonable Pluralism and the Public Political Culture
Rawls’s concept of the reasonable citizen reflects a hopeful view of human nature, suggesting a capacity for genuine toleration and mutual respect beyond self-interest and dogma. This capacity allows for the possibility of reasonable pluralism, where diverse worldviews within a society themselves endorse toleration and democratic principles. This includes various reasonable religious and non-religious perspectives that do not seek to impose conformity through state power.
Reasonable pluralism softens but does not fully resolve the legitimacy challenge. Even in such a society, no single comprehensive doctrine can be the basis for legitimate coercion, as no single doctrine can be universally accepted by all reasonable citizens.
Instead, Rawls turns to a society’s public political culture as the source of shared fundamental ideas for basic laws. This culture, encompassing constitutional institutions, legal traditions, and historical documents, provides a common ground. Rawls argues that fundamental ideas implicit within this public culture can be developed into a shared political conception of justice.
3.4 Political Conceptions of Justice: A Freestanding Framework
Rawls’s solution to legitimacy is that political power should be exercised based on a political conception of justice. This conception is an interpretation of fundamental ideas within a society’s public political culture. It is not derived from any specific comprehensive doctrine nor is it a mere compromise. Instead, it is freestanding, developed independently of citizens’ diverse worldviews.
Reasonable citizens, seeking mutually acceptable cooperation, recognize a freestanding political conception as the only viable basis for agreement. Political power guided by such a conception is thus legitimate.
Rawls identifies three fundamental ideas within democratic public political culture: citizens as free and equal, and society as a fair system of cooperation. Liberal political conceptions of justice center on interpreting these ideas.
While diverse interpretations exist, all liberal political conceptions share core features:
- Guaranteeing familiar individual rights and liberties, such as freedom of expression and conscience.
- Prioritizing these rights and liberties, especially over aggregate welfare or perfectionist values.
- Ensuring sufficient all-purpose means for citizens to effectively exercise their freedoms.
These abstract features translate into institutional demands: fair income and wealth distribution, equal opportunities in education and employment, universal healthcare, and public campaign finance. A libertarian conception, lacking sufficient means for all citizens and permitting excessive inequality, fails to qualify as a liberal political conception by Rawls’s criteria. Justice as fairness, however, does qualify.
3.5 Stability: Overlapping Consensus and Shared Endorsement
Legitimacy ensures the acceptability of law, but stability addresses citizens’ willingness to obey. For long-term stability, citizens must have internal reasons to abide by the law, even when imposed by a collective with differing beliefs.
Rawls proposes overlapping consensus as the foundation for stability. In this model, citizens endorse a core set of laws for diverse reasons rooted in their own comprehensive doctrines. The political conception of justice acts as a “module” fitting into various worldviews.
For example, the Second Vatican Council’s declaration on religious freedom demonstrates how Catholic doctrine can support a liberal right for its own reasons. Similarly, reasonable Islamic and atheistic doctrines might also support religious freedom, each from their own perspectives. In an overlapping consensus, all reasonable comprehensive doctrines affirm the political conception, each for its own reasons.
Citizens integrate the liberal “module” into their personal worldviews. Some may see liberalism as directly derived from their core beliefs, while others may accept it as valuable but separate. Crucially, all citizens view the values of the political conception as highly important, generally outweighing conflicting values in political reasoning. They prioritize the political conception in shaping basic laws.
Overlapping consensus provides a more robust stability than a mere modus vivendi (balance of power). Power shifts can destabilize a modus vivendi, but in an overlapping consensus, citizens’ internal endorsement ensures continued support for the political conception, even with changing power dynamics. It is stable for the right reasons: moral endorsement from diverse perspectives.
Rawls acknowledges that overlapping consensus is not guaranteed in every liberal society and can be fragile. However, he sees historical trends in liberal societies towards belief convergence and deepened trust, suggesting its possibility and desirability as the strongest foundation for stability in a free society.
3.6 Public Reason: Justification in the Public Sphere
Building on reciprocity, Rawls introduces public reason, requiring citizens to justify their political decisions to one another using publicly accessible values and standards. This extends the requirement of reasonable acceptability to the process of political justification.
For instance, a judge should not base a legal decision on religious doctrine inaccessible to all citizens. Public reason requires justifications grounded in shared public values and standards.
Rawls’s doctrine of public reason can be summarized:
Citizens engaged in certain political activities have a duty of civility to be able to justify their decisions on fundamental political issues by reference only to public values and public standards.
Key elements of this doctrine:
- Public values: Values of a political conception of justice, related to freedom, equality, and fair cooperation. Examples include religious freedom, political equality, economic efficiency, environmental protection, and family stability. Nonpublic values, specific to particular associations (e.g., religious doctrines limiting roles for women), are excluded.
- Public standards: Principles of reasoning and evidence acceptable to all reasonable citizens. Reliance on common sense, generally known facts, and well-established science is favored over divination or disputed theories.
- Fundamental political issues: “Constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice,” such as voting rights, religious toleration, property rights, and anti-discrimination principles. Public reason is less strictly applied to less fundamental issues like tax rates or park funding.
- Certain political activities: Primarily applies to those exercising public office: judges, legislators, executives, and candidates. Rawls also extends it to voters. These activities involve exercising or influencing political power, requiring public justification. Private activities (e.g., religious worship, academic research, personal conversations) are not bound by public reason.
- Duty of civility: A moral, not legal, duty. Violating public reason is not illegal but morally inappropriate, undermining mutual respect and civic friendship. Citizens retain full legal rights to free expression.
Rawls includes an important proviso: citizens can use the language of their comprehensive doctrines in public political discourse, even on fundamental issues, if they also demonstrate how these assertions support public values. Lincoln’s use of biblical imagery against slavery is an example, as it appealed to public values of freedom and equality. Public reason is thus permissive within the bounds of civility.
4. Justice as Fairness: Principles for a Just Liberal Society
Justice as fairness is Rawls’s specific theory of justice for a liberal society, a member of the broader family of liberal political conceptions. It aims to define the most morally desirable arrangement of social institutions, going beyond mere legitimacy. Rawls sees it as resolving the tension between liberty and equality, addressing critiques from both socialist and conservative perspectives, and as superior to utilitarianism.
Justice as fairness envisions citizens relating as equals within a reciprocal social order, rejecting unjust status hierarchies. Rawls highlights how social and economic inequalities can lead to harmful status inequalities, fostering deference, servility, domination, and arrogance, especially when status is based on morally arbitrary factors like birth, gender, or race.
4.1 The Basic Structure of Society: Institutions as the Focus
Justice as fairness focuses on the basic structure of society: major political and social institutions like the constitution, legal system, economy, and family. These institutions distribute fundamental benefits and burdens, shaping social recognition, basic rights, opportunities, and the distribution of wealth.
The basic structure profoundly impacts citizens’ lives, influencing not only their prospects but also their goals, attitudes, relationships, and character. Such pervasive influence demands justification. Rawls argues that tacit consent by remaining in society is insufficient justification for coercive rules.
Rawls assumes a society characterized by reasonable pluralism and reasonably favorable conditions with sufficient resources. He simplifies by assuming a self-sufficient and closed society, focusing primarily on ideal theory and setting aside non-ideal issues like criminal justice initially.
4.2 Two Guiding Ideas: Freedom, Equality, and Reciprocity
Social cooperation is essential for a decent life, but the distribution of its benefits and burdens is a central concern of justice. Rawls’s principles articulate the liberal ideals of fairness, freedom, and equality in cooperation. His interpretation combines a negative and a positive thesis.
The negative thesis asserts that citizens do not deserve advantages or disadvantages based on morally arbitrary factors like birth into wealth or poverty, natural talents, gender, or race. These features provide no justification for unequal social benefits.
The positive thesis is based on equality-based reciprocity. It starts with the presumption of equal distribution of social goods, allowing inequalities only if they benefit everyone, especially the least advantaged. Equality is the baseline, and any deviation must improve everyone’s situation, prioritizing the worst-off. This strong emphasis on equality and reciprocal benefit is a hallmark of Rawls’s theory.
4.3 The Two Principles of Justice as Fairness: Liberty and Equality
These guiding ideas are formalized in Rawls’s two principles of justice:
First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
- They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
- They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle) (JF, 42–43).
The first principle, concerning equal basic liberties, is enshrined in the political constitution. The second, governing socio-economic inequalities, applies primarily to economic institutions. The first principle has priority over the second, and fair equality of opportunity has priority within the second principle.
The first principle guarantees familiar basic rights and liberties: freedom of conscience, association, speech, and person; rights to vote, hold office, and due process. These are to be equal for all citizens. Unequal rights would disadvantage those with fewer rights, making equality the just default in normal circumstances.
Two distinctive features of Rawls’s first principle are its priority and the requirement of fair value of political liberties. Basic liberties cannot be traded off for other social goods. For example, economic productivity cannot justify infringing on basic liberties. Further, the fair value of political liberties demands substantive, not just formal, equality in political participation. Citizens with similar abilities and motivation should have equal opportunities to hold office and influence elections, regardless of wealth. This has significant implications for campaign finance and media access.
The second principle has two parts. Fair equality of opportunity requires that individuals with similar talents and willingness should have equal educational and economic opportunities, irrespective of their socio-economic background. It aims to eliminate the impact of morally arbitrary factors like birth class on opportunities.
The difference principle, the second part of the second principle, governs wealth and income distribution. It allows inequalities if they benefit everyone, especially the least advantaged. It requires that any economic inequalities maximize the well-being of the worst-off group.
Consider hypothetical economies A-D and their income distribution across groups:
| Economy | Least-Advantaged Group | Middle Group | Most-Advantaged Group |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | 10,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 |
| B | 12,000 | 30,000 | 80,000 |
| C | 30,000 | 90,000 | 150,000 |
| D | 20,000 | 100,000 | 500,000 |
The difference principle selects Economy C, as it maximizes the income of the least-advantaged group. It permits inequalities that benefit all (relative to A and B) but rejects those that enrich the rich at the expense of the poor (Economy D). It embodies equality-based reciprocity: inequalities must improve everyone’s position from an egalitarian starting point, especially the worst-off.
The difference principle is grounded in the idea that natural talents are undeserved and should be viewed as a common asset for mutual benefit. It allows those with greater talents to benefit, provided it also benefits the less fortunate. It promotes social unity by ensuring that the economy works for everyone’s advantage and that natural endowments are not used to worsen the position of the less fortunate. This contrasts with libertarian or meritocratic ideals, emphasizing a shared fate and reciprocal benefit.
4.4 The Conception of Citizens: Free, Equal, Reasonable, and Rational
Rawls’s principles are justified by his conceptions of citizens and society. He interprets citizens as free in three ways: seeing themselves as self-originating sources of valid claims, independent of specific comprehensive doctrines, and capable of taking responsibility for their lives.
Citizens are equal by virtue of possessing the capacities for social cooperation over a complete life, regardless of variations in skills or talents beyond this threshold.
Rawlsian citizens are both reasonable (possessing a sense of justice, willing to cooperate on fair terms) and rational (possessing a conception of the good, capable of pursuing and revising their values). These are termed the two moral powers.
From this conception of citizens, Rawls derives primary goods: essential for developing and exercising the two moral powers and useful for pursuing diverse conceptions of the good life. These include basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement and occupation, powers of office, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. Justice is concerned with the distribution of these primary goods.
4.5 The Conception of Society: Fairness and Publicity
Rawls’s conception of society is defined by fairness: social institutions must be fair to all cooperating members, regardless of arbitrary characteristics.
Publicity is another key aspect of fairness. In a well-ordered society, principles of justice are publicly known, accepted, and recognized as structuring the basic structure. The justifications for these principles are also publicly accessible. Publicity ensures that principles are not esoteric or masking power relations. Fairness requires transparency and reasoned justification in public political life.
4.6 The Original Position: A Thought Experiment for Justice
The original position is Rawls’s device for translating abstract conceptions of citizens and society into concrete principles of justice. It transforms the question of fair terms of cooperation into: “What terms of cooperation would free and equal citizens agree to under fair conditions?” This agreement-based approach places justice as fairness within the social contract tradition.
The original position is a thought experiment modeling abstract ideas of justice. It embodies Rawls’s conceptions of citizens and society, aiming to yield justified principles that align with considered judgments. It is superior to real-world bargaining, which is influenced by irrelevant factors like power and negotiation skills.
The original position creates a fair scenario where representatives of each citizen, acting solely as free and equal citizens, agree on principles. Fairness and equality are modeled by the symmetrical situation of the parties, where no representative can exert undue influence.
The most distinctive feature is the veil of ignorance. It prevents arbitrary facts about citizens from influencing the agreement. Representatives are deprived of knowledge of their citizens’ race, class, gender, age, talents, and comprehensive doctrines, ensuring impartiality. Information about the specific society’s political system and economic development is also withheld to focus on fundamental principles.
Behind the veil, parties know:
- Citizens have diverse comprehensive doctrines and life plans, and desire primary goods.
- Society operates under moderate scarcity.
- General facts about human social life and uncontroversial scientific conclusions are available.
The veil of ignorance ensures fairness, as no party can favor their particular citizen. Parties rationally seek principles that maximize their citizen’s share of primary goods within this fair framework. The resulting agreement is thus fair to all actual citizens.
The original position also models publicity and other aspects of Rawls’s conceptions, making the hypothetical agreement determinate through assumptions like no envy, risk neutrality, and a final, non-repeatable choice.
4.7 The Argument from the Original Position: Selecting Principles
The argument from the original position has two parts: principle selection and stability check. Rawls focuses on showing that justice as fairness is preferred to utilitarianism. Parties choose between Rawls’s two principles and utilitarian principles.
The first comparison is between Rawls’s principles and the principle of average utility (maximizing average utility). Rawls argues that parties would favor his principles due to the first principle’s guarantee of equal basic liberties.
He posits that maximin reasoning (maximizing the minimum outcome) is rational in this context. Parties prioritize securing the minimum level of primary goods for their citizen, and maximin favors justice as fairness. Average utilitarianism could permit restricting some citizens’ basic liberties for the greater good. Parties would find this intolerable, preferring the guaranteed equal liberties of justice as fairness.
Furthermore, justice as fairness fosters cooperation and mutual respect, removing contentious issues of liberty restriction from the political agenda. Utilitarianism, conversely, could breed suspicion and conflict over policies aimed at maximizing average utility, potentially at the expense of minority rights. The advantages of justice as fairness in securing basic liberties and social harmony are deemed decisive.
The second comparison is between justice as fairness and restricted utility (maximizing average utility with a guaranteed minimum income). This comparison focuses on the difference principle. Maximin reasoning is not central here.
Rawls argues that parties will favor justice as fairness because its principles provide a better basis for enduring cooperation. The difference principle, he argues, demands less of the better-off than restricted utility demands of the worst-off. The difference principle allows inequalities that benefit all, including the least advantaged, fostering reciprocity. Restricted utility, by contrast, might lead those at the minimum income level to feel their interests are sacrificed for the wealthy, potentially leading to cynicism and disengagement.
The difference principle promotes mutual trust and cooperation by embodying economic reciprocity. Parties recognize the benefit of a more harmonious society under justice as fairness.
4.8 The Argument from the Original Position: Stability Check
After principle selection, parties check if a society structured by these principles would be stable. They assess whether citizens growing up under these institutions would develop sufficient willingness to uphold them, forming an enduring overlapping consensus.
Rawls argues that his two principles align with each citizen’s good. They publicly affirm each citizen’s freedom and equality, providing a public basis for self-respect, essential for pursuing life plans confidently. Basic liberties allow sufficient space for diverse conceptions of the good. Economic reciprocity under the difference principle minimizes envy and fosters a sense of shared benefit. Citizens can find satisfaction in collectively maintaining just institutions.
Congruence with citizens’ good suggests a reasonable expectation of citizens developing a desire to act justly. Attachment to beneficial institutions and reciprocal relationships fosters stable allegiance to the principles. Rawls argues that the most stable conception of justice is “perspicuous to our reason, congruent with our good, and rooted not in abnegation but in affirmation of the self” (TJ, 261).
4.9 Just Institutions: The Four-Stage Sequence of Application
The arguments for justice as fairness occur in the first stage of the original position. Here, parties also agree on a principle of just savings for intergenerational justice. Considering fairness to all generations, they choose a principle that may favor a “steady state” economy (zero real growth) after achieving just institutions, rather than endless growth.
Following this, parties proceed through a four-stage sequence to apply these general principles to their specific society. The veil of ignorance gradually thins, revealing more societal information at each stage, allowing for increasingly concrete institutional design.
- Stage 2 (Constitutional Stage): Parties gain information about society’s political culture and development and design a constitution realizing the two principles.
- Stage 3 (Legislative Stage): Parties learn more societal details and agree on legislation within the constitutional framework.
- Stage 4 (Judicial Stage): Parties gain full information and act as judges and administrators, applying legislation to particular cases.
Through this sequence, abstract principles are progressively specified and adapted to societal context. For example, “freedom of thought” evolves into specific rights like free political speech, press freedom, and the right to criticize the government. Basic liberties are refined to harmonize with each other and other values, aiming for a system that best supports citizens’ moral powers and pursuit of their conceptions of the good (PL, 289–371).
At later stages, institutions realizing the fair value of political liberties are specified. Rawls emphasizes the need for public campaign finance, contribution limits, and equal media access to prevent political capture by economic power and ensure equal political opportunity, freeing public deliberation from “the curse of money” (PL, 449).
At the legislative stage, the second principle is implemented through laws governing property, contract, taxation, inheritance, employment, and minimum wages. The goal is to create institutions for education, production, and distribution that realize fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle over time.
Fair equality of opportunity requires proactive policies beyond non-discrimination, including quality education for the less well-off, basic income guarantees, and universal healthcare.
Realizing the difference principle aims to maximize the position of the worst-off group, achievable through adjusting tax rates and exemptions, within a framework of institutions realizing prior principles.
Rawls explicitly rejects the welfare state (JF, 137–40). He argues that welfare-state capitalism fails to ensure sufficient resources for political equality and equal opportunity due to concentrated private economic power, leading to a demoralized underclass. Laissez-faire capitalism is even worse for equality. Socialist command economies, while aiming for equality, risk excessive state power, endangering political equality and basic liberties.
Justice as fairness favors either property-owning democracy or liberal socialism. Property-owning democracy promotes widespread ownership of productive assets and broad access to education and training. Liberal socialism features worker-managed firms. Both aim to empower all citizens, even the least advantaged, to manage their own affairs within a context of significant social and economic equality. The least advantaged are seen not as objects of charity but as those “to whom reciprocity is owed as a matter of basic justice” (JF, 139).
4.10 The Original Position and Political Constructivism: Objectivity and Reasonableness
Rawls presents the original position as a method for achieving reflective equilibrium. Its value is affirmed by its selection of the first principle, aligning with common convictions about basic liberties. Having established credibility, it then guides principle selection in less certain areas like economic justice. It extends and systematizes common judgments about justice. Rawls highlights that the same method justifying basic liberties also leads to more egalitarian economic principles.
The original position is also central to Rawls’s metaethical theory, political constructivism. It provides an account of the objectivity and validity of political judgments. The original position embodies all relevant conceptions of person and society and principles of practical reasoning for judgments about justice. In an overlapping consensus on justice as fairness, it provides a shared public perspective for reasoning about justice. Judgments from this perspective are objectively correct in providing reasons for action, regardless of individual motivations or viewpoints.
Political constructivism does not claim that principles of justice as fairness are true in a metaphysical sense, a concept about which reasonable citizens may disagree. Rather, judgments from the original position are valid or reasonable, offering a basis for shared public justification.
5. The Law of Peoples: Justice in International Relations
Expanding beyond domestic justice, Rawls addresses international relations with the law of peoples, the next stage in his sequence of theories. He assumes that a world state is neither feasible nor desirable, citing Kant’s concern about global despotism or instability. The law of peoples is thus international, guiding a liberal society’s foreign policy towards other societies, both liberal and non-liberal.
Rawls outlines the motivations for the law of peoples: eliminating the major evils of human history – unjust war, oppression, persecution, poverty, and mass atrocities – which he attributes to political injustice. He believes that establishing just or decent domestic institutions globally will eventually eradicate these evils, realizing a “realistic utopia.”
5.1 The International Basic Structure and Principles of the Law of Peoples
Paralleling domestic justice, Rawls posits an international basic structure (LP, 33, 62, 114, 115, 122, 123), subject to coercive enforcement (e.g., international responses to aggression). Principles governing this structure require justification, accommodating greater pluralism among societies than within a liberal society.
Rawls proposes eight principles for the international basic structure:
- Respect for peoples’ freedom and independence.
- Observance of treaties and undertakings.
- Equality of peoples and their agreements.
- Duty of non-intervention (except for grave human rights violations).
- Right to self-defense, no right to war except for self-defense.
- Respect for human rights.
- Specific restrictions in the conduct of war.
- Duty to assist burdened societies. (LP, 37)
These principles largely align with contemporary international law, although Rawls’s list of human rights is more concise. He envisions international organizations like idealized versions of the UN, WTO, and World Bank within this framework.
5.2 Peoples: Liberal and Decent, Not States
The actors in Rawls’s international theory are peoples, not states. “People” is a moralized concept: groups bound by common government, sympathies, and a shared conception of justice. Not all states qualify as peoples.
Peoples, like citizens, are seen as free (politically independent) and equal (deserving of respect). They are reasonable, willing to cooperate fairly with other peoples, and reciprocally tolerant.
Rawls defines the fundamental interests of a people:
- Protecting political independence, territory, and citizen security.
- Maintaining political and social institutions and civic culture.
- Securing self-respect based on history and cultural achievements.
He contrasts peoples with states, which are motivated by territorial expansion, religious conversion, power domination, and relative economic gains. Peoples are not states and may view state-like actors as international outlaws.
Peoples are categorized as liberal peoples (internally just, adhering to political liberalism) and decent peoples (not fully liberal, but well-ordered enough for international society). Decent societies may be organized around a single comprehensive doctrine and may not be democratic, but they are non-aggressive and respect certain basic norms.
Rawls illustrates decency with decent hierarchical societies, exemplified by “Kazanistan.” These societies secure core human rights and have a decent consultation hierarchy, where government consults with representatives of all social groups, justifies laws, and respects emigration rights. While Kazanistan favors Islam and limits high office to Muslims, non-Muslims practice freely and are not subject to arbitrary discrimination. Rawls considers Kazanistan a decent, well-ordered people deserving of toleration and equal treatment.
5.3 International Toleration and the Role of Human Rights
Liberal peoples tolerate decent peoples and treat them as equals, respecting national self-determination and diverse paths to societal order. Criticism or pressure to become liberal may be counterproductive. Public reason applies to international relations, requiring justifications for foreign policy based on the law of peoples, avoiding parochial reasons.
Toleration of decent peoples is largely based on their guarantee of core human rights: subsistence, security, property, formal equality, freedom from slavery and genocide, and some liberty of conscience (though not necessarily democratic participation). These rights are considered minimal conditions for meaningful social cooperation and are protected by all well-ordered societies.
Human rights set limits to international toleration. Societies guaranteeing these rights are immune from intervention. Those violating human rights become outlaws, potentially subject to sanctions or military intervention.
5.4 The International Original Position: Agreement Among Peoples
The international original position mirrors the domestic one, asking: “What terms of cooperation would free and equal peoples (liberal and decent) agree to under fair conditions?” It builds the conception of peoples into its design, restricting reasons for favoring international principles.
Representatives of each people, behind a veil of ignorance (lacking knowledge of their people’s size, resources, or strength), agree on principles for the international basic structure, aiming to best serve their people’s fundamental interests.
Rawls argues that the parties would choose the eight principles listed earlier. Starting from equality and independence, there is no reason to introduce inequalities among peoples beyond functional distinctions in cooperative organizations. International utilitarian principles are rejected, as no people would sacrifice its fundamental interests for global utility maximization.
Following principle selection, stability is checked. Rawls argues that the law of peoples affirms the good of peoples, fostering trust and cooperation as they abide by these principles. International stability is thus stability for the right reasons, not a mere modus vivendi.
Rawls cites the democratic peace theory as empirical support, noting the historical tendency of democracies to avoid war with each other. He attributes this to liberal societies being “satisfied,” lacking imperial ambitions and able to secure needs through trade. Liberal and decent peoples have no inherent reasons for aggressive war, enabling a lasting peace.
After agreeing on principles, parties further specify them in a process analogous to the domestic four-stage sequence.
5.5 Non-Ideal Theory: Addressing Outlaw States and Burdened Societies
The law of peoples includes non-ideal provisions for situations of non-compliance and inability to cooperate. Principles 4-8 address these.
Outlaw states violate international norms through aggression or human rights abuses. The law of peoples permits self-defense and coercive action to stop human rights violations. Military action must adhere to just war principles, avoiding civilian targeting except in dire circumstances. The goal is to bring outlaw states into compliance with the law of peoples and eventually into international society.
Burdened societies face conditions hindering their ability to establish just or decent institutions, often due to lack of resources or dysfunctional structures. The international community has a duty of assistance (principle 8) to help them become well-ordered, focusing on strengthening basic structure and political culture. This duty is a significant departure from current international law, requiring greater global commitment to poverty reduction and state-building.
5.6 Reconciliation and the Realistic Utopia of Peace
Rawls envisions a peaceful and cooperative international order of liberal and decent peoples, jointly addressing aggression, protecting human rights, and assisting struggling nations.
Compared to grander cosmopolitan theories, Rawls’s international theory has limited scope. It does not aim for global democracy or address international economic inequalities beyond assistance to burdened societies. Individual suffering due to misfortune or spiritual emptiness are outside its purview.
The practical goal is eliminating major historical evils: war, oppression, persecution, poverty, and mass atrocities. While limited, this vision is also utopian, affirming the possibility of a just and peaceful future. It counters cynicism by highlighting existing decency, reciprocity, and reasonableness, suggesting their potential for growth. Rawls argues that “by showing how the social world may realize the features of a realistic utopia, political philosophy provides a long-term goal of political endeavor, and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do today” (LP, 128).
