John Stockwell stands as a significant figure in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), distinguished as the highest-ranking official to publicly resign and openly critique the agency’s operations. His career within the CIA spanned thirteen years, culminating in positions of considerable responsibility. He directed an intelligence-gathering post during the Vietnam War and served as the task-force commander for the CIA’s clandestine war in Angola in 1975 and 1976. Prior to his resignation, Stockwell was awarded the Medal of Merit, a testament to his service before his dramatic departure. His seminal book, “In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story,” published in 1978, became an international bestseller, further amplifying his voice and revelations about the inner workings of the CIA and U.S. foreign policy.
Stockwell’s insider perspective provides a rare and critical examination of the CIA’s covert actions and their global impact. His testimony before Congress offered detailed accounts of specific instances of deception and manipulation by the agency. He highlighted the extensive scale of covert operations, far beyond isolated incidents, revealing a systemic pattern of interventionism that he argues is detrimental to both U.S. interests and global stability.
In his public addresses and writings, John Stockwell delves into what he terms the “United States national security syndrome.” He meticulously dissects the mechanisms through which the U.S. government, often through the CIA, manipulates the press and public opinion to justify its foreign policy objectives. Stockwell connects these manipulative tactics to contemporary issues, such as U.S. involvement in El Salvador and Nicaragua, drawing parallels to historical interventions like the Korean and Vietnam Wars. He emphasizes that his analysis is grounded in publicly available records, including congressional testimonies, reports from the Senate Church Committee, and declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, encouraging independent verification of his claims.
Stockwell’s background is noteworthy. He identifies himself as coming from a profoundly conservative upbringing in South and East Texas, shaped by Marine Corps training. This background initially instilled in him a firm belief in the narratives of the Cold War and the necessity of the CIA’s mission to project American values and counter communism globally. He joined the CIA with genuine enthusiasm, aiming to contribute to what he perceived as a noble cause.
However, his six years of service in Africa marked a turning point in his understanding. Witnessing firsthand the CIA’s operations in places like Burundi, Stockwell began to question the agency’s effectiveness and the justification for its actions. He observed that many interventions did not genuinely serve U.S. national security interests but instead involved bribery and corruption, ultimately damaging the United States’ image abroad. A pivotal moment occurred during a conversation with Larry Devlin, a senior CIA officer known for his role in the overthrow and assassination of Patrice Lumumba in Congo. When Stockwell voiced his concerns about the lack of purpose and ethical compromises he witnessed, Devlin dismissed them as naive and instructed him to defer to the “big picture” understood by those in Washington.
Despite this initial discouragement, Stockwell’s doubts persisted. Upon returning to Washington, he found that his concerns were shared by others within the State Department. A classified internal report, known as the Macomber report, corroborated his observations, concluding that the CIA’s activities in Africa were largely unjustified and ineffective in advancing U.S. national security. This report suggested that the CIA’s presence and methods, including bribery and corruption, were counterproductive.
Stockwell’s career took a more serious turn when he was assigned to Vietnam during the ceasefire period of 1973-1975, a ceasefire that existed in name only. He witnessed intense fighting and the devastating consequences of the ongoing conflict. The stark reality of the war, exemplified by the ambush and slaughter of 300 young men, deeply affected him. Furthermore, his assignment required him to work with a sadistic South Vietnamese police chief, known for torturing prisoners. When Stockwell reported these atrocities to his superiors, he was met with bureaucratic indifference. The CIA prioritized the post’s operational importance over ethical considerations, effectively condoning the police chief’s brutality and warning Stockwell against any display of “moral fiber” that might jeopardize his career. This experience forced Stockwell to confront the moral compromises inherent in the CIA’s operations and the agency’s willingness to overlook human rights abuses in pursuit of its objectives. He drew a direct parallel between this situation and the CIA’s contemporary relationship with death squads in El Salvador, highlighting a consistent pattern of collaboration with abusive regimes.
Further compounding his disillusionment was the pervasive corruption within the CIA and the South Vietnamese military. Stockwell discovered that CIA officers were prohibited from reporting on the widespread corruption in the South Vietnamese army, even though it severely undermined its fighting capability. This corruption was rampant, with officers inflating troop numbers to pocket salaries, selling weapons and supplies to the Viet Cong, and using military resources for personal gain. The South Vietnamese army, riddled with corruption, proved incapable of resisting the North Vietnamese offensive in 1975, leading to the swift collapse of South Vietnam and a humiliating defeat for the United States. Stockwell witnessed firsthand how this systemic corruption, deliberately ignored by the CIA, contributed to the disastrous outcome of the Vietnam War.
Despite his growing reservations, John Stockwell accepted the assignment to lead the CIA’s secret war in Angola in 1975. He saw this as an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of U.S. national security decision-making at the highest levels, as the task-force commander role placed him on a subcommittee of the National Security Council (NSC). He hoped to find evidence of wise and informed leadership guiding these critical operations. However, his experience in the NSC subcommittee shattered this expectation. Instead of encountering insightful strategists, he found senior officials, including ambassadors, displaying apathy and disengagement, even sleeping through crucial meetings where decisions were made that had life-and-death consequences for people in Africa.
Stockwell’s investigation into the Angola operation revealed a pattern of systematic deception and manipulation. He discovered that the U.S. government, through the CIA, deliberately lied to its own citizens, the international community, and even Congress about its involvement in Angola. A significant portion of his task force was dedicated to propaganda, crafting a false narrative of Soviet and Cuban aggression to justify U.S. intervention. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Patrick Moynihan, repeatedly presented false statements to the UN Security Council, blaming the conflict on the Soviet Union and Cuba while concealing the U.S.’s active role in escalating the war. Similarly, CIA Director William Colby provided 36 briefings to Congress that were riddled with perjury, misrepresenting the CIA’s relationship with South Africa, the use of mercenaries, and the extent of U.S. involvement.
The consequences of this intervention in Angola were devastating. Stockwell estimates that the CIA’s actions directly led to the deaths of 10,000 Africans. Despite the CIA’s efforts, the MPLA, the initially targeted faction, ultimately prevailed, solidifying their control over Angola. The intervention also had significant negative repercussions for the U.S., aligning it with the apartheid regime of South Africa in the eyes of the world, a morally and politically damaging association. Furthermore, the use of mercenaries, and the exposure of U.S. lies, severely undermined U.S. credibility and international standing. Ironically, despite the anti-communist rationale for the intervention, post-conflict Angola maintained economic ties with the U.S., with Gulf Oil continuing operations and employing U.S. technicians protected by Cuban soldiers, highlighting the flawed premises of the entire operation.
John Stockwell’s experiences in Angola served as the catalyst for his resignation from the CIA and his decision to go public with his criticisms. He felt compelled to inform the American people about the truth of U.S. covert actions in Angola and Vietnam, leading him to write “In Search of Enemies.” The book’s success allowed him to reach a wide audience, including appearances on major news programs like “60 Minutes,” and to testify before Congress, further amplifying his message.
Following his resignation, Stockwell embarked on a personal journey of education and investigation. Having been indoctrinated with anti-communist ideology throughout his CIA career, he sought to understand the realities of communist societies firsthand. He traveled to Cuba, Hungary, Jamaica, and Grenada, engaging with leaders and citizens, and reading extensively on U.S. national security policy. These experiences further solidified his critique of U.S. foreign policy and the CIA’s role in perpetuating global instability.
Stockwell emphasizes the vast scale of CIA covert actions, estimating between 10,000 to 20,000 since 1961, with potentially millions of casualties. He points to specific examples, such as the 1965 Indonesian coup, where the CIA itself estimated 800,000 deaths, and the covert actions in China and Vietnam that he argues directly led to the Korean and Vietnam Wars, resulting in millions more deaths. He argues that these interventions disproportionately victimize people in the developing world, far more often civilians than actual communists or threats to U.S. national security.
A key aspect of Stockwell’s critique is the CIA’s systematic manipulation of information and public opinion. He details how the agency engages in propaganda, plants false stories in the media, and censors dissenting voices. He cites examples of government censorship of books by former CIA officers, legal actions against whistleblowers, and efforts to muzzle government employees. He warns of increasingly draconian measures, such as pre-emptive strike bills and the establishment of detention centers, which he sees as threats to civil liberties within the United States itself.
Stockwell connects the CIA’s covert actions to a broader “politics of paranoia,” arguing that fear and manufactured threats are used to justify excessive military spending and interventionist foreign policies. He points to the vast profits generated by the arms industry as a key driver of this perpetual state of conflict. He criticizes the erosion of democratic values and the increasing concentration of power in the hands of a “power elite” that prioritizes its own interests over the well-being of the American people and global peace.
Despite the grim picture he paints, John Stockwell’s message is ultimately a call to action. He emphasizes the importance of public awareness, education, and citizen engagement in challenging government secrecy and demanding accountability. He urges individuals to educate themselves by reading books and independent sources of information, to question official narratives, and to resist the manipulation of fear and propaganda. Drawing inspiration from the anti-Vietnam War movement, he believes that public pressure can force a change in U.S. foreign policy. He advocates for international cooperation and a shift away from militarism towards peaceful and just solutions to global challenges. Stockwell’s legacy is one of courage and conscience, a high-ranking insider who risked his career and reputation to expose the dark side of U.S. covert operations and to advocate for a more ethical and transparent foreign policy.
